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This thesis draws upon anthropological fieldwork carried out in 2010–11 in 
the Tikveš wine region of the Republic of Macedonia. Unlike most other 
countries of the former Eastern Bloc, Macedonia’s post-socialist transition 
was held off due to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The 
result is that a slower, more subtle shift has occurred there yet it has been one 
guided by neoliberal principles, thus significantly altering the livelihoods of 
the country’s inhabitants.  
My research in Tikveš illustrates the role privatisation (privatizacija, 
a term known and used locally) is playing in the region’s transition from 
government to private ownership and production, specifically in the wine 
industry. Although the quality and selection of wine in Tikveš has improved, 
the lives of the independent grape growers and their families have not. 
Instead, the growers have been subject to the leverage of the winery 
owners—who have reduced and delayed payments to them—while a 
neoliberalised government has taken a laissez-faire approach to market 
regulation.  
Combined with EU accession development policy, this thesis 
therefore focuses on how individuals in the region are both protesting and 
adapting to the change at hand through rearranging their livelihoods and 
work. Indeed, grape growers have been left with a surplus of grapes and a 
dearth of income and certainty, inciting some to produce vast quantities of 
homemade rakija (brandy) while others replace, abandon or sell their 
vineyards. New ways of bringing in income, such as selling one’s brandy, 
produce or homemade goods are also modes of survival. Yet many claim that 
is all they are doing, merely ‘surviving, not living’. 
An argument is thus made that there is a return to the peasantry. Such 
repeasantisation is a process whereby the focus of economic activity 
becomes further centred on households and the pooling of family resources 
drawn from working the land and engaging in non-professional types of 
work. This form of repeasantisation is essentially that increasing numbers of 
individuals are not only working their small plots of land to provide produce 
for their family and for sale, but that in replacing the employment and 
income once provide by the state they are engaging in petty trade and 
precarious employment when it can be found. The thesis is comprised of six 
chapters, with an introduction and conclusion as well.  
 
(KEY WORDS: post-socialism, transition, privatisation, development, 
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This thesis has been long in the making. My initial interest in a doctorate 
came about in 2008, when I returned to live (after serving there in the Peace 
Corps) and marry in Macedonia. Although my initial thoughts and interest 
were in continuing with my MA research on ethno-nationalism, marriage to 
my wife, Irena, in December 2008 and frequent visits to her hometown 
meant that I changed my research focus prior to evening beginning my 
project. That is, not long into 2009 I realised the severity of the agrarian 
transition occurring in my wife’s home region, Tikveš.  
I would therefore firstly like to thank my supervisor, Glenn Bowman, 
who admitted me to Kent to supervise one topic, but then ended up with an 
entirely different one on his hands. I would like to thank him for this, as well 
as his advice and patience in what has been a lengthy project and fieldwork 
research write-up.  
I would also like to thank my wife, Irena, for her suggestions prior to 
and during my fieldwork, and unquestioning support of me throughout this 
lengthy process. I dragged her to reside in England twice for doctoral 
obligations, and then moved us to the US in 2012 to continue with my 
academic work, research and writing. I thank her because hardly a word of 
complaint have I ever heard from her. In fact, she along with our daughter 
Vera (born during my fieldwork), have been enthusiastic for the adventure 
that being an anthropologist brings, even if it has meant a lack of stability 
and financial security at times.  
 Financially speaking, I must therefore thank the School of 
Anthropology and Conservation at the University of Kent for their bestowing 
upon me a Graduate Teaching Assistantship, and to American Councils for 
their awarding me a Title VIII doctoral research grant for the bulk of my 
fieldwork in 2011. Without this funding the continuation of my doctorate 
would not have been possible.  
 There are many individuals who have given me not only sound 
feedback and thoughts on my research, but general advice as well. In the UK 
and Europe these include Daniela Peluso, who has been a friend and mentor; 
David Henig, who gave me the wise advice to write my thesis through 
conference and journal papers; Dimitrios Thessolopoulos and the feedback 
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received in his graduate research seminars as well as thesis examination; 
Deema Kaneff, who provided the most extensive feedback on my entire 
thesis, given her role as my external examiner; Michael Costello and Oana 
Ivan, among other ‘SACians’ who provided a sense of camaraderie and 
intellectual stimulation during my residence in Canterbury, including Friday 
night pub outings. I would also like to thank Chris Hann, for welcoming and 
accommodating me at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in 
July 2010, and providing early theoretical guidance then and throughout with 
his own research.   
In the US, I would like to thank many scholars, but primarily Richard 
Wilk and Eduardo Brondizio at Indiana University, the former introducing 
me into the world of Food Studies he oversees, and the latter having brought 
me back to IU as a Research Associate with the Department of Anthropology 
in 2012; Croatian language classmate and fellow anthropology doctoral 
student Heather Meiers, who provided initial feedback and many thoughts 
and conversations in summer 2012; the organisers of the Soyuz and Society 
for Economic Anthropology (SEA) conferences, as well as those who 
accepted my papers for their panels at the last two AAA meetings in 2012 
and 2013, and the many individuals I met at such events. In particular, these 
include John Borneman, Diana Mincyte, Yuson Jung, Ronan Hervouet, 
Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, Peter Larsen, among others. I would also like to 
thank those who edited or provided significant feedback on various papers, 
including Laura Thompson and Jessica Hardin (Student Anthropologist), as 
well as Andrew Asher (Anthropology of East Europe Review).  
 Last but not least, as written in my dedication, this thesis and the 
information and experience relayed within it would not have been possible 
without the gracious hospitality provided by my wife’s family, and the 
neighbours, friends, informant-interlocutors and random acquaintances I met 
throughout my fieldwork in Tikveš. Their thoughts and experiences helped 
re-shape my understanding of their shifting conditions, plight and thus my 






I’ve often been accused of making anthropology into literature, but 
anthropology is also field research. Writing is central to it. –Clifford Geertz 
 
I call upon this quote in order to strengthen the case for the style of narrative 
ethnography which follows in this thesis. I call upon minimal theory in it, 
instead relaying the subjective experiences of not only my informants but 
myself. This exercise in reflexivity comes from my insider-outsider 
perspectives, which at times complement and at other times clash with each 
other. That said, the testimonies in this work are but a fraction of those I 
heard, observed and sensed while in the field. They come from some 500 
pages of largely typed field-notes, most of which did not make it into the 
text. Nonetheless, I hope that this thesis evokes and conveys a sense of the 
magnitude of the Tikveš region’s ongoing transition.   
As for the ethnographic material I do include, I call upon James Scott 
(1985) in explaining why I paraphrase at times. As Scott found, ‘human 
subjects often speak in shorthand, with similes and metaphors that they have 
no need to clarify to their neighbours but which sound strange and 
incomprehensible to an outsider (p138)’. I found the same, and have 
therefore sought to synthesise the information I received in order to 
demonstrate a particular trope in the discourse surrounding the wine region’s 
transformation.  
I incorporate myself into the text more than some anthropologists 
might because not only do I seek to adhere to a form of ‘radical empiricism’ 
(Jackson 1997, and which is defined in the Introduction) but because my 
understanding of the country is based on lived experience—five years of it. 
Further, my incorporation into the community extends beyond hospitality: by 
marrying a Macedonian I became someone else, a son-in-law (zet), and this 
defined my identity, as I was not just a foreign anthropologist. In fact, the 
latter aspects of identity were largely moot because my identity was based on 
which family I was married to—my affines and affiliations. It was always 
one of the first questions to come up when I was immediately seen as this 
‘stranger/foreigner’ (stranec) but one who seemed local, in terms of speaking 
the language and asking questions that could be answered. For indeed, I 
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made my questions not so specific as to narrow responses and make 
informants feel they were revealing something, but broad so that they did 
reveal something through monologues about their situation. They told me 
their stories—about their past, their families, and their losses. Those stories, 
within the larger framework for this project, I have thus shared when 
appropriate.   
Going back into the past, I would like to add my whole reason for 
studying anthropology as an undergraduate at Indiana University (1998-
2002) was a summer spent in Alaska in 1999. Seeking escape, in May of that 
year I flew off to Anchorage and wandered down into the Chugach 
Mountains on the Kenai Peninsula. Working at a fishing lodge on the Kenai 
River, I spent my free time exploring the wilderness and under-going a self-
imposed rite de passage. This affected me greatly and led me to the 
realisation that one of my goals in life was to be, among other things, an 
‘observer’. This I noted in a journal entry from July 1999, and I thenceforth 
decided to seek out patterns in society and history.  
It was therefore upon my return from Alaska three months later that I 
discovered anthropology as an academic discipline, and changed course in 
my academic studies (from biology and chemistry). For anthropology to me 
has assumed the place of traditional philosophy, and is about understanding 
humanity and the complex yet also simple differences in people. It is about 
pointing out the obvious and calling a spade a spade, but also explaining a 
reason or rationalisation for the custom, behaviour or tradition among a 
group of people, and what forces may be causing shifts to them. Last but not 
least, anthropology is about sharing the experiences of my informants and 
myself from a foreign location such as Macedonia, in order for the reader to 
broaden their horizons and knowledge about that country, land and its 
peoples.  
This thesis therefore conveys my understanding of the processes 
surrounding the privatisation of formerly socially-owned Yugoslav 
enterprises, and the ensuing ‘development’ of Macedonia’s premier wine 
region. I debate the extent to which it is appropriate to refer to this period of 
transition as one to free-market democracy and all that entails, and instead 
demonstrate how particular aspects of the currently lived world there are 
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beyond post-socialism. In fact, the lived experiences of Tikveš grape growers 
and their families fall more in line with Foucault’s notions of biopolitics-
cum-neoliberalism, such as Collier (2011) demonstrates: theirs is a world of 
uncertainty, deference within various fluid bureaucratic and societal power 
structures, and a possible return to a peasant form of existence (in taking that 
the peasantry and self-sustenance is the base form of economy.)   
Any shortcomings in this text I claim full responsibility for, as its 
writing was hindered by full-time employment at Indiana University since 
August 2012. Nonetheless, I hope readers will find it ethnographically rich 
despite its personal tone, and informative about a region and country little 
studied outside of the trope of (ethno)nationalism and post-conflict studies 
surrounding the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 














A NOTE ABOUT THE MACEDONIAN LANGUAGE 
A few notes on the use of the Latin alphabet variants of Cyrillic letters and 
their sounds. Without complicating things and including the Cyrillic, I 
include only Latin letters in this text and thus seek to clarify the differences 
between ‘c’ and ‘č’, ‘s’ and ‘š’, and ‘z’ and ‘ž’, as well as what constitutes 
the sound made by the letters ‘j’ and ‘y’ in English compared with 
Macedonian. They are the following: 
• ‘c’ makes the sound ‘ts’, as in cats, whereas ‘č’ makes the sound ‘ch’ as 
in chat 
• ‘s’ makes the sounds ‘ss’, as in sister, whereas ‘š’ makes the sound ‘sh’ 
as in shoe 
• ‘z’ makes the sound ‘zz’, as in zoo, whereas ‘ž’ makes the sound ‘zh’ as 
in casualty 
• The sound made by the letter ‘j’ in English (as in ‘John’) is written as 
‘dz’ in Latinised Macedonian; eg, the red pepper condiment pindzur 
could be written in English as pinjur  
• The sound made by the letter ‘y’ in English is written as ‘j’ in Latinised 



















This introductory chapter will discuss the project setting and history of the 
region and country in which it took place. Yet to begin, it explains the 
purpose, theme and contribution of this thesis. The purpose of this thesis is to 
describe the constantly transitioning state of affairs occurring in the Republic 
of Macedonia, and as a project it makes a contribution to a number of 
anthropological subfields, and overall is an ethnographically inspired work 
with a strong empirical foundation. Although change is constant everywhere 
in life, Macedonia has experienced a unique transformation in the last two 
decades. The transition from a Yugoslav, state-led economy to a ‘free-
market’ one has been significant, and has altered the nation’s psyche and the 
livelihoods of the people living there.  
More specifically then, this thesis is an examination of the 
neoliberalisation of the wine industry and the predicaments faced by grape 
growers in the Tikveš wine region of Macedonia. This is done through a 
detailed and in depth ethnographic exploration, which provides a good case 
study for reflecting and understanding the privatisation of the Macedonian 
economy from a local point of view. In addition, the thesis makes visible the 
role of the family and informal networks in ameliorating the consequences of 
privatisation. This information can encourage an appreciation of the local 
parameters and experiences of the transition to unregulated capitalism in 
societies unaccustomed to neoliberal economic competition.  
By focusing on wine production more explicitly, regional viticulture 
and the privatisation of land ownership are explained in the latter half of the 
thesis. What follows is an examination of the neoliberalisation of the wine 
industry, the emergence of a ‘wine mafia’, and the perception of pre- and 
post-capitalist structures of corruption during the transition to privatisation. 
These themes are further explored by focusing on the discontinuities that 
emerge from EU policies, and in particular the implementation of the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for Rural Development. What 
follows is the reaction to this transition, with a look at the efforts of the local 
inhabitants and grape growers and how they manage to survive in an unstable 
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and unsupportive economic environment. Additionally, the role of local 
networks—based on kinship, friendship and neighbourhood—illustrate the 
support that wider institutions fail to provide.  
The thesis as a whole provides a case study of the post-socialist 
transition to privatisation that makes a valuable addition to the rather limited 
anthropological literature of the particular region. In this respect, it makes a 
small contribution to the anthropology of post-socialism, and economic 
anthropology more generally. Yet more importantly, it makes a contribution 
to the anthropology of Macedonia specifically, which has been particularly 
thin and dominated by the issue of national identity (at the expense of 
ignoring local social life). The thesis comes to fill this particular gap of 
knowledge, providing valuable ethnographic information that will be of 
service to future researchers working in this area from anthropological or 
interdisciplinary social scientific perspective, particularly those focusing on 
themes related to identity, citizenship, and economic, political and thus 
power structures. Further, through its discussion of neoliberalism, 
privatisation, EU accession, and state legitimacy, it highlights the existential 
crisis of a young nation seeking to create a new identity for itself, but finding 
such a path hindered by a crisis full of contradictions, ambiguity and 
disinformation. 
To clarify its use of the terms transition and transformation, the former 
is the process of shifting from one economic and political system to another, 
whereas the latter is the result of such a transition. Thus the transition is 
officially characterised by the shift to a ‘free-market democracy’, along with 
increased uncertainty and inequality for the majority of Macedonians. In the 
wine region, this has been predominantly seen in the state’s disconnection 
from the wine industry. All of this though is transformative, affecting the 
behaviour, attitudes and perceptions of the people living there.    
 
Historical considerations 
The Republic of Macedonia is but a kernel of the territory of the Balkan 
Peninsula yet the twenty year-old nation-state is a rich and flavourful 
‘mosaic’ of peoples, their history and identity, and the places they inhabit in 
their mountainous country. Macedonia has been conquered (and divided) so 
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many times that explaining its inhabitants requires a good understanding of 
history. For the anthropologist, such knowledge can be enlightening. On the 
other hand, history can be overwhelming, full of bias and thus distracting. 
My most vivid early memory shortly after arriving in Macedonia in 2002 was 
of my friend’s host-father1 shouting at us (naturally to make us better 
understand) ‘Five-hundred years we were under the Turks, 500 years!’2 
Given our poor knowledge of the language, he slowly counted the centuries 
and said how when the Turks came America did not exist, and they only left 
after the 1912-13 Balkans Wars and World War I—a discourse I have heard 
several times over the ensuing years.  
While those first two years of living in Macedonia were full of stories 
and historical explanations, it took returning some years later (summer 2006, 
then more permanently from August 2008) and reading the history for myself 
to realise that some of the things I had been told were not exactly accurate, 
and some were possibly not true at all. I delve further into the country’s 
history elsewhere in this thesis, but my point here is that what both citizens 
and foreigners are taught or told may not necessarily reflect the reality of a 
place, its people and their history. On the one hand this can mean we 
anthropologists receive false information, yet more importantly we can take 
this presentation of history as representative of the nation-state, and its 
perceptions and intentions. Indeed, as the state functions autonomously yet 
with great effect upon its inhabitants, both it and its citizens are actors in a 
semi-scripted production. Seeking to create a sense of authenticity, taught 
(and learned) history is not merely the lesson of school-books but is subject 
to great political manipulation, and in my fieldwork it was frequently 
mentioned when comparing contemporary Macedonia with its colourful past.  
Therefore, perhaps one could write anthropologically about small-
town life in Macedonia without tying the local community to the national 
government, to politics, to its Yugoslav or Ottoman past, and to its linkages 
not only within the country and region but to the European and global 
economies. However, I do not see how it would be possible to avoid 
                                                 
1 As a US Peace Corps volunteer, I lived with a host-family, where the man of the house is 
one’s host-father, the woman of the house one’s host-mother, etc.  
2 Pet-sto (500) godini pod Turcite! 
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connecting Tikveš villagers to their contemporary state or recent past (as in, 
the last few decades and century). The Euro-centric world and its particular 
millenarian philosophy of Marxism, which gave rise to the unique form of 
Marxism-Leninism then Titoism in Yugoslavia, coupled with the Ottoman 
legacy has become as much a part of the identity and history of today’s 
Macedonians as are their own ‘traditions’ and local histories. Yet I attempt in 
this thesis to combine both the imagined past and convoluted present in order 
to explain contemporary Macedonia—who its people are and how they have 
come to this point.  
In fact, things are often cyclical: market behaviour for example, from 
the ability to open a store to the right to hire labour shows how past and 
present, although ruptured during socialism, have met again. But what 
separates the market of yesterday from today is a complicated vortex of 
history and the opportunities that came and went throughout it. From Roman 
times onward, Tikveš lay near the Via Egnatia corridor—the road heading 
southeast from the Albanian port of Durrës (Drač) on the Adriatic Sea, 
through the mountains into and across southwest Macedonia into what is 
modern day Greece, before moving eastward to Istanbul. In Macedonia, the 
road turned south at Bitola (Manastir) but a major offshoot passed through 
Tikveš and went along the ‘Black River’ (Crna Reka), meeting the Vardar 
River at the archaeological site of Stobi. Artefacts found at Stobi and its 
surroundings indicate millennia-old wine production, trade and 
consumption3. Altogether, agriculture and viticulture have therefore long 
played a role in the Tikveš economy and obviously will continue to do so in 
the foreseeable future.  
Culturally, Macedonia has been a diverse melting pot, with Romans, 
Greeks, Bulgars, Huns, Celts, Illyrians and Slavs, among others, mixing there 
since the first millennium AD, and various tribes living there for millennia 
before that. More recently, with the onset of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th 
century, the Sultan invited the Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain to settle 
                                                 
3 Stobi is not only near the Tikveš wine-town of Gradsko but is now the name of one of the 
largest wineries in the country, making it a heavy-weight contender in the local political and 
economic scene—the winery has sought local influence and through sponsorship, taken the 
place of the (in)famous Tikveš Winery in sponsoring the annual grape harvest and wine 
festival every September (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3). 
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in the Macedonian port city of Salonica and throughout the young empire. As 
trade flourished in the Balkans, the region became even more diverse, with 
Jews and Muslims settling and prospering in the region’s larger towns and 
cities. Indeed, before the 20th century’s world wars, there were sizable if not 
predominant Jewish populations in the Macedonian cities of Salonica4, 
Skopje, Štip and Bitola, and given Ottoman rule and conversion of local 
populations, Muslims made up significant portions of towns and cities as 
well.5  
Yet many of the above were traders, artisans and townspeople, 
whereas the countryside was comprised of a predominantly Slavic, Christian 
peasantry who only came into towns to take up artisan crafts in the 19th 
century. Rural land in Ottoman Macedonia existed for centuries in small to 
large fiefdoms, which had been parcelled out to the Ottoman Sultan’s 
nobility near these Slavic villages (and labour). This included the famous 
çiflik, which functioned as a plantation, with Macedonian peasants 
conducting the labour as part of their tithe to the state. According to Adanir 
(1989), the main problem with these though was a shortage of labour and the 
fact that peasants’ small plots were better cultivated and more productive 
than the commercially oriented yet poorly managed çiflik; perhaps early 
evidence of a form of resistance and utilisation of Scott’s ‘weapons of the 
weak’ (1985). 
Regardless, it is worth noting that the empire saw drastic changes due 
to international trade competition by the mid-19th century, raising the stakes 
in commercial production and shifting it as a result.6 As historian Andrew 
Rossos writes of competition with the US and India:  
Macedonia’s agrarian sector was too backward and inefficient to 
withstand the foreign challenge. After the American Civil War ended in 
1865, Macedonia could not compete with cheaper and better US and 
                                                 
4 As historian Mark Mazower writes in his text on Salonica, before WWI the city was 
predominantly Jewish, followed in decreasing size by Muslims (Turks), Greeks and Slavs.   
5 Their histories are full of tragedy: the [Turkish] Muslims were largely expelled after WWI 
with the great Greek-Ottoman population exchanges as well as the onset of Bulgarian and 
Serbian rule in Vardar Macedonia (today’s Republic), and the Jews were deported in March 
1943 and eventually murdered in Nazi concentration camps.   
6 For example, with increasing American and Asian textile competition and demand for 
tobacco, the Empire cut back on cotton production and began growing tobacco industriously 
in the 19th century in Macedonia. Salonica is still a large outlet for tobacco, shipping 
Macedonian tobacco (from Prilep) abroad.  
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Indian cotton and grain. The Ottoman state did nothing either to improve 
crops or to stimulate production. Indeed, burdensome, unfair, and 
arbitrary taxation…held the sector back. Peasants had no incentives to 
produce more: they were turning to subsistence and worked only enough 
land to feed their own families. There was no tax on uncultivated lands, 
and so only one-fifth of Macedonia’s arable land was under 
cultivation—the rest was pasture (2008, p71).  
 
Rosso also discusses changes in the early 19th century. Although Greek, 
Vlach and Jewish merchants still predominated (along with Muslims, of 
course), Slavic Macedonians migrated into towns and took up artisan work. 
In the 1830s in particular, major towns doubled if not tripled in size. This 
included my town, Kavadarci, which had three thousand inhabitants at the 
time. Livestock and textile trade fairs (panaguri)7 became major trade 
events, which allowed Macedonians to create business connections 
throughout the empire. Some merchant families even had offices in larger 
cities—Salonica, Belgrade or Vienna. European powers thus took an interest 
in the region, helping the empire to build a railroad through it. Of course, this 
benefited Europeans more than citizens of the Ottoman lands, as the Balkans 
became a ‘virtual economic colony, a source of raw materials and a dumping 
ground for agricultural surpluses and manufactured goods’ (ibid). Evidence 
suggests that the region’s economies stagnated with such competition, yet 
despite the absence of ‘foreign capitalists and investors’ and the small chance 
of a Macedonian town or village directly joining the capitalist world system, 
petty commerce flourished in local marketplaces, making them the focal 
points of social life. And to some extent they still are, as the Macedonian 
saying ‘two women and you have a market’8 rings as true as ever. But a 
market of what and for whom remains the question. 
Clearly the transition has created power struggles, resentment and left 
resources to be battled over, yet I consider kinship and the role of extended 
family a significant factor which has allowed individuals to survive and stay 
on their feet despite the various challenges they have faced in recent years. 
Indeed, I have found in my married life in Macedonia (since 2008) that 
kinship and the connections that come from it are paramount to survival. 
                                                 
7 Which are still common today and usually occur in the spring and autumn. 
8 Dve ženi, imaš pazar 
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Although socialism cut down on family size (making as a standard an 
average of two children9), family plays a significant role, for better or for 
worse, in the opportunities they have. From getting good meat at the 
butchers, to manoeuvring through bureaucratic structures, to getting into the 
right school or university, family and the connections it brings trumps all.   
What is interesting is how this plays into local power structures. A 
well-known family may appear to have more resources, thus individuals may 
express deference to and patronise them. Yet as is commonly noted of the 
well-off in the West, they are in fact less likely to be charitable and share 
their ‘wealth’. Therefore, they are respected because of the authority and 
connection their resources command, yet this defies economic logic given 
that their wealth is in fact unlikely to benefit the less fortunate. Of course this 
depends on how we define wealth, an issue I address in Chapter 6 when 
considering what local economies and their goods are comprised of, and 
what the local ‘market logic’ is. On this topic and throughout this thesis, I 
use the town in which I lived, Kavadarci, as my main frame of reference, 
despite the contrast it may present with a smaller town or village. My 
research is thus not documenting the transition so much as the responses to 
it—what people say or do, how they are affected and how they react to the 
change they are experiencing. For many are shocked that things have gone as 
they have, though some have come to their own conclusions about the 
scenario; they have studied it as have I, an indicator of the value they place 
on knowing their past. 
  
Tikveš in Yugoslavia and into the 21st century 
Modern agricultural policy began with the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-
1941), which conducted land reform after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, 
resulting in small plots of three hectares on average. Land formerly in the 
hands of Ottoman landlords had been managed under a share-cropping 
system, leaving the share-croppers to theoretically become owners of the 
land that they had farmed (Thompson 1993). But the trend to land reform 
                                                 
9 Ethnic Albanians however, who were excluded from many of the privileges of the ‘south 
Slav’ federation, maintain much larger families to this day. The majority of Albanians I 
have met are one of anywhere from five to ten children, and this has played a significant 
role in their communities and culture. 
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was reinforced by the Law on Agrarian Reform and Resettlement of 1945. 
This law aimed to 1) uproot the ‘exploitation of man’, 2) provide social and 
economic care for loyal peasants, and 3) ensure the political support of the 
population (Miljković 1996, p12). Under this law, 1.6 million hectares of 
land were expropriated from some 160,000 owners throughout the former 
Yugoslavia, and less than one-sixth were compensated for it. The land came 
from churches, peasants who held more land than the law permitted, as well 
as peasants who were considered enemies of the state.10 Two-thirds of the 
land went to 320,000 families, and the rest went to the creation of state or 
collective farms. By 1953 though, food security had become an issue and the 
government sought to increase state owned property. Maximum land 
ownership thus decreased to ten hectares of cultivable land, and more land 
came to comprise state farms, given the government’s plan to see modern 
agriculture drive industrialisation. Yet those owning land were allowed to 
sell it to the state, and the owners from whom land was taken were to be paid 
reimbursement on an instalment plan over twenty years.11  
In the 1960s the majority of the state-owned land was developed into 
vertically integrated agricultural enterprises, known as kombinati (pl.). Each 
region had its own kombinat (sg.), if not several of them, as the organisation 
of food production was not based on efficiency but on four main principles: 
1) state control of land, 2) national food security, 3) balanced regional 
interests, and 4) minimal discontent among peasants (ibid p14). The latter is 
of considerable interest, because although today the rural agricultural 
population in Macedonia is nearly one-fifth of the workforce,12 historically 
peasants were larger in number than the urban populace and had a strong 
spirit of independence and resistance. They were behind the numerous 
rebellions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries against the Ottoman 
                                                 
10 I have met and heard of several families who fell into this category. One man’s father 
returned from America, where he had worked and saved for nine years, and opened a hotel 
in the centre of Kavadarci, only to have it seized and destroyed without compensation. 
Another family’s land and house were taken and they were forced to sign documentation 
saying they would never seek remuneration for it. They were given a small plot on which to 
build a new house, but also received no financial compensation. This documentation has 
prohibited them from seeking compensation even after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and 
the declared independence of Macedonia.   
11 By the 1980s land ownership increased to up to 30 hectares.  
12 Although I personally believe this statistic fails to reflect those who work part or full-time 
in agriculture, either for subsistence or as migrant labour.  
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Empire, as well as against the pre-socialist Yugoslav Serbian and Bulgarian 
occupations.  
That said, although the role of government in Yugoslavia was 
seemingly less controlling in comparison to other communist countries of the 
Eastern Bloc, to understand power and decision making in the former 
Yugoslavia it must be understood that the government did nonetheless 
persecute those seen as a threat to the state and it had considerable control 
over society through the large public sector. The control mechanisms 
included control of property rights, political power, employment regulations, 
organisational structure and economic intervention through subsidies and 
support prices (ibid). Property rights were one of the most important 
elements characterising the social ownership system. ‘Social ownership’ 
assigned all of the ownership and management rights of the enterprise to the 
employees working in it, however no fixed assets, including land, were 
allowed to be sold to the private sector. The government therefore let the 
workers run the day to day operations of their enterprise, but all under the 
umbrella of directives and rules coming from above.  
To better understand the post-socialist mentality in Macedonia, the 
difference between the Yugoslav socially owned enterprise (SOE) and a free-
market, capitalist one should be clear—including consideration of 
employees’ long term interests in their enterprise or company, respectively. 
If workers in a SOE developed and advanced the production of their 
enterprise (which they were likely not allowed to), they saw no additional 
benefits. In fact, they could not be easily dismissed and were only interested 
in their paycheques. They therefore had no interest in any expense or effort, 
for example, in large scale investments or research and development because 
there was no incentive and no competition. Salaries were paid uniformly, 
regardless of work done or position, and the right to work was guaranteed by 
the constitution—no one could be laid off unless they failed to perform their 
minimal duties, nor could factories be closed even if inefficient or not 
needed. Two neighbouring towns, for example, may have factories or 
kombinati not operating at full capacity—overstaffed with employees—while 
producing the same or similar products, despite the fact that economically it 
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would have made sense to have only one production facility. There was 
essentially no unemployment as a result of this system. 
In fact, to prevent unemployment government legislation mandated 
that factories employ a set number of recent graduates at all levels every 
year, regardless of need, which led to enormous underemployment and a 
system slow to adapt to new technologies and demands13. The state 
supported SOEs by guaranteeing purchases from the ‘state commodity 
reserves’ or by giving cheap credit to state farms and growers. Economic loss 
was of little concern, as new organisations of associated labour were 
established based on local political interests, and shutting the SOEs or labour 
organisations down was not favoured by political leaders. Overall, there were 
few cooperative farms and state land was organised in the associated labour 
system and kombinati, meaning that workers would associate their labour 
with socially owned factors, such as land, tools, equipment and facilities, 
which individuals used ‘on the side’, such as Lampland (1995) observed in 
her fieldwork Decisions on overall production, however, came from above 
and were the result of deemed need and political interest.  
The government also subsidised inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides 
and seeds, making private venture production a formidable challenge in the 
face of cheap, state-produced goods. As the amount of state-owned land 
increased by fifty percent from the 1950s until the breakup of Yugoslavia in 
1991, and production with new technologies increased even more, the 
number of private producers eventually dwindled. The remaining ones have 
taken up work with state-owned operations or produce only on the side. 
However, even though the number of employees of state farms and agro 
industries increased over time, it is difficult to gauge private agriculture 
production given family labour.14 The latter, however, may be the only thing 
saving rural Macedonians today and will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
 
                                                 
13 A situation which challenges the former Yugoslavia, from Macedonia to Croatia, today. 
14 Data on employment in agriculture therefore was and remains skewed by the fact that 
private sector production and labour is not easily quantifiable. For these reasons, the real 
bottleneck under socialism was underemployment in the state, not the private agricultural 
sector, a situation which has no doubt been alleviated since the 1990s. 
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Inter-subjective reflexivity in the field  
When I returned from the field in late 2011 I decided that the experiences I 
had and the information I had gathered through coffees, conversations and 
interviews with family, friends and strangers had given me sufficient 
material to work with, and an advantage over the few other Western 
anthropologists who have worked in the region, particularly in rural areas of 
the former Yugoslavia.15 After all, I had spent a total of five of the previous 
ten years in the country, and had a solid understanding of the language and 
culture. Despite my time and marriage there though, I am not convinced that 
the fieldworker’s insider privilege and empiricism enabled me to overcome 
the ethno-centrism that Hann claims has long characterised the Western 
intellectual outlook toward socialist and post-socialist societies (1987). But I 
wholly agree with him that we have a special strength and insight to describe 
and analyse the political and economic systems that few other scholars have 
access to. Instead of relying on sources produced via filtration and re-
interpretation through institutions, bureaucrats, scholars and the like, we 
create ethnographies via first-hand, eye-witness, on the ground experience.  
What this means to me is that through being at the local level—in 
villages, neighbourhoods and towns—and creating analyses there, we can 
use our findings for comparative research on socio-political and economic 
ideas, practices and behaviour among the post-socialist countries. The 
statistics compiled by economists, political scientists and other scholars at 
governmental or non-governmental institutions, universities and think tanks 
are based on various ministerial compilations, and present demographics, 
trade, production and consumption. Yet the national political structures 
which guide them can never convey what society is about at the street level, 
in the local café or out in the fields. That is not to say that such data are 
irrelevant (as they are not) and my understanding of Macedonia has been 
(like for most foreigners) initially based on such information. In fact, my 
area-studies Master’s degree—researched and written while based in the US 
and which focused on changing economic conditions in Macedonia—would 
not have been possible without it.  
                                                 
15 See Chapter 1 for a literature review of their work. 
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However, I am certain that my understanding of Macedonia has 
multiplied exponentially through my doctoral fieldwork. Unlike working 
with NGOs, in an embassy or teaching in a school, such as I did during and 
after Peace Corps in Macedonia, my fieldwork was an experience of constant 
observation and engagement with those around me, not to mention living 
among my affines. Unlike some anthropologists who find it difficult to 
immerse themselves in the local community they reside in, I indeed arrived 
pre-immersed: married to a local and with a child on the way, with 
godparents in a small village and living with my parents-in-law, a respected 
doctor and nurse-midwife couple. 
Despite this, I often felt privileged during my fieldwork and that 
those I sought out to study and work with had no use for me. I felt that I 
should be offering them some sort of help, and hoped my labour and more so 
awareness of their plight would be compensation for the often enlightening 
information I received from them. Yet as I will address later on, there were 
various reasons why my labour was not needed and was undesirable. The 
main issues I had, besides what I at first considered a distracting domestic 
situation with a wife, baby daughter and parents-in-law always taking my 
time and attention, was whether I could really begin to understand the local 
social and economic structures that I had set out to, not to mention people’s 
motivations for the actions they undertook.  
My overall concern now is therefore in how and whether I am able to 
intelligently relate what they told me and what I observed so as to not 
completely misrepresent those aspects of cultural life and the positions of 
individual informants that I want others to understand. Further, it was always 
difficult to know whether I fully understood—despite my advanced 
knowledge of the Macedonian language—what was being said, as I operated 
without a translator and conversations were often more monologues that 
were loaded with political and personal statements, whether direct or subtle, 
and which went on in great length with me trying to digest the information, 
make physical or mental notes and occasionally ask a question to keep the 
informant speaking.  
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However, it is my hope that my interpretation and presentation of 
information is as inter-subjective as Jackson (1997) suggests it should be, a 
sort of ‘radical empiricism’. As Jackson says of it: 
Radical empiricism helps re-join that which classical British empiricism 
put asunder. If we have been led to believe that knowledge and certitude 
can only be secured by building boundaries that divide experience into 
separate domains, then radical empiricism is a form of bridge building 
that opens up the possibility of traffic across boundaries…The aim of 
radical empiricism is care. Its analogue in social life is empathy. Its field 
is experience undergone rather than gone beyond. Knowledge is seen as 
a form of worldly immanence, a being-with-others, an under-standing 
(p164).  
 
Indeed, I sought to be empathetic, careful and understanding when ‘being-
with-others’. Yet concerns of ethno-centrism on my part are legitimate, and 
at time somewhat necessary—they serve as a backdrop on which I and other 
students of Western anthropology can compare the ethnographic information 
presented hereafter. For we all have bias and convictions based on our own 
backgrounds and upbringings, and while we may have an open mind and 
‘zen-ful’ approach, some things will never quite make sense nor be adopted 
by the ethnographer. Not that they are meant to—social systems are 
structures through which individuals behave, yet they are fluid, open-ended 
and always changing.    
  More worrying in my research and thesis is that what I write could fall 
into the wrong hands, those of hegemonic interests who would use it as 
political fodder against my friends and family in Macedonia. While the post-
socialist Macedonian government is seemingly stable and focused on other 
issues within the country, I call upon history to supply me with the doubt that 
peace, democracy (or what semblance of it currently exists there) and power-
sharing governments will last. Given the ‘powder-kegs’ (or at least long-term 
international security situations) of Bosnia and Kosovo, and the instability in 
the region overall—with ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and nationalism 
and an ailing economy in Greece, for example—I think I am not being 
sensationalistic in feeling as such. Further, stories of political and other 
persecution are nothing foreign to my wife’s family: her grandfather was 
imprisoned for three years in Yugoslavia’s infamous island prison off the 
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coast of Croatia, Goli Otok16. I thus have legitimate concerns over 
‘authoritarian’ like governance (and address this in Chapter 4) and a biased if 
not controlled law enforcement apparatus at work.  
Indeed, the experiences that I had already had in Macedonia by the 
time I began my fieldwork—having spent more than three years in the 
country up to that point—meant that I did not walk in blind to the reality of 
political, economic and cultural life, nor did I embroil myself in petulant 
conversations debating cultural traits, tendencies and other issues which 
Western foreigners (namely Americans) so often find baffling, illogical or 
‘backward’. I did that as a Peace Corps volunteer, and was eventually set 
straight. I learned why showing the bottom of one’s feet (such as putting 
them up on a chair or coffee table) is incredibly rude, and why there is a fear 
of the draft (promaja)17, among other things.  
However, I did not understand as much as I thought of my field site’s 
personal characteristics, and the history and habitus which comprise these 
traits. The dialect was difficult for me in the beginning, as it is riddled with 
Turcizmi (Ottoman Turkish words), different accents and word use, not to 
mention the incredible penchant for swearing which residents of my town, 
Kavadarci, are known for. Further, my status as married to the daughter of 
the town’s primary oral surgeon and former Mayor was significant. It gave 
me instant connections and ‘ins’ most of the time, as it never took long for 
those I spoke with in and around town to find out who I was. However, 
sometimes this was not beneficial, as despite my father-in-law being the first 
Mayor after socialism and essentially doing very little beyond towing the 
former party line (in contrast with the newer parties and divided political 
spectrum of the past decade), he did have some enemies.  
                                                 
16 Goli Otok, or ‘naked island’ was where Yugoslavia’s, and more so President Tito’s 
political opponents—real or suspected—ended up. Prisoners there were subject to hard 
labour, and although it was by no means a death camp, many men died there or were 
permanently mentally and physically scarred from it.  
17 Promaja likely takes the prize as the most discussed cultural issue among Americans in 
Macedonia. It is simply the idea that when two or more windows or doors are open in a car, 
bus, room, etc., there will be air moving through that can cause severe headaches, muscular 
pain and even illness. While it is no doubt a culturally constructed perception, I do believe 
there is merit to it because the air in Macedonia is so dry, that even on mild days it can 
produce a chill when blowing through a cool house. Though on hot days and in stuffy buses, 
I will never quite agree with the passengers who would rather keep all but one window 
open.  
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Nonetheless, the project I set out to do was my own, with information 
I sought to acquire and questions I was keen to get answered. To say that I 
worked in my father-in-law’s shadow would thus be incorrect, as I explored 
the entire region, put my own background (language skills and knowledge) to 
use, and avoided politics at all possible costs. That said, politics will creep up 
in this text, as I frankly feel it is impossible for anyone to write an 
ethnography about the local in the Balkans without considering the politics 
of the national (state), let alone the international levels of the EU and US in 
particular, but certainly Russia and China as well. Indeed, the latter two 
countries still seek influence in the post-Cold War world, and are the wine 
region’s most sought after markets.  
 
Methodology 
In order to trace how the economy, identity and livelihoods of grape growers 
in Tikveš were being affected by privatisation in the wine industry and 
agricultural sector, I spent the majority of 2011 (from January to September) 
in Tikveš. Through doing so, I was able to observe a full growing season of 
activities surrounding the production of grapes. Although the vineyards are 
not tended to formally until mid-February, with the pruning of the vines on 
St. Trifun's Day (14th February), beginning archival and institutional 
research, and speaking with various growers from January allowed me to 
gain a better understanding of their plight from the previous season's harvest 
(for example, whether they had received their due compensation instalments) 
and how they imagined the season to come. As the growing season lasts 
through to the end of October though, my preliminary research and residence 
from April 2010 had undoubtedly helped illustrate the political dimensions 
surrounding the harvesting, price setting and payment for grapes.  
 My methods for collecting this diverse information can be divided into 
three main areas: participant observation, archival and current events 
research, and interviews and surveys. Participant observation includes both 
the formal work I took up and the informal discussions from which I heard 
locals’ and growers’ thoughts and experiences. The formal work was 
primarily being involved in several aspects of grape growing. I had intended 
to find at least three groups or families of growers in Tikveš with whom I 
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could speak and work with on specific days of the week throughout the 
growing season so that I could go with them to their vineyards and learn their 
work. However, as I discuss throughout this thesis, this was difficult to 
manage and I worked with several growers when it suited them.  
 As sharing meals or appetizers (meze) in Macedonia is a cultural 
custom through which individuals spend hours in conversation, I thus spent 
as much time with family and friends involved in grape growing, getting to 
know their families and lives otherwise in order to see how they were being 
affected by shifting external conditions and forces in society. Yet I also 
spoke with owners of ‘agricultural pharmacies’18, local businesses and small 
winery owners—with whom I was able to hear their take on the current 
transition and ‘katastrofa’ in the region—and the local outspoken political 
leaders who had been involved in the 2010 growers’ strikes (which I 
observed as a bystander).    
 The archival and current events research I conducted was comprised of 
local research in Kavadarci, including the collection of news published in the 
print media19, and use of the municipal archives in the Kavadarci museum 
along with conversations with the Director there. I also networked with 
faculty at the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology at the state 
university, Sts. Cyril & Methodius, and participated with scholars at the 
small but well established Euro-Balkan Institute (EBI) and its summer 
programme in Ohrid20. I thus hoped that academically, further insight and 
information would come to the surface through such relationships, yet 
interest seemed minimal in my topic given both the more classical and 
ethnological approach to anthropology in Macedonia, as well as the EBI’s 
predominant focus on gender issues. Furthermore, there was a clear concern 
by faculty—who either work for or are indirectly subject to the state 
apparatus—to speak out against it and the privatisation process.  
                                                 
18 Zemjodelski apteki—which supply growers with pesticides and materials for their work. 
19 Macedonia is rife with daily and weekly newspapers/periodicals which cover political 
topics, including the local Kav’darečki Vesnik. 
20 Co-founded by anthropologist, Keith Brown. I am well acquainted with the director and 
had visited there several times prior to my research project, and their summer programmes 
draw in scholars from around Europe. I participated in their July 2011 programme under the 
moniker ‘Ohird Summer University’.  
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 Branching my archival research to interviews, and indeed given the 
power of the central government, I interviewed individuals in the 
government’s Ministry for Rural Development (Ministerstvoto za Ruralen 
Razvoj) to find out their role in and opinion of agrarian reform and 
privatisation. I sought to find out how macro policies and subsidies for grape 
producers had changed, and how privatisation and thus private interests were 
affecting the government’s control over agriculture in the country.  
In Kavadarci and surrounding towns and villages21 I fostered 
relationships and often informally interviewed grape growers and other 
members of the community22. I spoke with individuals who were willing to 
share their insights, observations and experiences with the recent effects of 
the privatisation process and transition. Such interviewees were my key 
informants, and through asking them about their income and expenditures 
they indirectly supplemented my understanding of the costs of grape growing 
and other agriculture, as well as how they were surviving.  
In a different sense of the term, I also intended to do a life history of a 
bottle of wine, investigating how grapes act as a commodity, and thus 
following them along a supply chain through production. However, I did not 
produce such a ‘life history’ but did gain great insight into wine production 
in attempting to do so, as is discussed in Chapter 3. I also attempted to make 
two research trips elsewhere in the greater Macedonian region in order to 
give both a post-socialist and EU comparative perspective by visiting 
Bulgaria’s Melnik (near Sandanski) and northern Greece’s Macedonian 
(north of Salonica23) wine regions. The former I visited in August 2011, but 
the latter never came to fruition. Nonetheless, the information I gathered 
from visiting Melnik and through conversations had with friends and 
acquaintances in Salonica and elsewhere in Greece gave me great insight into 
the wine industries of those countries, which I discuss in the thesis 
Conclusion.  
                                                 
21 There are several villages and/or small towns in which I established relationships. These 
are in the five municipalities of Tikveš, and include Kavadarci and the village of Begnište; 
Negotino and the villages of Pepelište, Temjanik and Dolni Disan; Rosoman, Gradsko and 
Demir Kapija. They are all very close, within a 10-20 minute drive of each other (see 
Figures 3 & 4 in Appendix II).  
22 See Appendix I for a list of research questions. 
23 Also known as Thessaloniki. 
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Altogether, the conversations, research, interviews and regional visits 
helped illustrate the role of grape growing in the community, and through the 
inevitable tensions which have arisen from privatisation, they provide 
evidence showing the forces of change at work on grape growers, and their 
families and communities in Tikveš. 
 
Thesis foundation 
In order to determine how Macedonia has been affected by its post-socialist 
privatisation, ‘development’, EU candidate status and transition to a 
sovereign ‘free-market democracy’, among other things, I sought out to find 
a place where something subtle was happening. I decided to steer away from 
my Master’s research of ethno-nationalism—with its clear involvement of 
the media, government(s), political parties, international organisations and 
the like. Instead, I focused on the ‘institutions’ surrounding rural life, namely 
kin and community, local economies and agriculture, and the livelihoods 
they support. With my wife being from the main wine town in Tikveš, 
Kavadarci, and knowing from our occasional visits of something radical and 
seemingly sinister occurring, I chose the Tikveš wine region as my ‘Petri 
dish’. 
It was in Tikveš that I studied the implementation of largely EU 
development programmes and policy, as well as the reactions to privatisation 
(privatizacija)—a term known and used locally when decrying the region’s 
transition (tranzicija). One might hear someone exclaim ‘all of this is the 
work of privatisation and this transition!24’, for the effects of both on the 
individual grape growers and their local communities which supply the 
wineries have indeed been a ‘catastrophe’ (katastrofa). With claims of theft 
by the connected, corrupt elites which now command the business, there 
have been protests due to unpaid grape harvests occurring as recently as 
February 2013, evidence that this transition is ongoing.  
The protests in 2013 over up to five years of unpaid harvests from 
one winery are extreme evidence of the problematic transition. The growers 
consequently blame the ‘wine mafia’ (vinska mafija)—connected 
                                                 
24 Se e od privatizacija i ova tranzicija! 
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businessmen and politicians—who have become the new owners of the 
former government wineries yet tout a ‘free-market’ approach to business. 
Although these ‘businessmen’ (biznesmeni) have modernised and improved 
the quality of wine in the country, the profits they earn come on the backs of 
the grape growers’ labour. The transition the growers are undergoing is thus 
a double-edged sword, where the conjunction of the state and capitalism is 
resulting in a subtle but imposing form of authoritarianism, and a ‘thieving 
state’ (apaška država), as many in Tikveš would claim. 
The idea of studying repeasantisation came from hearing stories back 
in 2009 of grape growers who were indeed not getting paid for their crop and 
instead were replacing their vineyards with vegetables, so that they would at 
least have something to eat. With a decade of high unemployment statistics, I 
knew things were only going from bad to worse. But notions of state 
legitimacy from my Master’s thesis, further preliminary research in 
Macedonia, as well as contact with anthropologist Keith Brown, led me 
down the road to considering the role of the state, the EU, development and 
privatisation. Therefore, while I discuss and incorporate the notion of a 
‘return to the peasantry’, so often discussed elsewhere in the former Eastern 
Bloc and Soviet Union, this thesis in fact has several components which I 
hope will present an illustration and explanation of the multi-faceted realities 
that the inhabitants of Tikveš have recently assumed or adopted. As new 
information and perspectives during my fieldwork naturally influenced my 
understanding of the situation, I came to realise that what I should be looking 
at was not just their methods of getting by and surviving on the one hand, but 
adapting by changing habits, consumption and even traditions on the other.   
Although my fieldwork did not technically begin until January 2011, 
and I was busy with my daughter’s birth and preparing my fieldwork 
proposal the year before, I essentially resided in Macedonia from April 2010 
until September 2011. During that initial eight month, pre-fieldwork period, I 
gained a stronger sense of what was occurring in Tikveš. I heard about the 
region’s ‘hyper-production’ (hiperprodukcija) of grapes, stories of two years 
of unpaid grape harvests, and saw the anger, uncertainty and frustration spill 
out onto the streets where growers were either trying to sell their grapes, or 
protesting by dumping them and blocking main roads in the region. They did 
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this because they sought help from a state which had paid and assisted them 
for so long that they knew nothing else of how to deal with the several tonnes 
of produce that they individually grow and harvest every year.  
What they did not understand was the power behind the radical 
transformation to their region and the industry they were supporting through 
their arduous labour, and many still do not. I am certainly not claiming to 
fully understand the inner-workings of local and national power structures, 
but I do feel that given my work and life in Macedonia’s capital, Skopje, and 
both institutional and societal education on markets, politics and economics, 
I have been able to straddle the rural and urban in Tikveš and see the two 
sides of the coin. That is, by meeting with the growers and getting a sense of 
their lives and livelihoods, I saw how sharply they contrasted with those of 
the businessmen, traders, bureaucrats and other working professionals, such 
as those I knew in the international community in Skopje. The latter go to 
work in offices, whereas growers go to labour in their fields. Both may 
suffer in one way or another, but how they do so differs considerably. My 
thesis, by virtue of my particular relationships with kin, acquaintances and 
friends, thus reflects my understanding of the region’s various forms of 
habitus, culture and livelihoods. More specifically, I discuss kin-neighbours 
as I know them—their backgrounds, habits, concerns and pleasures—and use 
materials gathered in interviews and conversations with growers, winery 
owners, lobbyists, bureaucrats, politicians and ordinary citizens of Tikveš.       
Given the general theme of returning to the peasantry, I am not 
suggesting a drifting back in time nor a form of backwardness. My point is 
that the agriculturalists of the region were ‘peasants’ until just a little over 
half a century ago, and that the industrialisation brought about by socialism 
was a liminal political and economic phase between post-Ottoman farming 
and sharecropping, and what we have today: a state with both a growing 
urban-rural divide and disparity between rich and poor. It is a dichotomy 
where some drive new European cars, others drive old Yugoslav or East 
European ones; some have all the food they could need, others significantly 
less; some have the newest technology, many others not so much; most have 
electricity, but some not at all.... Indeed, one could hardly imagine a greater 
contrast than that between some village families who have no electricity and 
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those with not only electricity, but food aplenty, new cars, televisions, 
computers, mobile phones and all of the information and opportunities these 
bring.  
Throughout this text I therefore intend to demonstrate how what is 
occurring in Tikveš follows a pattern that shows similarities with other 
countries where relatively recent peasant-cum-industrialised societies have 
seen a dissolution of their markets and government support coupled with 
privatisation and a growing dichotomy in terms of access to goods, 
foodstuffs and resources. Bundled in an opaque package called transition, it 
is as I heard one individual quip ‘Do you know what socialism was? The 
long road from capitalism to capitalism’. Or one might alternatively respond, 
‘from peasantry to peasantry’.  
 
Peasant theory & history  
Peasants are never rulers, only ruled (Wolf 2001, p240)  
In his earlier work, Hann (1985, p10) admitted that it was impossible to 
specify at which point the peasantry gave way to farming, but attempted a 
definition of the peasantry, reducing it to three classes: 
 
1) It is a numerically dominant but politically passive section of pre-
industrial states, and is part of an immobile and closed society.  
2) Family, not machines, are crucial to the peasantry. Family work to 
satisfy wants and needs (by traditional cultural standards), not profit. 
Generally, a different or changing economic environment renders them 
relatively insensitive to changes in market prices.  
3) Given socio-political and economic characteristics of the peasantry, it 
can be concluded that the necessary condition for it is psychological. 
Land was family property, but collectivisation was the demise of the 
peasantry throughout Eastern Europe.  
 
As post-socialist studies in Eastern Europe show though, the peasantry are 
not relegated to the past as a part of a ‘pre-industrial society’ but are able to 
re-appear given certain economic conditions. Further, collectivisation was 
not the full demise of the peasantry. In Macedonia, while we can say that 
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collective farms did not exist as they did in neighbouring Bulgaria and 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, land was initially collectivised and a traditional 
way of life was greatly compromised and altered. Yet, as Hann points out 
with Poland, who had a similar experience to Macedonia and the former 
Yugoslavia in terms of not realising full collectivisation, a peasant mentality 
remained because land was largely left to private ownership and utilisation, 
but with the option to work in the socialist sector (ibid). While he suggests 
that the problem was one of establishing a genuine market environment for 
agriculture given a lack of production incentives, agriculturalists were in fact 
left to operate with greater autonomy than in either the rest of the more fully 
collectivised Eastern Bloc or Soviet Union, and were able to maintain their 
own plots of land. 
Yet Hann wrote of their egalitarian kinship based society: ‘A peasant 
does not combine formally…with other peasants to achieve his goals, though 
the goals…might be identical, and an observer could point out that the 
needs…might be better satisfied if some collective pressure were applied. In 
practice there is very little economic cooperation outside a narrow circle of 
kin’ (p 91). Indeed, in ‘Worker Peasants in the Three Worlds’ (1987), Hann 
discusses how family farms, particularly part-time ones such as those which 
existed during Yugoslavia and after, were so resilient: kin relations have 
been at the forefront. 
I do not intend to debate who qualifies as peasants but to stipulate 
that I believe, like Teodor Shanin (1987), that a peasant existence has and 
continues to represent the majority of humankind, and that in the Tikveš 
wine region the demise of profitable grape growing has returned some of the 
population there to ‘the peasantry’. I only include some of the population 
because this existence fluctuates with the economic winds—immersion into a 
strong economy lessens the peasant nature of a group of people; exclusion or 
the absence of such an economy brings individuals back into the peasant 
fold. Contemporary peasant families and communities may be a dual mixture 
of individuals working the land, a trade or in factories (when the opportunity 
arises). What differs among peasants are the extent to which a hierarchy 
arises, creating clashing classes and values. As Wolf (1966) describes of this 
‘peasant dilemma’, ‘the perennial problem of the peasantry thus consists in 
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balancing the demands of the external world against the peasants’ need to 
provision their household’ (p15).  
  Indeed, peasants flow both in and out of the wider society and 
marketplace. Despite their economic and political subordination, they have a 
good degree of independence in terms of controlling land and labour. By 
controlling their means of production, they are therefore able to operate in a 
dual fashion—providing for others by selling off surplus goods when times 
are good, and sustaining themselves in times of trouble. Although 
anthropological research has focused on this ability to move between worker 
and small-scale producer of goods for trade, several scholars disagree with 
the notion of the peasantry as a clearly distinguishable class (Harris 2005). 
Instead, the likes of Sidney Mintz (1986) and Eric Wolf (1966, 1987) discuss 
how peasants are in fact always being reconstituted in different times and 
space, which is precisely what I assert here.  
 In order to sustain themselves, Wolf (1966) distinguishes between 
different kinds of ‘funds’ which the peasant has to produce. The first and 
most basic is the need to have something to eat and stay alive. Peasants must 
also repair or replace their equipment and tools, and often to supply seeds for 
their crops. These two ‘funds’ form the basis for peasant reproduction and 
the creation of a surplus—that which they sell or trade with. However, 
cultural differences influence what is considered sufficient for present 
consumption and what is deemed surplus. Surplus is a primary consideration 
in day to day activities, ‘yet in meeting this root problem peasants may 
follow two diametrically opposed strategies. The first of these is to increase 
production; the second to curtail consumption’ (Wolf 1966 p15). There are 
two kinds of extra surplus provisioning: a fund for festivals, feasts and 
celebrations, and a fund for rent—the paying off of debts with money or 
goods. This debt distinguishes peasants from other independent cultivators, 
such as tribes-people, because this is how political control is exacted and a 
social hierarchy created; ‘the peasant’s loss was the power-holder’s gain’ 
(ibid p10). Peasants are therefore defined by Wolf as ‘rural cultivators whose 
surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers’ (p3-4). In times of 
economic hardship, the peasant family can generally adapt by reducing the 
amount produced for its funds, and can diversify its crop production for 
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domestic consumption. So long as it can hold onto the land and resources 
which form its base, it will be able to return to viability at a later date.  
 While Hann (2006) says that the ingenuity with which people adapt in 
times of instability is often a reflection of their traditional ways of viewing 
the world, Wolf (2001) believes it is more so a reflection of economic 
reality—goods bought must be functional in peasant life, and goods sold 
must be ‘cheap, easily transportable and adaptable to the limited capital of 
the seller’ (p151). What both Hann and Wolf have seen, however, are 
changes in loyalties. Loyalty lasts only so long as there are incentives and 
relationships at stake. Wolf observed this in the corporate peasant 
communities of Latin America where there was, similar to Macedonia, a 
dualisation of society into a ‘dominant entrepreneurial sector’ and a 
‘dominated sector of [native] peasants’ (p154). He saw that, from the point of 
the view of the former, the peasant sector remained most of all a labour 
reserve in which labour could maintain itself at no cost to the enterprises.25  
I insist though that there is a culture clash between the two groups 
Wolf mentions. While peasants must keep a balance between their own 
resources and the ‘resources in people’ (p155) to whom they must maintain 
access through customary behaviour, such social relations among an 
entrepreneurial business class are less important and more fluid given their 
economic strength. This is a double-edged sword against peasants, who are 
thus subject to the cut that merchants take and their at times authoritarian 
influence and ruthless behaviour. Yet the symbiosis occurs as a result of the 
fact that peasants and agricultural production feed the urban population, and 
the latter cannot survive without the former.  
As Wolf (2001) points out, in studying peasants-cum-rural producers, 
we must therefore be cognisant of how outside factors affect the world they 
inhabit, and how that world is organised into the larger socio-cultural whole. 
A significant difference between the urban merchant and rural peasant 
‘classes’ is the extent to which peasant families do accounting in terms of 
labour. Increases in output and restrictions of consumption are carried out by 
                                                 
25 In Tikveš, even grape growers have expressed this—they know they will continue to 
work because they have to do something, and grapes are what they know.  
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the nuclear family, leaving the grower not entirely sure of where his income 
comes from in his capacity as a worker. In consideration of the entire 
family’s labour, the family ‘does not know how much its labour is worth’ 
(p203). Even Alexander Chayanov, the late 19th century Russian agricultural 
economist, saw that the prevailing concepts of economics that explained the 
behaviour of the capitalist entrepreneur did not apply to the peasant family 
who rely on the labour of their own family members (Kerblay 1987). 
‘Labour, proportionate to the size of the family, is the stable element which 
determines the change in the volume of capital and land’ (p78). 
For socialism to fledge, the peasantry had to either be removed from 
the land or collectivised. Yet the concept of ‘petty commodity production’ 
helps shed analytical light on the study of peasants and their labour. The 
phrase refers to economic activities intended to generate income from market 
sales and in which there is a low capital investment and little dependence on 
hired labour, helping reveal the economic relationships involved (Harris 
2005). Petty commodity production shows that peasants can be both 
‘capitalists’ (owners of the means of production) and ‘workers’ (labourers 
who work for themselves). Their dilemma is navigating and dealing with the 
various demands on them, which can be dealt with in different ways 
depending on the time and circumstances. The availability of land, labour 
and capital, such as getting credit through patrons, are just some factors that 
affect their livelihood and adaptability. Most of all, however, it is the peasant 
valuation of labour in terms which are alien to the calculations of the market 
that gives them flexibility. 
 
Today’s reality in rural Macedonia 
I use the term peasant because I see the grape growers of Tikveš as 
increasingly subject to the kinds of ruling classes, such as money-lenders and 
middle-men that characterise the ‘classical’ peasantries, and more so 
returning to a subsistence form of economic agency. Yet as I have suggested, 
this thesis incorporates the role of the state, and how it exploits the agrarian 
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population26. The combination of factors such as these inevitably makes my 
project a study of the plight of existence in contemporary Tikveš, rural 
Macedonia and other parts of the Western Balkan region.  
At the crux of my thesis lies the contention that while individually 
farmed plots of land (covered primarily with vineyards) in Tikveš continue to 
exist—and exist to supply the former socially owned enterprises (SOE) 
turned private wineries with grapes for the country’s number one beverage 
export, wine—they are already undergoing a relatively quick transition 
whereby grapes are unpaid for, wineries want to own and manage their own 
vineyards, and growers are giving up and abandoning or replacing theirs. For 
all of the talk about making the transition to a capitalist, free-market 
economy with greater prosperity for the country and its people, socio-
economic factors combine to render much of such rhetoric comical 
propaganda at best, and more realistically catastrophic for growers’, their 
families’ and their communities’ livelihoods, standards of living and outlook. 
In short, they are becoming poorer, less satisfied with life and less optimistic. 
Fortunately, the land is fertile and the people are industrious and practical, 
yet the state and special interests will continue to exploit them with the 
knowledge that the rural, agrarian mentality is one that is seasonal, circular 
and always working for ‘bread’ (leb). Growers can continue to do this on 
their individual plots of land, but they will decry privatisation as they 
transition to a self-subsistence, barter and cash(less) economy27 while the 
ruling elite go the other way. 
Such a ‘return to the peasantry’ means that socialism has clearly been 
laid to rest and that the socio-economic ties and organisation that bound rural 
people to the central government’s agricultural and economic directives have 
largely faded into the past. Essentially, what is occurring is that grape 
growers in Tikveš must move away from grape growing in order to grow 
                                                 
26 Ironically and interestingly, until recently the verb ‘to exploit’ in Macedonian, 
eksploatira¸ had been benign. It had been used in tourism brochures to explain how many 
natural resources the country has for the taking, among other things. Only recently has it 
become a word associated with something negative, as its noun form eksploatacija has been 
used to describe many of the ills of the post-socialist, 21st century world: privatisation, 
corruption, theft, human trafficking, sweatshop-like employment, etc. 
27 This in contrast to the government supplied inputs and income provided by wage labour 
during socialism and after, which allowed individuals to ‘slough off’ the state (Lampland 
1995).  
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other crops which they can consume and/or sell, or to find work for which 
they will ideally be paid enough to keep their families properly fed and 
clothed. By my examination of life in Kavadarci and the region, I 
demonstrate how people have set about breaking from their association with 
the country’s wineries (and the tradition of supplying them) both literally and 
psychologically while nevertheless pointing to the trials and tribulations that 
have arisen after decades of multi-faceted political and economic support 
from the former Yugoslav turned independent Macedonian state. Therefore, 
this transition is not one that is just political, economic, indefinite and 
seemingly to nowhere certain, but an alteration to the nation’s psyche and 
through severance of government ties, one whereby the state has lost 
legitimacy in the eyes of many (though power and authority it increasingly 
maintains). 
In an attempt to frame the current situation it is necessary to consider 
the rich past of the Macedonian region of Tikveš. I do so because an 
historical basis allows me to provide evidence that there are fundamental 
elements in the continuity of southeast European cultural life that link ‘new’ 
economic systems and the habitus of economic life to those which have 
existed before. However, most of the information I intend to link to the 
present situation has not so much to do with grape growing life and practices 
but with present commercial pursuits, and economic, political and power 
structures which comprise the region’s various ‘transcripts’ (Scott 1985). For 
although agriculture makes up the base of the local economy (as it does the 
country’s), there are large percentages of Macedonians in Tikveš who work 
in a variety of occupations, and all must continue to make ends meet. They 
do so through adaptation and entrepreneurship, but a renegotiation of kinship 
relations as well.  
As for the businesses they work for, some are long established but 
others new. Kavadarci, for example—a town of some 30,000 inhabitants—
has an industrial zone with factories and facilities for metals, cigarettes, 
nickel smelting and food production, as well as myriad registered companies 
involved in the international trade and shipment of these items, namely 
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trucking companies28. There are also the local shops and businesses 
providing everything from pharmaceuticals to gambling outlets to groceries 
to technology, not to mention the recent spate of used car importers and the 
niche business they have created (as discussed in Chapter 6). In short, 
Kavadarci is the informal ‘capital’ of the region, and thus contains the bulk 
of its wealth, economic diversity and most of the government jobs in 
ministries, schools and other institutions, not to mention agricultural 
suppliers and of course wineries.  
Yet by the same token, it is not only those who label themselves as 
agriculturalists29 who are doing the grape growing, it is the schoolteacher, 
secretary, merchant, doctor or even parents of the Mayor who tend to family 
land outside of their town or village. What separates these individuals from 
the agricultural production of the past is the unravelling of governmental 
inputs in the form of tractors, tools and payment for crops, and jobs with 
guaranteed pay, healthcare and thus overall security. Concurrently though, 
there is the privatisation process and corruption alongside it. By corruption I 
mean not just the willingness of an individual to take a bribe or do a favour 
for one person and not another and profit off of it, but the societal climate of 
disregarding rules and regulations, and using connections to get the latter 
changed—to ‘liberalise the economy’. Thus to borrow from Wacquant 
(2009), there are corrupt forces outside of and within the government who 
are ‘punishing the poor’ with a paternalist program of increasing then 
penalising poverty, all of which aims to curb the maladies brought about by 
economic deregulation while imposing precarious employment conditions on 
the ‘post-industrial proletariat’. This is corruption, and one aspect of the 
post-socialist transition in Tikveš.  
The result of this is the oft-heard ‘suffering’ (maka), ‘misery’ 
(mizerija) and ‘catastrophe’ (katastrofa) for those who remain in Tikveš, but 
there are also shifting paradigms which mean that Macedonians are engaging 
                                                 
28 Trucking companies (špedicii) have been an unusually popular post-socialist business 
enterprise in my experience. I know many individuals who own trucks, and slowly 
accumulate one after another in order to ship goods throughout the Balkan region. I assert 
that this has to do with the number of Macedonians employed as šoferi, or drivers, during 
socialism. Indeed, I have met many who drove goods throughout Central and Eastern 
Europe, and others who delivered to the Middle East, namely Turkey and Iraq.  
29 Farmers in general are called zemjodelci and grape growers, lozari. 
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in opportunities not available since before World War II, if they ever were. 
These include going abroad for education, establishing larger companies in 
the international produce industry, as well as working on cruise ships, in 
Dubai or as airline flight attendants30. I even have a former student, a trained 
soldier, who works in Iraq for an international security firm31. Most of these 
positions are not enviable, but what they provide are opportunities to live, 
work and travel abroad, primarily throughout Europe, North America and 
Asia. The Macedonian diaspora is therefore once again growing, as it did 
prior to socialist Yugoslavia, and ultimately this is resulting in the re-creation 
of Macedonian identity—from the Yugoslav era notion of a historical ‘folk’ 
(narod) to the 21st century’s global individual.  
Given the lack of opportunities for young people, the ‘brain-drain’ 
occurring is in fact a significant problem for the country, with some 
estimates claiming that around one-fifth of the country’s total population (or 
450,000 Macedonian citizens) had migrated out of Macedonia by 201032. 
The real figures about the brain-drain are hard to come by as the last census 
was in 2002, though if this trend continues Macedonia will not have the 
human capital to grow the economy, create jobs and collect taxes. All that 
would be left in Macedonia would be pensioners, public sector employees 
and some small businesses, making this trend unsustainable in the long-term. 
Indeed, Macedonians have been free to travel within the EU’s 
Schengen Zone since 2009 and those of means are often keen on taking 
holidays in the eastern Mediterranean. From Greece to Turkey to Israel to 
Egypt, Macedonians have fanned out from their little corner of southeast 
Europe in search of opportunities within a neoliberal world system that is 
radically different from that of their parents’ generation. Macedonians and 
other citizens of the former Yugoslavia admittedly had far more freedom 
during socialism than their neighbours33 and others within the Soviet 
socialist system. Yet what the past two decades’ transition has meant is not 
only that there is a pre-socialist connection (re)established, but that it is being 
                                                 
30 Qatar Airways advertises and recruits Macedonians regularly for such positions. 
31 Three years after teaching him, I ran into this student in the Istanbul airport in May 2012. 
I was flying home to Chicago, he eastward to Baghdad.  
32http://www.kapital.mk/mk/makedonija/86747/447_000_lugje_se_iselile_od_zemjava__m
akedonija_vo_grupata_so_najmnogu_emigranti!.aspx 
33 Namely Albania, Bulgaria and Romania 
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done largely outside of a politically imposed, non-historical Balkan 
phenomenon—the former Yugoslavia’s authoritarian political and economic 
system.  
While it is difficult for an ordinary citizen to take advantage of such 
opportunities—finances, and all that money can buy, being the main 
obstacle—today’s political system does not prohibit Macedonians from 
engaging in international opportunities. In fact the government seeks support 
from its large diasporas in the US, Canada and Australia, and has growing 
diplomatic representation in those countries and others. Like the influential 
Greek, Albanian, Turkish, Armenian and other diasporas in the US, some 
Macedonians there are fervent nationalists, expressing their opinions and 
lending support through marketing campaigns, lobbying groups34, financial 
contributions to Macedonian political parties and, as of 2011, being able to 
vote in the nation’s parliamentary elections from Macedonian consulates and 
embassies around the world. Through such support, and a combination of 
post-conflict power struggles over political and economic power within (and 
outside of Macedonia with nearly all of its neighbours), the current (and re-
elected in 2011) governing party, VMRO-DPMNE35, has harnessed domestic 
and international Macedonian support to complete a project known as 
‘Skopje 2014’. This will be discussed at greater length in the thesis 
conclusion, but it is essentially a government led, nation and identity 
building mission on a grand scale.   
 
The problematic transition 
Although the term ‘transition’ tends to be most associated with that of post-
communism in Eastern Europe since 1989, I wager that there has been a 
much longer transition occurring, particularly in the former Ottoman lands of 
Southeast Europe. A century ago (1912) the First Balkan War broke out, 
                                                 
34 The United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD) in the United States. 
http://www.umdiaspora.org  
35 VMRO stands for ‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization’, DPMNE standing 
for ‘Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity’. VMRO though is a name which 
dates back to the self-proclaimed rebel-terrorist group who sought to draw attention to 
Ottoman Macedonia’s plight in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The party in 
Macedonian is called Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija—Demokratska 
Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo (VMRO-DPMNE). 
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which led to the Second Balkan War and then World War I with the 
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. These conflicts and the 
power shift that resulted created a geographical, political and economic 
ontology defined by the powerful West. Unique to the Western Balkans 
though is that a dangerous blend of ethno-nationalism tore the region apart 
throughout the 20th century and continues to threaten its stability.  
Therefore, while neoliberal capitalism has moved full-steam ahead in 
the region, it has done so alongside tumultuous political conditions. Yet to 
make matters worse, there is the corruption, greed, inequality and illicit 
nature of privatisation, which thus characterises the transition as problematic, 
filled with ambiguity and potentially destabilising. Further, the use of the 
term ‘transition’ bears asking how long does this last and to where are they 
transitioning? Is it as Creed (1998) found in Bulgaria in the 1990s, a situation 
of ‘always in transition’, or is there an end to it? And what will justify that 
end? I address this in the conclusion, but if we look at the West and its 
obsession with consumption, new trends, personal economic gain and the 
like, the outlook is not a positive one. The equality of post-WWII 
governance, from Europe to the US, seems to be increasingly a thing of the 
past. Instead countries and people are riddled with increased expenses and 
debt, unemployment, and thus overall uncertainty.  
In rural Macedonia things seem all the more unpredictable. European 
integration, as I assess in Chapters 3-6, alongside the government’s resolute 
stance against compromising on the ‘name issue’ with Greece while that 
country seems to disintegrate into austerity measure induced depression, 
makes Macedonians sincerely wonder what path they are on. The slow 
transition in Macedonia initially, as a result of the conflicts elsewhere in the 
former Yugoslavia and due to the consequent wealth of money and NGOs 
which poured into the small country, have made the road to the ‘free-market’ 
a slow and less intimidating one. Furthermore, the legacy of socialism has 
held strong in terms of governance, bureaucracy, lustration (or a lack of it) 
and thinking, while neoliberalism has set a different course for the country’s 
economic, political and social agenda.  
A tug-of-war between such systems working simultaneously does 
function however, for although the socialist system has been nearly 
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annihilated, a lack of lustration means that many bureaucrats of the previous 
regime (or their offspring) remain in high positions, and regardless there has 
to be some sort of system in place. But merit, for example, plays little role in 
one’s success, and this applies to not just government but law, higher 
education and medicine—an increasingly frightening reality when you need 
the attention of a qualified medical doctor at the hospital but have instead an 
individual who seldom attended classes and paid to get the best marks on his 
exams36. Concurrently, the less connected rural inhabitants of the country 
must scramble to find sufficient money and resources with which to keep 
their families fed and provided for. To borrow from the graffiti seen round 
Kavadarci, I consider this new economy one of ‘surviving, not living’37.  
In terms of repeasantisation, it must not be considered only part and 
parcel to processes of land ownership and cultivation, but also to the 
diversification in the rural economy engendered by the indirect 
internationalisation of true local market (pazar) economies. While there is 
the ideal (or perhaps just rhetoric) of new varieties of goods and jobs in the 
economy, the down side and reality of the matter is that these new (non-food) 
goods are often of poorer quality than those found in neighbouring EU 
countries, more expensive and are likely older in terms of the year they were 
produced. Such as during the Ottoman era when Rossos called the region ‘a 
dumping ground for agricultural surpluses and manufactured goods’ (2008, 
p71), so it is today where unsafe, non-EU standard products (or those meant 
for that market but which were rejected), from toys to pharmaceuticals to 
foodstuffs, are dumped in Macedonia and sold. Toxic toys or peanuts 
(produced using illegal, harmful pesticides) or unapproved medicines make 
their way daily into the marketplace and consumers’ homes. But in the grand 
scheme of things that’s hardly a worry for most Macedonians. What is a 
concern are the indirect, hidden forces at work on their livelihoods and 
communities, which make the local market a microcosm for what is 
occurring on the larger level. 
                                                 
36 This is a phenomenon of the post-socialist system of higher education, so one would be 
wise to choose an older doctor over a younger one. 
37 Nie preživuvame, ne živeame 
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While the bulk of my thesis deals with grape growers and the wine 
industry they support, it is those who do not work in agriculture but whose 
livelihoods are intricately tied to it that emerge at times as equally vulnerable 
to the plight of privatisation and the deleterious consequences of the 
transition. I refer here to those working anywhere from bakeries to shops to 
hospitals, as in many cases these individuals provide products or services 
which require the capital of the majority of the economy’s inhabitants, 
namely grape growers. When the latter have no money to spend though, they 
drag down the entire economy or create separate economies impenetrable to 
those with fewer means. The majority of such non-agricultural workers are 
often poorly paid and paid unpredictably, yet doctors and nurses may earn 
little more than someone working in a shop, and both may have their pay 
held in arrears. Some may have a salary of 150 euros per month, others 300-
400, but what many have in common is that someone is holding back on 
actually paying them. This withholding of pay or paying off debts then 
becomes endemic, because one person withholding means someone else 
connected to them does not have the income to pay someone they owe, and 
so on. But at the top, someone else is using that capital to essentially 
subsidise their own interests, or ‘line their pockets’ so to speak. As I discuss 
throughout this thesis, this is certainly the case in agriculture as well yet this 
ambiguity surrounding responsibility for the transition and the illicit dealings 
and degradation of life it has caused is really the dark cloud over Tikveš. 
The result of this is that many people have taken to planting and 
growing produce for their own families as well as for sale at the market. It 
has become well known in Kavadarci and other agricultural towns in fact that 
the outdoor markets, limited in stalls and space, have grown beyond their 
means. Vans and trucks open up on the side streets, selling illegally but 
hoping to make a living as those in the market itself have done for so long. 
Yet is that not the idea of the ‘free-market’? Ironically, although 
specialisation is a main-staple characteristic of capitalist economies, one 
could argue (as has Creed, 1995) that the professional variety has thus 
narrowed in the past decade in the post-socialist world (though food aplenty 
there is for sale).  
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Kinship and family interaction though have taken on entirely 
different and contrasting meaning in post-socialist Tikveš. There is greater 
dependence on family than there was a decade or two ago, as salaries are 
uncertain for those who have jobs, and most young people have no 
employment at all. Kin must therefore chip in and work together but they do 
so in an environment of insecurity and uncertainty. I address this throughout 
my thesis, but certain family members must strike out and do what they can, 
and one’s character and personal connections often come into play here. 
Being married locally and knowing Americans and other foreigners, 
including the Israeli manager of the local ferronickel smelting operation, 
Feni Industries, I was sought out for connections and favours just as any 
family might seek out the same from others. This ‘economy of favours’ 
(Ledeneva 1998) is further discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, but must be fully 
taken into consideration when attempting to better understand the local 
economies that exist in Tikveš.  
As inferred earlier, an obvious alternative to such a life (particularly 
among the young) is that of moving elsewhere for work. Macedonians have a 
long history of doing so, hence the oft-heard statistic that there are just as 
many Macedonians living outside of the country as there are within (2.1 
million). They have gone and returned as pečalbari or gastarbeiteri, both 
terms referring to those migrant workers who go off for sometimes years at a 
time but always with the intent to return to their homeland. Locals often go 
where they know someone else, thus diasporic groups from one town in 
Macedonia have formed in another specific town or country. For example, 
Macedonians from Kavadarci are by and large either in the Patterson, New 
Jersey or Dusseldorf, Germany, while those from Bitola and Ohrid 
(southwest Macedonia) are known to be in Melbourne or Sydney, Australia, 
Detroit, Michigan or Toronto, Canada. The eastern Macedonia diaspora, such 
those as from the town in which I lived as a Peace Corps volunteer (Delčevo) 
was a bit closer to home: Turin, Italy.   
Yet despite this legacy of diaspora, I argue that Macedonians are 
worse off today than they have been in quite some time. Granted there have 
been no recent devastating wars, of which there were many in the first half of 
the 20th century when the Macedonian diaspora first formed due to an exodus 
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of individuals, but rural Macedonians are paralysed by visa regimes 
alongside inflation and constrained finances. Despite television and 
computers, the modern world seems as foreign and distant as ever, a place 
where many young rural individuals might dream to be but cannot fathom 
getting to. Merely completing the paperwork and securing the money to 
apply for a foreign visa seems an overwhelming task to many I met38, for 
although their families struggle at home, the resources a family provides are 
compensation in another form. While not easily quantifiable, the family 
network includes labour, shelter, connections, protection, as well as 
economies in which to interact and seek out goods, opportunities and 
services—even if in limited fashion.  
In Chapter 1, I introduce the Tikveš region but also discuss 
anthropology in and of the country and the greater Balkan region, including a 
general anthropological literature review of the former Yugoslavia, Greece 
and Bulgaria. I then discuss the geographical setting and local history, and 
how it has contributed to the customs and character of the inhabitants of 
Tikveš. Lastly I discuss the home and in reflexive form, gender and being 
male and a son-in-law in Tikveš, and how the male and female spheres differ 
within and outside of the house. In doing so, I hope to foster a stronger sense 
of the region and my life within it. 
In Chapter 2, I focus on the notion of ‘katastrofa’, which 
encapsulates the precariousness of economic life in Tikveš. I use this 
opportunity to address and explain my use of the notions of privatisation, 
neoliberalism and transition. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the history, traditions, land and labour 
associated with grape and wine production. This includes the habitus of the 
region and its inhabitants, the grape types grown in Tikveš, shifting forms of 
production—both in the last decade and century, pricing, purchasing, 
subsidies and notions of the state’s role in the industry. Lastly, as a preface to 
Chapter 4, I discuss the emergence of the ‘wine mafia’, privatisation and the 
crisis since 2008. 
                                                 
38 I often discussed (im)migration as an option with younger individuals I met in the field.  
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In Chapter 4, I discuss in greater detail the effects of privatisation and 
the players in the wine industry, calling upon conversations with a variety of 
them, including wine producers and grape growers, as well as the middlemen 
between them. For they are the special interest groups in this situation, and 
the chapter is meant to not only explain the transformation but investigate the 
factors behind the region’s radical transition and the affect on these groups. 
Therefore, theoretical issues concerning neoliberalism, rule of law, 
democratic versus authoritarian governance, and state legitimacy are 
incorporated.  
In Chapter 5, the region’s future under EU agricultural policy, the 
market for its wine, and its (re)development by international foreign 
development agencies (namely European and American) is discussed. I do so 
primarily through a review of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for 
Rural Development (IPARD) programme—how it is being advertised and 
implemented, who is using it and the projects realised. Leading into Chapter 
6, I discuss the need for connections to take advantage of the IPARD, and the 
incompatibility of development programmes such as the IPARD with the 
needs and perceptions of growers, as well as how the neoliberal project fails 
to consider how it must incentivise individuals to become incorporated into 
it, as merely expecting them to become entrepreneurs is unlikely.  
In Chapter 6, I discuss survival and entrepreneurship, as well as how 
everyday hospitality, sociality and reciprocity are shifting because of the 
region’s economic transition. This conversation incorporates the con-social 
exchange among kin-neighbours in particular, and illustrates how 
‘economies of favour’ are interspersed in such relationships.  
Lastly, in the thesis conclusion I present a synthesis of the transition 
in Tikveš, and its effect on Macedonian identity there. I include in this 
discussion notions of not just privatisation and development, but power, 
inequality, and the intersubjective, lived experience of this transformation. I 
discuss to where the wine region and country seem to be heading and what 
options the country and wine region have as a wine producer, among other 
things.  
This thesis is therefore a compendium of my thoughts, observations 
and experiences after not only a year and a half of fieldwork, but on top of 
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several years spent living elsewhere in the country. What began at university 
as an interest in both Mediterranean societies and post-socialism has 
serendipitously morphed into a place and life in which I have been immersed 
beyond my wildest dreams. Through such work, life and marriage, I have 
learned and experienced over these years more than I could ever put into 
words. Yet it is my hope that the reader will find my interpretation and 
presentation of life and culture in Macedonia generally, and Tikveš 
specifically, to be food for thought at least, and perhaps enlightening in terms 
of gaining a clearer understanding of what is occurring in this near 
Mediterranean, former Yugoslav, pre-EU, Balkan nation—as if that doesn’t 























Chapter 1  
Timeless Tikveš: an anthropology of the region’s people, land 
and life 
 
Introduction: Anthropology in Macedonia 
Like many regions and places of the world, anthropology in and of 
Macedonia and the Western Balkan region has held a unique position in both 
the eyes of the examiner and the examined. Modern anthropology barely 
exists in the region except for the political genre of ethno-nationalism, for 
which there has been a deluge of research since the violent dissolution of 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. When I went to meet with some ‘anthropologists’ 
in early 2011 at the recently renamed Institute for Ethnology and 
Anthropology39 in Skopje—most of them older faculty members who indeed 
only know their discipline to be ‘ethnology’ (etnologija)—they were 
delighted to hear that my research was not on the cliché topic of ethnic or 
national issues in Macedonia.  
But indeed, use of the word antropologija in Macedonia is a recent 
one, and there was only one faculty member, the young Ljupčo Nedelkov, 
who seemed at all understanding of what I was interested in pursuing through 
my research. The other professors (with whom I sat drinking brandy at 11am 
on a weekday during term), were in fact used to discussing the long taught 
ethnology of the country—a discipline which has led to a wonderful 
categorisation of the peoples’ traditional dress and dances, architecture and 
artefacts via ethnographic research and archaeological excavation. However, 
the discipline is otherwise a very general description of Macedonia’s 
cultures, established to suit the nation (narod) based project of the former 
Yugoslav government40.   
                                                 
39 Institut za etnologija i antropologija; previously the ‘School of Ethnology’ (Etnološki 
fakultet) 
40 During the Yugoslav era the respective republics and some of their religious minorities 
(eg, Muslims) were categorized based on their national status. Therefore, the ‘Macedonian 
people’ were the Makedonski narod, Serbians the Srpski narod, Bosnians the Bosanski 
narod, though the Muslims of the federation were called Muslimani in general, and within 
different regions various other names. For example, in Bosnia they are known as Bošnjaci, 
in Serbia they are either the Albanians (Albanci) or the Slavs who converted to Islam called 
Gorani, which in Macedonia are called Torbeši. For more on this complicated yet 
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British visitors to the region have long written about the generally 
friendly and hospitable nature of the people there, but did so through various 
time-sensitive, political lenses. A century ago they wrote about the Ottoman 
regions of Europe, Macedonia being a large and cosmopolitan part of 
‘Turkey in Europe’ (see Appendix 1, Figure 1). The exoticism of Ottoman 
life, particularly the harems of the empire’s nobility, led to a fascination with 
the region given its close proximity to Western Europe41. However, even 
foreign visitors got caught up in the region’s political divisions. Edith 
Durham (1905), who vehemently criticised the monarchical Yugoslav state 
as it developed and referred to the Serbs as ‘vermin’, was held in high esteem 
by Albanians, and was not only close with the Albanian people (including 
the exiled King Zog) but lived among them as a ‘sworn virgin’—a woman 
who dresses as a man and whose female gender is therefore largely 
disregarded42.   
The politics and history of the time are perhaps best covered by 
historians43 but the most interesting, widely publicised exposé of the Balkans 
came not from an anthropologist nor a historian, but the journalist and travel 
writer, Rebecca West. Travelling through the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 
1936-38, she wrote vividly in her massive work Black Lamb and Grey 
Falcon (1941) of the region’s peoples, land and history, considering all to be 
the heart of historical Europe. However, whereas Durham’s relationships and 
writing are seen as pro-Albanian, West’s are seen as pro-Yugoslav and 
Serbian. Nonetheless, her text, at over 1,200 pages in length, remains a 
window to the times: the post-Ottoman inter-war years in which 19th century 
nationalisms were being incorporated into the monarchy—whose legitimacy 
was fragile and which eventually lost out to the communist victories of 
World War II.   
                                                                                                                                            
fascinating aspect of anthropology and Islam in the Balkans, refer to the works of Frances 
Trix (1993, 2008), Tone Bringa (1995) and David Henig (2009, 2012), among others.   
41 The ‘Ottoman’ foot-rest stool, used in Macedonian households to this day for guests to sit 
at around a low-level coffee-table—and not for propping of the feet by any means—come 
from this era, as did what were deemed the lewd dancers of places such as the Moulin 
Rouge in Paris, given the 19th century interest in the Orient.  
42 A tradition which although rare, still exists to this day.  
43 Although anthropologist Keith Brown (2003, 2013) does an excellent job of using 
archival work to dissect just what was occurring in one Macedonian town in 1903, at the 
time of the famous Ilinden (St. Elijah’s Day) uprising and the notions of loyalty surrounding 
the revolts there.   
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Another adventurer’s writings of the 1930s’ are those of Olive Lodge, 
who compiled an ethnography of the vast region of what was then ‘southern 
Serbia’, which included not only Serbia, but Kosovo and Macedonia as well. 
In fact, he includes no bibliography to his text Peasant life in Jugoslavia 
(1942) because ‘the contents of the book…are the result of field work—my 
own wanderings all over Jugoslavia, getting to know peasant and town 
dweller, studying old customs and ceremonies’ (p24)44. 
In terms of academic work in the region, the prolific writing of 
Eugene A. Hammel includes research on social structure, networks and 
kinship, primarily among the industrialising peasantry in 1960s’ Serbia. Joel 
Halpern has also written extensively about Serbia and the former Yugoslavia; 
and although his more well-known works focus on the 1990s’ conflicts and 
their aftermath, he also authored the text titled Yugoslav social structure and 
demography (1982), and earlier articles on the modernising Yugoslav 
countryside and zadruga social structure, as well as migrant labour (pečalba) 
traditions45.  
Although about northern Greece, sociologist Irwin Sander’s work 
Rainbow in the rock: The people of northern Greece (1962) provides an 
insightful look at a Greek speaking village in western Macedonia, just 50 
miles south of the border from the Republic of Macedonia in what is a 
traditionally diverse region near Lake Prespa—a lake shared by Macedonia, 
Greece and Albania. The region has in fact been at the centre of Macedonian 
refugee claims to ancestral lands, and is the subject of Greek anthropologist 
Eleni Myrivili’s research. She wrote her doctoral thesis The Liquid Border: 
Subjectivity at the Limits of the Nation-State in Southeast Europe (2003) 
precisely on the Prespa area, outlining the competing yet overlapping ethnic 
groups, discourses and power structures there. Far more contentious was the 
text Fields of wheat, hills of blood (1997) by another native Greek, Anastasia 
Karakasidou. It evocatively combined archival research, life histories and 
personal knowledge to describe the Greek nationalist assimilation project of 
the inter-war years, and explained with great precision how the portion of 
                                                 
44 The book is dedicated ‘To the spirit of Kosovo’ and includes appendices on everything 
from historical dates to market days in ‘chief towns’ to maternal and infant mortality rates 
to songs and toasts to traditional recipes.  
45 Both are available online at http://works.bepress.com/joel_halpern/  
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Macedonia which lies in northern Greece was Hellenised through 
propagandistic policies and laws coming from Athens, and their 
consequential draconian implementation and forceful assimilation on the 
ground46.  
Tone Bringa’s text on gender and household in Bosnia, Being Muslim 
the Bosnian way (1995), is not only a wonderful ethnographic text, but one 
which came at the end of Yugoslav rule and is thus a window into that era 
and the region’s violent break up. In discussing neighbourly relations, 
identity constantly surfaces given her village’s Catholic and Muslim 
population and helps to reveal the tensions surrounding the radical transition 
that began there two and a half decades ago.     
Contemporary work on Macedonian identity and nation includes that 
by Keith Brown, whose main text The past in question: modern Macedonia 
and the uncertainties of nation (2003), I call upon later in this chapter. 
Loring Danforth also wrote a text on Macedonian nationalism (1995), and his 
most recent text (2012) is an investigation into the evacuation programs 
enacted during the Greek civil war and how they affected the 38,000 
Macedonian children who were displaced by them. Andrew Graan (2010, 
2013) focuses on post-conflict identity and nation-building, and how notions 
of image are incorporated into the ‘nation-branding’ process. Last but not 
least is Hugh Poulton’s text on the diverse peoples of Macedonia, which 
seeks to answer the ‘Macedonian question’ and is in fact titled Who are the 
Macedonians? (2000)—a simple question which garners continued 
consideration yet which has no simple answer.   
Native researchers in the region whose work I have come across 
include Milenko S. Filipović, whose ethnographies—conducted over several 
decades from the 1930s through the Yugoslav era—were mostly written in 
the author’s native tongue47 and Jozo Tomasevich, whose major work is 
Peasants, politics and economic change in Yugoslavia (1975). Ljupčo 
                                                 
46 The author’s father was an Anatolian Greek, forcefully re-moved to Aegean Macedonia 
during the 1920s’ population exchanges. A professor at Wellesley College in the USA, 
Karakasidou received acceptance then rejection by Cambridge University Press (which 
changed their mind due to feared political ill-will from Greece) and several death threats 
upon eventual publication of the book.   
47 Although an English compilation was put together and published in 1982, with the 
assistance of Eugene Hammel.  
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Nedelkov in Skopje wrote an insightful explanation of Tikveš birth 
traditions, which I call upon in the next chapter.  
What one can deduce from this literature is that although the region 
has not been front and centre on the world stage (nor Western governments’ 
interest in it), there has been little contemporary anthropological research 
done there. Yet there has been an ongoing fascination with and interest in the 
peoples and places of the so called Balkans, and the roles they have played in 
the last century. For the Balkans and southeast Europe have sat at the 
intersections of Europe and Asia, West and East, as well as time and space: 
pulled to and fro by competing external and internal interests, the region is an 
amalgamation of cultures, religions and traditions, as well as political and 
economic systems. Whereas the modern nation-state formed in Western 
Europe in the 18th century, it was not until a century later that it did so in the 
Balkans.  Yet the diasporas of the region’s inhabitants, be they Slavic, Greek 
or Albanian; Christian, Jewish or Muslim, have left an indelible footprint on 
the Western world in the 20th and into the 21st centuries. They are a people 
who have spread far and wide, and subtly but surely played a role in the 
modern world. For indeed, they come from a land steeped in tradition and 
conflict, seemingly always in transition from one political and economic 
system to another.  
Indeed, the Balkans and in my experience, Macedonia, sit at a 
crossroads; their history imperative to understanding the present and the 
region a microcosm of the rest of the world. The Tikveš region, with its 
hillside vineyards, snaking rivers, mountains and plateaus, strewn with dirt 
roads and paths for man or machine, shepherd or sheep, is undoubtedly a part 
of this. Knowing the land, people and places is thus paramount in my 
opinion, and in the following text I hope the reader will gain a deeper sense 
of the region in which I not only first resided a decade ago as a Peace Corps 




                                                 
48 My first 12 weeks of my Peace Corps volunteer experience were living in the Negotino 
village of Pepelište, from late November 2002 to early February 2003.    
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The Setting  
The Republic of Macedonia is mountainous. Whereas central Aegean 
Macedonia, in northern Greece, rises ever so slowly from the Aegean Sea 
and allows one to look across great swaths of farmland north of Salonica, 
once one enters ‘Vardar’ Macedonia49 they see a drastically different 
landscape. The road winds alongside the Vardar River, with steep ledges 
rising above, leading to nearby mountains. If one was to follow the main 
motorway, the E-75, all the way north they would pass by several mountain 
ranges and through two large canyon systems, that in the Tikveš town of 
Demir Kapija being the most impressive. The town’s name in fact means 
‘iron gate’ in Turkish, and it was historically a strategic geographical point 
and is indeed a formidable natural barrier. Donned with a fortress in 
medieval times and now a haven for rock climbers, it has in modern times 
been tunnelled through to give access to vehicles travelling south into the 
country’s more Mediterranean climes, where citrus and olives grow on the 
border with Greece.  
There are half a dozen mountain ranges in Macedonia, and within 
them fifteen peaks over two-thousand metres. Thus whereas the lowest point 
in the country is but fifty metres above sea level, alongside the Vardar River 
and E-75 at that same border with Greece, the highest point is Mount Korab, 
at 2,754m, on the border with Albania in the Šar Mountains50. Having lived 
in three distinct regions of the country and wandered their mountain ranges, I 
can speak to the diversity of the land and how topography and location affect 
culture. How individuals greet one another (what they say), respond to 
questions (how they gesture) and the many customs they practice, all depend 
on the way their local culture developed and how isolated they were or 
remain. Indeed, I feel rather certain that if Macedonia were instead flat, the 
country’s cultures and peoples would be much more homogenous. Instead, 
the combination of history and geography has meant that with every invasion 
or migration, groups nestled themselves further up in the mountains in order 
                                                 
49 The portion of Macedonia which constitutes the Republic of Macedonia, and which will 
hereby be called ‘Macedonia’, is named so for the Vardar River which originates in its north 
and drains into the sea near Salonica. The third portion of the greater Macedonian territory 
is Pirin Macedonia in southwest Bulgaria, named so for the great Pirin Mountains there.  
50 The highest peak in all of southeast Europe is Mount Musala in Bulgaria’s Rila 
Mountains, standing at 2,925m. 
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to avoid subjugation. Whether this was successful is debatable, but by 
isolating themselves various groups indeed developed different dialects, 
customs and characteristics. The Macedonian saying ‘a hundred villages, a 
hundred customs’ (sto sela, sto adeta) helps illustrate this, or to paraphrase 
the 17th century philosopher Blaise Pascal’s statement about the Pyrenees, 
there are truths on one side of the mountain which are falsehoods on the 
other51.   
Granted socialist industrialisation led to a significant depletion of 
mountain villages, but Macedonians across the country are still attached to 
their ancestral regions, and I have heard more times than I can count the 
references given to the villages of one’s parents. Furthermore, while living in 
Skopje I heard the dialects spoken by friends from different corners of the 
country, and was told with pride about their various and often differing 
customs: how and which holidays are celebrated, which forms hospitality 
takes, how they greet one another, and the like.   
Yet Macedonia is only 25,713 square kilometres in size, or just 
slightly larger than the American state of Vermont, and one-quarter larger 
than Wales. It is bordered by Albania to the west, Kosovo and Serbia to the 
north, Bulgaria to the east and Greece to the south (see Appendix 1, Figure 
2). In every corner of the country, and indeed at different elevations, there 
exist a variety of ecosystems, soil and rock types, flora and fauna, and thus 
agriculture. There are olives and citrus between Strumica and Gevgelija in 
the south; rice paddies near Kočani in the east; tobacco in the southwest 
around Prilep; and grain grows throughout the lengthy plain of Pelagonia, 
leading to the former Ottoman regional capital of Bitola52. These agricultural 
concentrations are partially due to Ottoman and then Yugoslav government 
directed production though, for I have seen corn growing in every corner of 
the country, just as I have vineyards. However, as I discuss in Chapter 3, 
Tikveš takes the prize as the largest concentrated wine region, not just in the 
country but the whole of southeast Europe.  
                                                 
51 Written by Pascal (1966) in his Pensees (‘thoughts’), which was first published as a 
volume in 1669. 
52 Bitola, called ‘Manastir’ during the Ottoman era, is also known as the ‘city of consuls’ 
and is an impressively preserved town located at the foot of the beautiful Pelister National 
Park, whose mountains tower above the town.  
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 The impressive agricultural production of Macedonia is due to its 
mineral rich soil and excellent growing climate. The winters are generally 
continental: cold, rainy, and snowy, and the build-up of precipitation in the 
mountains is an excellent source of water for the mostly hot, dry and sunny 
summers. Indeed, good soil, water and plenty of sunshine allow nearly 
anything to grow, and never have I seen such a diversity of wild and 
domesticated produce than in Macedonia. In town or country one will, 
depending on the season, come across apricots, peaches, strawberries, 
blackberries, blueberries, figs, persimmons, pears, plums and apples, among 
other fruits. Additionally, the abundance of sun makes for excellent melon 
and squash production, as well as vegetables, the most common being 
cucumbers, tomatoes, a variety of peppers, aubergines, cabbage and carrots.  
Tikveš is a part of the Povardarie region—the rocky yet fertile stretch 
of land which runs south from Skopje along the Vardar River. The Tikveš 
valley is the largest section of it, however, and is comprised of the five 
municipalities of Kavadarci, Rosoman, Gradsko, Negotino and Demir Kapija 
(see Appendix 1, Figures 3-4). Further, the region has a distinctive 
Mediterranean micro-climate due to the Vardar River acting as a conduit. 
Although the water flows south, air from the Aegean Sea heads north 
through the Demir Kapija canyon (klisura). The effect of this warmer, 
slightly more Aegean humidified air is that Tikveš, surrounded on all sides 
by a variety of natural barriers in the forms of ridges, hills and mountains, 
acts like a Mediterranean climate bay: hot and dry summer days, but winter 
days which are sunnier than elsewhere in the country, and along with 
Gevegelija, are the warmest53. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for winter 
temperatures to plummet to minus twenty Celsius, even though summer 
temperatures may well reach forty degrees at their hottest. The average 
temperature is thus thirteen degrees Celsius, yet the difference between day 
and night is usually significant, with temperatures shifting fifteen to twenty 
degrees.  
                                                 
53 Demir Kapija and Gevgelija are known as the warmest towns in the country—milder than 
the rest of the country during winter, and very hot in summer. Both hold the hottest 
temperatures ever recorded in the country, and often hit 40 degrees Celsius during summer.  
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Because Kavadarci is the largest municipality in the region (and the 
entire country, incidentally) and because I lived there throughout my 
fieldwork experience, I seek to elaborate further on the town and area. The 
municipality covers 1,132 square kilometres, and its southern half is 
comprised of the foothills, sheep pastures and then peaks of the Kožuf 
Mountains, which comprise one-sixth of the country’s border with Greece. 
Kavadarci also makes up the largest share of the Tikveš valley.  
Etymologically, the name Kavadarci supposedly originates from the 
Greek word kavadion, referring to a cape made from a specific sort of textile 
which was purportedly produced in the town or region. The first written 
record of the town’s name dates to the early days of the Ottoman Empire in 
1519, when Kavadarci and Tikveš were a part of the well known Salonica 
vilayet54, and Kavadarci was known as a small, agricultural town. Indeed, it 
has long been known for its agricultural production, as prior to socialism a 
variety of domesticated plant cultures flourished there in addition to grapes, 
including poppy, sesame, barley, cotton and tobacco. As I mention in the 
introduction, the latter two goods, in particular, were mass produced due to 
global competition facing the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century, and 
persisted into the 1950s when most informants mention having worked in 
their families’ fields of tobacco and/or cotton while growing up55.  
With a total population of just over 70,000 inhabitants56 in Tikveš, 
the majority of who work in agriculture, there is a plethora of produce 
grown, much of which goes unaccounted for. Official statistics partially help 
to illustrate the importance of agriculture, nationally as well as locally in 
Tikveš. Nationally, agriculture makes up 9.5% of GDP but those employed 
in agriculture make up 19.9% of the work force. This data is skewed though 
                                                 
54 A vilayet was an Ottoman province. 
55 Macedonian tobacco, now coming predominantly from the city of Prilep an hour to the 
west of Kavadarci, still makes its way to Salonica’s port for eventual distribution to 
international markets, and is known for its high quality, being labelled ‘Turkish tobacco’ 
and purchased for use in Camel cigarettes, among others. The major difference between 
cigarette production a century ago and now is that most of the cigarettes are actually 
produced in Macedonian factories, including one in Kavadarci. One former factory in 
Salonica is in fact a tobacco themed boutique hotel which I had the pleasure of staying at in 
2010.  
56 According to the last census (2002) the municipalities of Tikveš have the following 
populations: Kavadarci: 38,741; Negotino: 19,212; Rosoman: 4,141; Demir Kapija: 4,545; 
Gradsko: 3,760 
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because, as I discuss in Chapters 3 and 6, there are many individuals—
employed, unemployed or retired—and kin of all ages who work informally 
in agriculture. Indeed, entire households participate in the production, 
harvesting and selling of their produce. Further, unlike the industrial, service 
oriented capital, Skopje, where the latter occupations comprise the lion’s 
share of job opportunities and GDP57, in Tikveš I frequently heard that three-
quarters of its approximately 20,000 households live off of agriculture. In 
fact, in small villages, of which there are fifty in the Kavadarci municipality 
alone, only a small minority of individuals work in industry or services (for 
which they must travel to a town such as Kavadarci or Negotino). The clear 
majority of villagers therefore either work for former socially owned 
enterprises (kombinati) and their plantations, or subsist off of the land.  
 
Historical interactions at the crossroads of Macedonia 
Tikveš is about as centrally located as possible in the greater Macedonian 
area. Just south of Demir Kapija there is a restaurant along the motorway and 
Vardar River called ‘113’, referring to the number of kilometres to either 
Skopje to the north or Salonica to the south. And the western or eastern 
borders of the region, with Albania or within Bulgaria (‘Pirin Macedonia’) 
respectively, are three hours away. To reach Kavadarci one must travel ten 
kilometres north from Demir Kapija to Negotino (which also sits beside the 
Vardar River along the E-75 motorway), and then another ten kilometres 
southwest up and over hillsides of vineyards.  
Despite being a part of the Tikveš valley, Kavadarci is a small valley 
town of its own, straddling the Luda Mara (‘Crazy Mary’) River coming 
down from the massive Vitač plateau above town, and the Kožuf Mountains 
even further up. The town is thus twice as long as it is wide, and sits on hilly 
slopes which the river has cut through over time. It has a beautiful city park 
on its east side, where cobblestone paths weave up to and around a large hill. 
The forested park, one of the few places one will hear melodic bird-song in 
                                                 
57 Twenty-seven percent of GDP comes from industry, and 63.4% comes from services; and 
in terms of the labour force, industry provides jobs for 22.1% of those employed, and 
services 58%. Further, one-third of the country’s population (2.2 million) resides in Skopje.  
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the town, includes a restaurant, playground, wine house58 (vinoteka) and at 
top, a large socialist monument59 to the fallen heroes of the early 20th 
century. It is one of many monuments around town to such ‘fighters’ (borci), 
from both World War II (known as the National Liberation War in 
Macedonian) and uprisings against first the Serbian then Bulgarian occupiers 
in the inter-war period.  
The most famous of these was the ‘Tikveš uprising’ (Tikveško 
vostanie) in 1913 against Serb occupiers—who remained until Word War 
II—when approximately 500 local individuals and their family members 
were killed in reprisal. Another uprising occurred upriver from town at what 
is now a park-monument called locally ‘twelve children’ (dvanaeset deca, 
and officially ‘twelve comrades/friends’60). It commemorates the day in 1944 
when 12 young men—some just teenagers—were gathered there and 
supposedly conspiring against the fascist-allied Bulgarian occupiers who 
ruled Macedonia from 1943-46. The men, with some young girls present as 
well61, were executed on the spot or as they tried to flee, and the event serves 
as a reminder of the distance between Bulgaria’s good-will toward 
Macedonia and its historical actions within the country62. I was told by one 
                                                 
58 The wine house is actually a recent installation—completed toward the end of my 
fieldwork through European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) funding. 
Its completion, however, was plagued by corruption and the theft of its initial funds by the 
previous mayor, and it is only sporadically open for business.  
59 Known as Kosturnica, or ‘house of bones’ (bone being koska), the monument built of 
concrete yet with the bones of some of said heroes with its walls. It is an ailing monument 
and a serious danger because of its crumbling concrete and holes in the viewing platform 
atop, but with a height of 15m and sitting in a hilltop, it affords an excellent view of the 
town of Kavadarci and the surrounding hills.  
60 Dvanaeset drugari, the latter word being used during socialism as both comrade and 
friend, and still officially in use when referring to acquaintance-friends or school classmates 
(which contrasts with other former Yugoslav republics, such as Croatia, where there has 
been a strict, intentional separation from using such terminology; in both countries though 
the word for a good friend is a form of pri(j)atel.) 
61 I met one of these women in 2011 at the annual commemoration ceremony. She still 
vividly recalled the day she saw her older brother killed in cold blood, chased down and 
shot three times as he tried to flee. 
62 Bulgaria was the first country to recognise Macedonia upon independence in 1991, yet it 
denies that the inhabitants of the country are anything other than a mixture of Bulgarians, 
Serbs, Albanians, etc., nor that Macedonian is a separate language from Bulgarian (as they 
are mutually comprehensible). They thus deny Macedonians their identity and right to self-
determination in short, and join many neighbours in their aspirations to dissect Macedonia 
into its supposed national parts—the Albanian populated northwest being part of a ‘greater 
Albania’, and the other neighbouring countries seeking the majority of its territory, as they 
did in the Balkan Wars, World War I and inter-war era, as their own. The history of shifting 
allying and fighting in 1912-13 are particularly good evidence of this, as the Greeks 
consider Macedonia to be inhabited by Slavs and others, but Greek in history and territory, 
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individual though how when the war ended, the Bulgarian officers were 
captured and publicly stoned to death by men and women on the spot where 
the Tikveš Winery now sits on the west side of town. That individual, my 
father-in-law’s cousin, Kole, was just a boy when this happened but he was 
present to witness it.  
The town and region therefore, while largely agricultural, rural and 
relatively distant from the tension of inter-ethnic border zones and large 
cities, sit along a key transit route and have been subject to occupations over 
time, and which for the elderly generation are still in memory. I heard many 
stories about the allied German-Bulgarian occupation in the 1940s, and the 
atrocities committed at the time. For example, my wife’s father’s family fled 
into the hills near to the secluded village of Begnište63 when my father-in-
law’s oldest brother was just an infant. Without much food, they were not 
sure if who would survive, as young men such as my wife’s grandfather, 
Aleksandar, stayed and fought, and the father of cousin Kole died in the 
eventual liberation of Kavadarci in 1944— a local holiday still celebrated 
annually on 7 September.  
Another story I heard of German occupation occurred in the small 
village of Prždevo, a few kilometres from the Vardar River between 
Negotino and Demir Kapija. As recounted by my good friend, Slavko, whose 
father is from there, in retaliation for the ambushing of German soldiers the 
men of the village were gathered in a group and forced to play a game. With 
a locally married Slovenian woman who spoke German translating, the men 
were lined up and instructed to drop when they heard the rapport of a rifle. In 
this way no one knew who was going to be shot and all fell to the ground, yet 
they then had to stand back up and await their turn, as the Germans went on 
firing until all of the men were executed. And in a formerly Muslim village 
                                                                                                                                            
whereas Serbs and Bulgarians consider Macedonia to be inhabited by a mixed lot of ethnic 
groups, but the Slavic majority being either Serbian or Bulgarian, respectfully. Bulgaria has 
also granted citizenship to Macedonians willing to vow that they are Bulgarian, with the 
trade-off being an EU passport for Macedonians and Bulgaria upping its claims to 
Macedonia as a Bulgarian inhabited region. Further, a more recent historical issue came 
with the opening of the Holocaust Museum in Skopje in 2010 and a film made in 2011 
about the extermination of Macedonia’s Jews at the hands of the Bulgarian occupiers (The 
Third Half).  
63 Whose name likely comes from the Ottoman term beg, but which ironically means in 
Macedonian and South Slavic languages a place where refugees (begalci) or someone who 
is running away (bega) might be.  
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nearby, Besvica64, there is a plaque by the village fountain (češma) and 
crumbling mosque with the names of 50-60 men who were killed there by 
the fascist ‘beast’ (zver) of German and Bulgarian occupiers.       
I discuss such historical events because they indeed persist in the 
conversations and oral histories of the region’s inhabitants, and 
understanding who the people think they are clarifies for the outsider what 
individuals feel constitutes part of their collective identity. For instance, old 
photos of my wife, Irena’s, family show some of the more subtle effects of 
these occupations, and this knowledge plays into her family’s perception of 
those nation-states today and their role in current affairs. A post card 
addressed to Irena’s grand-father, Aleksandar, had his surname, Manakov, 
spelled with the Serbian suffix –ić (Manaković), and a later photo of his shop 
(where he was a tailor) had the Bulgarian Cyrillic accent ‘Ь’ (which the 
Macedonian alphabet does not have) placed at the end (МАНАКОВЬ). In 
addition, their name was Vlach65 to begin with, and not Slavic at all—it went 
from Manaki to Manakov and beyond as a result of politics (and the 
accompanying lexical shifts) in the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Like so many Macedonians, Irena’s grandparents, born in the 1920s, 
lived through World War II and significant social change. But her great-
grandparents, born just before the turn of the century, lived through the 
demise of the Ottoman era, the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-13) and 
World War I, not to mention its aftermath and into Serbian occupation and 
World War II. This was a time of great destruction, migration and tragedy in 
greater Macedonia, as various budding nation-states and armies vied for 
power and control over the region, and peoples were persecuted based on 
their supposed national identities.  
                                                 
64 Most of its inhabitants went to Turkey with the onset of socialism after WWII. Tikveš 
was in fact a densely populated Muslim region of Macedonia, given its location and the 
agricultural trade over which Ottoman nobility presided. Old photos of towns such as 
Kavadarci and Negotino show several mosque minarets towering above, and in fact the 
towns were primarily populated by Muslims, with the Christian Macedonians living in 
smaller, rural villages.  
65 The Vlach are a minority group in the Balkans who descend from the Aromanians, a 
Latin speaking group residing in the Balkans since the time of the Roman Empire when 
legionnaires and native peoples who were Latinised and made citizens of the empire mixed. 
Indeed, Aromanian comes from the term Romanus, or Roman citizen.    
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In fact, as anthropologists such as Keith Brown (2003) and Loring 
Danforth (1995) have illustrated, many inhabitants of the region were not 
sure what to call themselves in the shifting political landscape, as the 
Ottoman millet system of categorising the empire’s peoples based on their 
religion—namely Christian, Muslim or Jew—was shifting into categories of 
ethno-national identity. In particular, given the national Orthodox churches 
of neighbouring states, the Christians of the region suddenly became 
Bulgarian, Serbian or Greek, and patriarchate or exarchate, as these nations 
sought to indoctrinate the people of Macedonia into their own churches and 
national folklore, and concurrently take Vardar Macedonia as their prize. To 
do so, national schools were setup alongside Bulgarian, Serbian or Greek 
Orthodox churches, and depending on the location locals may very well have 
expressed deference to the newcomers, particularly if they seemed to stand to 
gain from doing so. Names were changed, allegiances shifted and families 
and communities divided.  
Indeed, for many the first half of the 20th century was a time of 
confusion, chaos and great uncertainty, as there were large migrations and 
expulsions of Turks and Jews alongside the region’s leaders vying for their 
share of Macedonia. In Aegean Macedonia, Slavs were forced north into 
modern-day Vardar Macedonia, while at the same time the Greek and former 
Ottoman governments agreed to population exchanges of Greeks in Anatolia 
(modern day Turkey) with Macedonian Turks and other Muslims. This 
resulted in a radical transition in and ethnic cleansing of Aegean 
Macedonia66, which has been rarely discussed in recent decades outside of 
the region except for by academics such as Karakasidou and Myrivili, as well 
                                                 
66 Indeed, with the concurrent expulsion of Turks alongside the 600,000 Anatolian Greeks 
who were re-settled in Aegean Macedonia in the 1920s, as well as due to the 1926 Greek 
‘Law on Topographical Names’ whereby all towns, villages, rivers and mountains were 
given Greek names, the region’s ethnic and cultural makeup was drastically altered within a 
very brief period of time. Furthermore, there was the strict prohibition of the use of the 
Slavic Macedonian language—be it in public or at home—from the late 1930s on, a 
draconian measure which still exists in various forms. Knowledge of this historical fact was 
shared with me by several informants in Kavadarci, as the region’s proximity to Aegean 
Macedonia meant many refugees (begalci) fled into and settled in Tikveš, referring to their 




as Mark Mazower (2006) in his book on Salonica and its pre-Greek religious 
diversity and Ottoman cosmopolitanism.  
The 20th century indeed saw significant change in the region, and this 
was evident in the old photos of Irena’s great-grandparents. Their dress, with 
her great-grandmother wearing a headscarf covering all but her face and her 
great-grandfather wearing a long coat and a fez cap, was taken at the end of 
an era—Ottoman Macedonia’s demise. This history helps paint a portrait of 
the Manakov family in the 20th century, as they have lived in the same region 
of Macedonia for over a century, and likely longer. Irena’s great-
grandparents, all from and living in the Tikveš region their entire lives, were 
born during the Ottoman era; her grandparents were then born into the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in what was being called ‘Southern Serbia’; her 
parents were born just after World War II into the fledging Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and Irena and her brother, Igor, were also 
born into that federation’s increasingly independent ‘SFR Macedonia’. And 
now, our daughter and the generation born after 1991 will only know the 
independent Republic of Macedonia—the first time in the nation’s long 
history that Macedonia has in fact been an independent, sovereign republic.  
Therefore, while Ottoman rule lasted nearly five centuries, in just one 
century the Tikveš region—along with the rest of the country—has been 
subject to the rule of six different states, kingdoms, regimes or republics, 
with governance coming in various forms from Istanbul, Berlin, Belgrade, 
Sofia, Skopje and Athens (if one considers the plight of the refugees from 
what is now northern Greece). Moreover, some born just before the Balkan 
Wars of 1912-13 who lived into the 1990s would have passed through and 
experienced all of these changes. What effect this tortuous past has had on 
the culture, customs and character of Macedonian and Tikveš society and its 
people is difficult to pin down, but cannot be disregarded and I hope will 
come through as a consideration of mine and for the reader throughout this 
thesis.  
 
Living in ‘Timeless’ Tikveš Macedonia 
One of the first things I realised upon moving to Kavadarci was that I needed 
to learn to speak the Kavadarci dialect (da lafam Kav’darečki), though others 
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said I just needed to learn to drink rakija, swear (p’cue)67 and work in the 
vineyards (and no doubt the dialect would be picked up in the process). All 
these things I did, but it was not through living in a small village, rather it 
was by living with Irena and her family. For it was not an option to live on 
our own when one’s immediate family was right there, even if it meant (in a 
wholly Western form) sacrificing our privacy. Further, it would appear that 
there was some discord in the family if we were to have done so—and 
discord may have been the result if I had insisted on living separately, as I 
would be offending my parents-in-law. Back in her home domain and always 
fearing the detriment of gossip, Irena was thus very concerned about this; she 
did not understand why I would want to pay rent on an old flat anyhow, and 
she had a point: living with her family saved us money and was enriching in 
multiple ways. Besides the practical aspect of sharing food and utility costs, 
as well as helping us care for our new daughter, Vera, Irena’s parents were 
informative, helpful and wonderful to live with overall. We had our moments 
of disagreement of course, but I came to speak daily to and learn from 
Irena’s father, Mančo (whom I could hardly understand prior to my 
fieldwork because of his use of the rich colloquial speech), as well as her 
mother, Rosa68. They are gracious, generous and always engaging 
individuals, despite my father-in-law’s archetype, Macedonian-male 
personality69.  
 Although an agricultural town, life in Kavadarci is always in a flurry of 
activity. Individuals are constantly coming from or going to work, the 
vineyards or fields, the market, a café, shop, the grocery or just a walk into 
town. Relatives and neighbours visit one another from mid-morning until 
                                                 
67 People from Kavadarci (Kavadarčani) are well known for their swearing. It is not 
uncommon to greet a friend with a ‘How are you, I’m [going] to screw your mother!’ (Kaj 
si da ja ebam majka ti!) In fact, either in casual conversation or out of frustration, men 
predominantly will use the ‘I’m [going] to screw it/your mother’ (da go ebam/da ja ebam 
majka ti) or the less threatening but equally sexual ‘pussy of your mother’ (pičku mater).  
68 The name Rosa means ‘dew’ and is not pronounced with a ‘z’ but a ‘s’ sound. The name 
which comes from rose would be Roza in Macedonian.   
69 Although I do not engage much in discussions of gender other than toward the end of this 
chapter, my father-in-law was the embodiment of such archetype male traits as charisma, 
machismo and authority. Because of his previous political standing as the first mayor of the 
town after the breakup of Yugoslavia as well as his position as the town’s only oral surgeon, 
he is respected, used to negotiation and full of character, and in turn exudes a sense of 
authority. Further, his rare given name is co-incidentally so similar to the word ‘macho’ that 
it only seems natural for his character to match up.   
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early afternoon, and again after the traditional lunch time and afternoon 
siesta70. Society and its social structure, in short, seem characterised by a 
busy-ness, and one could say that people seem anxious to enjoy. Yet in fact 
there are the mundane tasks and chores of daily life, along with religious and 
ritual celebrations and other events to prepare for, hold or attend, 
bureaucracy to deal with and connections to maintain. 
The town is comprised of distinct neighbourhoods, or maala (maalo, 
sg). Ours was the ‘church neighbourhood’ (crkvinsko maalo), since our 
house sits just below the town’s main church near the centre, while the newer 
buildings (built since the 1960s) are known as the ‘new centre’ (nov centar). 
Unlike in villages, where houses are clusters of buildings and space—such as 
the house, outdoor oven (furna), hen-house, utility shed, garden and pig-pen, 
houses in town are more likely to be on small, demarcated square plots, 
separated by fences, walls or just the structure of the houses themselves. 
Indeed, although not always fully enforced, there has been urban zoning, and 
the houses may not have any outdoor space except for a terrace or balcony on 
the property. Further, whereas in towns urban planning has led to a more 
defined grid of streets, the roads weaving through a village are often 
centuries’ old, and thus the village exists in a circular shape. That said, in 
Tikveš one will rarely see a street sign or hear people use the names of 
streets to describe location. Instead, it is determined by its proximity to a 
public place, building or something or someone else mutually known 
between those conversing (eg, an acquaintance’s house).   
What both Tikveš villages and towns have in common is that most 
households are patrilineal and patrilocal, and although several homes will 
occupy an area of buildings, there are often kin relations among them, 
comprising the main social units of society71. Kin relations are both intimate 
and intense, and indeed make up the social lives of individuals and 
neighbours in Tikveš. Houses in Kavadarci may have back gardens but they 
almost always have front gardens and/or seating in front of the house, either 
                                                 
70 There is no word in Macedonian for the afternoon break other than that used for lunch, 
ruček. However, shops are closed in the afternoon after one or two o’clock and re-open in 
the early evening (usually between four and five o’clock), working for several hours more.   
71 See Chapter 6 for more on such kin-neighbour relations and the reciprocity which binds 
them.  
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on balconies, terraces or just in the garden itself. A table and a few chairs 
make for an easy place to sit, have coffee, chat with passers-by and keep an 
eye on things. Privacy (privatnost) is not a word often heard, as 
Macedonians’ social perspective is geared toward their collective kin 
(rodnini) and neighbours (komšii), not just their immediate [nuclear] family 
(semejstvo) within the home72. Houses, being largely un-insulated and built 
of stone or brick, remain cold until the constant heat of summer warms them. 
Therefore, on a warm spring or early summer day it may very well be chilly 
inside, but hot in the sun outside. This of course lends to the concern about a 
draft (promaja), described in the thesis Introduction.  
To illustrate what a typical contemporary Tikveš Macedonian home 
is like, I will use two households in which I have visited or resided in 
Tikveš—those of my wife’s family and my former Peace Corps host-family 
in the Negotino village of Pepelište. Both houses are modern, having been 
built and renovated during the latter half of the 20th century. Unlike earlier 
housing, made of wood beams and mud bricks, modern houses are made of 
cinder blocks filled with concrete and supported with steel rods, making for 
very sturdy albeit poorly insulated structures73. The windows, made of wood 
frames, often lack any sort of additional insulating lining as well. 
Fortunately, modern homes do include the common to Central Europe built-
in, drop-down shutters, which are operated by a cord inside. When these are 
closed a room becomes both nearly pitch-dark and slightly better insulated—
the heat staying in better and the cold out.  
Both of the houses in Pepelište and Kavadarci have mudroom 
entryways, which are tiled floors at ground level where shoes are removed 
(and in most seasons of the year except summer, slippers are put on74). There 
are doorways from the mudrooms leading into a cellar-like storage room 
                                                 
72 Immediate family members are in fact the most important thing to most people, and the 
conversations had within the closed walls of the house differ significantly from those held 
outside, as I discuss in the next chapter as well as Chapter 6. Further, the maintenance of 
good relations is more than a genuine form of good neighbourly relations—it is a way of 
ensuring one’s presence in the local social network and its economy of favours. 
73 Mud brick homes, if properly constructed, are reportedly better insulated, as the walls are 
built up to a metre thick.  
74 There are often ample slippers in a Macedonian home for guests, as concerns about 
catching a cold in the winter from a cold floor are legitimate—with poor insulation, tile or 
wood flooring and an unheated ground floor beneath the living space, the floor remains cool 
in the winter at best, even if the house is well heated.  
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(podrum), and the house in the village has half a flight of steps leading down 
into its cellar, as it is in fact partially subterranean. In both houses these 
storage rooms contain a variety of goods, and are where produce is kept. 
There are always baskets for potatoes and onions, which are staples in 
Macedonian cooking; large bags of flour for the intensive baking and 
production of pecivo, or pastry dough and other such goods (bread usually 
being bought in shops) which many Macedonian women make regularly; and 
zimnica, which are a variety of homemade jarred goods. Such goods are a 
significant portion of the winter and spring diet, and include the roasted red 
pepper and aubergine spreads called ajvar, pindzur or lutenica, the aubergine 
only condiment called malidzano, pickled salads and vegetables, tomato 
sauce, jams including strawberry, apricot and blackberry, and traditional 
slatki (‘sweets’), which are a variety of fruits but often raisins, grapes, 
cherries and even aubergine, in a thick, sweet syrup and traditionally served 
to guests with Turkish coffee. The podrum is of course also where wine and 
brandy are stored, as the cooler temperature keeps the former in better 
condition as it ages. Depending on the house, there may be other items there 
such as a washing machine and a wood burning stove, which is connected to 
radiators elsewhere in the house, as was the case in both of these modernised 
homes75.  
 To reach the living room, (dnevna soba76) and main living space of the 
house, one must go upstairs to the first floor. Traditionally, the first floor is 
where families cook, eat, socialise and sleep. In our house this was the 
case—the ground floor contained the podrum, a garage-storage room77, as 
well as a dental clinic which Mančo had installed in the 1990s, and which is 
rented to a young dentist for her practice. In Pepelište, there is living space 
on the ground floor—one of two kitchens (kujna, sg.), the dining room 
(trpezarija), a toilet (toalet) and a bedroom (spalna soba) which housed 
Zoran’s grandfather (before he passed away at the age of 104 in 2005—at the 
                                                 
75 To have radiators installed in a house is an expensive affair and a sign of relative wealth. 
The majority of town or village homes have only wood-burning stoves in the kitchen and 
living rooms, with bedrooms left unheated. This means that in winter, families spend an 
exceptional amount of time together in the living room and kitchen areas.  
76 Literally ‘daily room’ 
77 This is not the norm, and our garage was just barely large enough to fit a car into it. 
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time the oldest living man in the country), and where Zoran’s mother now 
sleeps.  
On the first floor there are two bedrooms on one side of the hallway, 
a bathroom, and then a large living room with doors to an outdoor terrace 
(terasa) with a table and laundry lines. In Kavadarci though, the kitchen and 
living room are connected and L-shaped around the east and north sides of 
the house. There is a long and narrow balcony (balkon) alongside the 
kitchen, used mainly for drying the laundry, and another on the west side of 
the house, attached to one of the four bedrooms.  The main bathroom in the 
house (kupatilo78), where there is both a shower and bathtub, is located in 
close proximity to the bedrooms.  
Because of the structure of the houses and the arid environment—
where even on warm days the temperature falls significantly by early 
morning—Macedonian homes are relatively pleasant to be in except for 
during the intense heat of July and August. At such times the house will heat 
up like an oven, and will stay warm throughout the night, though sleeping 
with an open window will bring some relief after midnight. To maintain a 
warm house in the winter is another predicament. A family must feed their 
stove regularly, and indeed nearly all homes are heated in such a manner. For 
longer-lasting fuel, we used Macedonian coal (jaglen, čumor), though like 
many families we predominantly burned wood which was gathered the 
previous summer79.  
Most families, however, with restricted access to such fuel, only heat 
their home in the afternoon and evening. At night they sleep in thick pyjamas 
and under an even thicker blanket (kjebe) and duvet (jorgan). Given Irena 
and Vera being home most of the day, however, we heated our house 
throughout the day—a luxury we were able to afford because of my research 
support80. Mančo or Rosa would usually start the fire in the morning (by 
                                                 
78 Kupati is the south Slavic verb infinitive ‘to bathe’, though the actual verb used to 
describe bathing in Macedonian—as opposed to Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian (B/C/S)—is se 
banja. 
79 The distribution of wood is a political process as much as it is a bureaucratic one, but 
regardless is state run and happens in June and July. Illegal logging is common—because 
wood costs nearly 50 euros per cubic metre, or 600 euros for an average winter’s worth—
but those caught are increasingly subject to severe fines.  
80 Incidentally, I could never actually get my father-in-law to sit down and discuss how we 
might help out financially, and he never asked. Therefore, we purchased the majority of 
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which time on cold winter nights the house had chilled considerably from 
lack of heating at night) and it would be fed throughout the morning. On 
mild days it would be let to die out but in the late afternoon to early evening, 
when the winter sun disappeared and temperatures fell, would be relit.  
The unfortunate result of burning wood and coal (among other 
things81), is that the town’s air quality goes from bad to worse in the winter. 
Whereas in the summer air pollution is just tractor and car exhaust combined 
with dust on hot days, in the winter it is a combination of everything being 
burned and emitted otherwise, the accumulation of such particulate matter, 
and the more frequent cloud cover which seemed to hold in the pollution. 
When out walking or going to the market though, the winter is a more 
comfortable time to be in town, as in the summer the air and heat make it 
unbearable except for in the morning and late evening. In short, summer and 
winter both require adjustment to the extreme heat or cold, respectively, and 
are at times rather arduous to deal with.  
However, life goes on and people stop to say hello and drink coffee 
indoors or out depending on the weather, and men selling the sesame seed, 
bagel-like rings (gjevrek) from their push-carts shout for your attention: 
‘Warm gjevrek! Warmmmm!82’ There is in fact a particular way of 
socialising in Kavadarci, characteristic of small-town southern European and 
Mediterranean societies: older individuals speak at their garden gates or on 
the streets, while younger adults go for drinks in a kafič or congregate in 
parks, and children play in their families’ gardens, on the streets or in 
alleyways. Even in the winter, primarily older men stand about in the town 
centre (čaršija) or sit in male-dominated taverns (kafani), engaged in 
conversation and games such as cards or backgammon. But teenagers, most 
of all, walk the streets in groups with their classmates (drugari) and friends 
(prijateli). They walk arm-in-arm, stalling to chat as they have learned from 
their parents and grandparents, yet being mixed-gender, seek to connect with 
                                                                                                                                            
food and paid for miscellaneous goods to make sure that we were paying our fair share of 
the household expenses.   
81 The odours in the air and from what others have told me indicate that many will burn 
anything they can to stay warm, including plastic bags, bottles and other refuse, as well as 
tyres.   
82 ‘Topli gjevrek, topliiii!’ Tikveš gjevrek are boiled like bagels but are more like round 
sesame seed pretzels—thin and 5-6 inches in diameter.  
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others in a way only adolescents do; like youth around the world, they seek 
company (društvo) and to converse with one another. 
Regardless of age, there is a locally constructed art to conversation 
everywhere, and Tikveš is no exception. The constant contact with people on 
the street means that the questions are general rather than specific, and work 
(such as in the vineyards or fields) and family affairs are usually mentioned 
in response. Indeed, there are not direct questions expecting direct answers, 
but circumlocution and exchanging of pleasantries. People speak to one 
another theatrically, but also like one speaks to a foreigner who does not 
know English well—slowly, audibly and often repetitiously83. Further, 
whereas with a group (or at dinner) in the West there might well be several 
conversations going on at once, this is very rare in my experience in 
Macedonia. Individuals may speak, balk, yell, interrupt or jest, but it is 
perfectly normal to do so and such discourse occurs within the group with all 
eyes on the speaker. Naturally though, an individual who carries on too long 
may eventually be cut-off by others wanting to speak, and the topic of 
conversation will change. Yet the latter are rarely exchanges of ideas and 
knowledge, nor attempts at truth-seeking and enlightenment. Instead they are 
a splattering of metaphors, stories or jokes on the more positive side, and a 
ruing of deleterious societal trends on the other—politics (local, domestic 
and international), the government, the economy, etc. Regardless of topic 
though, a conversation is a canvas quickly covered with verbal illustrations, 
and there is not a rush to complete it. There may be pauses and immediate 
observations made at the time though, and social engagements thus often last 
several hours at least. Such social contact and connectedness might therefore 
constitute a good amount of one’s day, making time a matter of less concern, 
and in fact paid little attention at all. 
 Indeed, the perception of time is a culturally particular phenomenon, 
and in Macedonia it is hardly the case that there is an imposition of time and 
                                                 
83 And this makes sense given the melting pot Macedonia was a century ago and before. 
The multi-lingual inhabitants trying to communicate with one another, yet there being five, 
six, seven languages to possibly work with—Macedonian, Serbian, Ladino (Sephardic 
Spanish), Greek, Vlach/Aromanian, Turkish, Romani, Albanian—one would have to speak 
slowly to try to understand what was being said.   
 
 70 
schedules. Instead, children enjoy and do not learn at a young age to know 
what time it is, or to calculate the time it takes to get from one place to 
another so as to arrive ‘on time’—the word-construct na vreme rarely being 
uttered84. In fact, it is unusual to plan to be anywhere at a particular hour—
with the time of day (morning, afternoon, evening85) used instead. Nor is it 
unusual for one to be ‘late’; for to show up a half hour to an hour after a set 
time is perfectly normal and acceptable. Life there has a harmony to it 
whereby the foreigner becomes accustomed to this timeless rhythm, and 
engaged in a conversation with someone else while waiting for their 
acquaintance or friend.  
The country has actually advertised itself as ‘timeless/eternal’ 
(večna)86, and if appearing too eager to get something done87 or moving too 
fast to get somewhere, one will be chided and told ‘slow down, there’s time’ 
(poleka, ima vreme). When visiting another family (going na gosti), custom 
has it that departing should not be sudden. One must never appear anxious to 
go, for it is disrespectful to the hosts given the effort they exert in 
accommodating you, and your first insistence on going will always be in 
vain. Even if you have been there several hours, you will be asked ‘why, 
where do you have to go?  You’ve hardly been here, come on sit and drink, 
eat some more!’ Another conversation will start and it may take some time 
and another one or two announcements of needing to go to actually be able to 
depart. That is the way of things—‘Macedonia, timeless’ indeed.  
 
Reflexivity in the field: gender and being male in a Macedonian home 
My life in Kavadarci took some getting used to, but I changed and adapted 
by mostly falling into proscribed gender roles. In line with what is expected 
of men, as my fieldwork proceeded I would leave by mid-morning and only 
come home for short periods of time during the day. If I was in a village or 
                                                 
84 Even in schools which I have taught at teachers do not constantly remind students to be 
on time. In fact, it is often the teachers who are late in arriving to class.  
85 In Macedonian: sebajle/utro, popladne, večer, respectively. 
86 A series of ‘Macedonian-Timeless’ commercials were aired on CNN international to lure 
tourists to the country, romanticising the country’s history, archaeology, natural beauty, 
culture, cuisine and wine. They are available at  http://www.macedonia-timeless.com/  
87 I have and will likely remain guilty of this, having been told on many occasions in my life 
in Macedonia to ‘slow down’, from while walking through town to jogging on a country 
road. Fortunately, with age and time I have learned to indeed slow down. 
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another town I may not come home at all, and I sometimes slept a night or 
two in Pepelište or at friends’ in Demir Kapija. But when I was in Kavadarci 
I would return home, grab a sandwich and see what was going on, perhaps be 
instructed to run an errand, and then be on my way. I did so because over 
time I came to feel alienated by the house and the activities occurring 
within—for neighbours and relatives came over daily, but they were always 
women. Men only visit when there is an official occasion or matter to 
discuss, and otherwise spend their free-time on the streets, in café-bars or at 
the town square and čaršija. Women who are relatives or next-door 
neighbours, however, will let themselves into the house and come upstairs to 
the main floor for coffee. There is rarely anything else drunk on such 
occasions (though juice or mineral water may be offered), and I know that 
my mother-in-law and the various aunts who come by usually drink three to 
four cups of Turkish coffee88 a day. They immediately jump into 
conversation about their children or increasingly, grandchildren, and discuss 
who is doing what—getting married, going away for work, dealing with 
unpaid crops, unemployment, etc. Yet despite my good relationship with all 
of these women, I was never asked to sit and have coffee with them and often 
received a cold stare when attempting to converse with them in such a 
setting.  
Indeed, similar to what Bourdieu (1979) saw in Algeria and Herzfeld 
(1985) in Crete, men are to be out representing the family and maintaining 
connections—an integral part of the local economy—with the home the 
domain of women. Within the house though, women indeed carry their 
weight. Irena and her mother communicate constantly when they are in the 
same room, discussing situations and working a variety of things out. I was 
not always privy to the content of these conversations, but I do know that 
much occurs in terms of women planning things. They discuss needs and 
then plan the shopping, doctors’ visits and trips to realise such needs. If 
                                                 
88 Turkish coffee (Tursko kafe) is made from coffee beans ground to a flour-like fineness, 
then boiled in a small, long handled pot called a dzezve. The sugar is added while it’s 
boiling, but when one drinks it they must be cautious at the end to avoid consuming the fine 
grounds which settle into a silt at the bottom of the cup. Incidentally, women will 
sometimes turn their cups upside down to see how the grounds disperse, and perform a 
fortune-telling from the lines and images they see. Some women are known to be 
particularly good at this, including our neighbour Olga.   
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enough needs accumulate a trip to another town or the capital is planned, 
which turns into a social occasion—to see friends and family in the big city. 
However, I have been privy to some female only conversations because of 
my insistence on sitting around, not to mention that I do not feel as ashamed 
as the average Macedonian male might. Indeed, men are usually doing other 
things when at home—watching television, working in the garden or on 
something related to their crops, or are often out on the streets, in cafes or at 
the čaršija speaking with those they know passing by. Men walk, talk, jest 
and represent, whereas women entertain, discuss, prepare and plan—and 
only among immediate family and between spouses does the information 
gathered in both spheres come together.  
Men thus represent the rules that women impose on their household. 
There may be an apparent patriarchy, but I must contest it when I see how 
women send men on errands to get meat, produce and bread for lunch, and 
men should return with these in due time. I think it is thus very interesting to 
consider the playful relationship men and women have with each other in this 
regard. Women give birth, nurture, feed, raise, tend house and give direction 
to their families. Yet when around men they express a sort of deference, 
appearing to submit to their husband’s authority but essentially only lending 
him that power. For as the Macedonian saying goes, ‘there’s nothing [done] 
without [the help of] a woman’s hand’89. 
This suggests a matriarchal aspect to society, where men may be the 
‘heads’ but women are the ‘necks’—steering the husband in a certain 
direction and allowing him to do the talking. And there is no shortage of 
strong-willed women in Macedonia—they maintain their femininity but work 
the same jobs as men do and more. Women not only work in typically 
female-dominated fields such as teaching, banking (as tellers), as 
pharmacists, shop cashiers, or in factories and fields, but they are full 
professors and deans at universities, business managers, journalists, MPs and 
politicians. Admittedly they are the minority in such positions of public 
power and are clearly discriminated against in terms of pay and promotion, 
yet they have options and leverage and are not subject to the sexual 
                                                 
89 Nema ništo bez ženska raka. 
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distinction that may be presumed given their modest behaviour and apparent 
subservience to men in what is considered a ‘patriarchal’ society and country 
full of tradition. While socialism greatly contributed to the empowerment of 
women in this regard, as I discuss below surrounding my life as a son-in-law 
living with my wife’s family, there are plenty of early 20th century 
ethnographic examples of men marrying older women because of the bride’s 
family and resources, and living with her family ever after.     
However, it is how men are taught and supposed to act that maintains 
the sense of patriarchy in society. Women and men each have their own 
domains, and they rarely cross the proscribed boundaries of them—girls 
being raised to cook and socialise with other women indoors, and boys taken 
out onto the streets and into the social world of men90. Unfortunately, women 
usually suffer more as a result of this, as they are taken advantage of socially, 
psychologically, physically and economically, both at home and in the work 
place. As Sanders (1962) noted, women are ‘bound to busy-ness’ and ‘a 
woman’s work is never done’. Indeed, it might be argued that they are 
perceived and treated as creatures needing to be tamed and in the service of 
men. Whereas men sit or stand around, women cook, clean, iron, shop and 
take primary care of their children and grand-children. My mother-in-law 
Baba Rosa, for example, is on her feet most of the day. The only time when 
she sits is when visitors come for coffee and in the evening when the family 
sits around watching TV and reading the papers. The only TV programme 
she watches regularly is one of the famous Turkish soap-operas (serii), which 
along with Brazilian and Indian soap operas have internationalised drama 
and romance for Macedonians.  
Yet men do not always benefit from prescribed gender roles either, 
and I think the roles men are supposed to take are restricted. Whereas in 
cosmopolitan Skopje men and women are more likely to work on either side 
of the gender aisle, and have more options as a result, elsewhere in the 
country one could suggest that Macedonians are confined to customs which 
do not best suit the needs of a modernising European nation in the 21st 
century. Although EU integration seems increasingly questionable, it appears 
                                                 
90 When visiting from Skopje, our primary school-aged nephew will always be out and 
about with his grandfather in the evening. 
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that young people resoundingly want the opportunities it affords yet 
traditional gender roles stand in the way of availing the freedom to make 
such choices. 
 
Life as a ‘zet’  
More than anything else, being a local son-in-law (zet) defined me in the 
eyes of those I met.  My in-laws and the neighbours ceased using my name 
and called out to me ‘zete!’91 Although I found this strange and slightly 
irksome at first, I became used to it, and on more than one occasion I used 
my status as a Kavadarci son-in-law (Kavadarečki zet) to make a connection 
either in person or over the phone when trying to meet with someone. But to 
justify it—given that it is the bride who traditionally goes to live with the 
husband’s family—people often recited to me the saying ‘from where your 
wife is, is where you are from’92. This frequently used statement, along with 
use of the well-known term domazet for a married man living with his wife’s 
family, was evidence that others are not only accepting of this arrangement 
but have developed a discourse surrounding it. Indeed, I met many a domazet 
over my time in Tikveš, and according to Hammel (1968), being a domazet is 
in fact relatively common. Although not usually favoured and the result of 
not having enough resources (eg, land or a house) or too many brothers, such 
individuals constitute a small minority—one-eighth of married men 
according to Hammel (p18). Yet their social status is not usually any the 
worse, and sometimes is in fact significantly improved when a wife’s family 
has resources to impart on their resident son-in-law. In my experience, there 
was thus reciprocity in my acceptance into the community that was a real 
necessity for my access to relationships (and to information for my research). 
To be a domazet meant that I had to represent the family who adopted me in 
many ways, and to become a part of their social order and kin network, as 
well as to practice their traditions93. 
                                                 
91 The suffix –e on the end of nouns in the South Slavic languages is the vocative case, and 
a formal conjugation implying respect for someone. For example, gospodin (‘Mister’) 
becomes gospodine when being spoken to formally, such as in a place of business.   
92 Od kaj ti e žena od kaj si ti.  
93 Hammel wrote about such incorporation, and discusses how a domazet will adopt his 
wife’s family’s saint day celebration (slava) at first, but may then revert to his own once his 
father-in-law and/or any other males in the family pass away.  
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As one local domazet said to me of our status though, we are ‘like a 
TV without the sound’94. The Macedonian word for ‘sound’ (glas) used in 
the phrase has alternative meanings though, and means ‘voice’ as well as 
‘vote’. Therefore, the implication is that a domazet is not only less vocal, 
quiet and ‘without the sound’, but has no voice or say in matters. I can testify 
that there is some truth to this, as a wife’s subservience when a daughter-in-
law (snaa) within her husband’s family’s home is greatly lessened in her own 
family’s home95. Furthermore, her authority—and that of all women in the 
house—is strengthened given strong mother-daughter and sister 
relationships.  
Indeed, trying to maintain a relationship with my wife such as we had 
prior became nearly impossible, as our private time was severely diminished 
and we had different obligations and schedules. The only thing we really 
seemingly shared, besides our daughter and our innate love for each other, 
was an obligation to the extended family to represent and maintain its name, 
honour and identity. This likely helps maintain marriages and decrease the 
likelihood for divorce, as the latter is still stigmatised96. In short, 
relationships are thus more about safety, support and shared success for the 
extended family than autonomy and self-success and happiness for the 
married couple and their nuclear family. Further, upon having our daughter 
and living in Irena’s family home and hometown, I realised the full extent of 
my purpose from a kin perspective—even as a domazet I am a patriarch in 
the making—father of Vera, husband (maž97) of Irena, son-in-law to Mančo 
and Rosa, and brother-in-law to my wife’s brother, Igor98.  
Regardless, I never ceased to appreciate my privileges as a zet. I was 
both an American and a foreigner yet also a local, able to ease my way into 
anything using a combination of these identities. In Kavadarci I merely 
mentioned my father-in-law and was generally well received—and I became 
                                                 
94 Kako televizor so boja, bez glas. 
95 In addition to Sanders, Lodge and Hammel, anthropologist Tone Bringa writes about 
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law relationships in Bosnia and the common tensions among 
them—ethnography which applies to Macedonia’s multi-generational households as well. 
96 In fact, Macedonia is in the top ten countries in the world in terms of lowest divorce rates. 
97 Literally ‘man’. 
98 In the complicated structure that characterizes Tikveš kinship, although we are brothers-
in-law, I am Igor’s zet but he is my šura.  
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accustomed to doing so because I was always immediately asked which 
family I married into99. If in another town in the country, just being a 
‘Kavadarci son-in-law’ was enough to gain a form of respect and social entry 
into a situation, including a different form of conversation—friendlier and 
more engaging. I was not merely viewed as a Macedonian-speaking foreign 
anthropologist (and perhaps a spy—as was often wondered of me during my 
Peace Corps days) but as a fellow countryman and distant relative.  
In conclusion, the agricultural Tikveš region in the south of the 
Republic of Macedonia is a region steeped in history and diversity. For the 
author, it was not only the first place I resided in the country over a decade 
ago and then again for fieldwork, but it is a second home and one where 
affinal relationships tie me in and down on the one hand yet give me 
immediate social entry and access to people and information, on the other. 
While the over-arching topic of my research was privatisation in the wine 
industry, my kin relations and daily life were paramount to my success and 
satisfaction in living there. I therefore discuss the rather mundane details 
about the house and daily life to illustrate where individuals live out their 
daily lives, and where the intersubjective, shared experience of sociality and 
survival is enacted. Although the latter is discussed at greater length in 
Chapter 6, in the next chapter I discuss kinship and the traditions surrounding 
marriage, birth and parenting which I experienced just prior to and during my 
fieldwork, and how friends and family play a role in perpetuating the 







                                                 
99 Asked either as ‘whose are you?’ (čija si ti?) or ‘who is your father-in-law?’ (koj e dedo 
ti?) 
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Chapter 2   
Deconstructing katastrofa: neoliberalism, privatisation and 
the precarious transition in Macedonia 
 
As discussed in the thesis Introduction, use of the term transition refers to the 
shift in economic as well as political structure in the last two decades, and 
Macedonia could thus be characterised as a transitional economy. Focusing 
on economics, however, underscores the significance of the transition in the 
country since its separation from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. In fact, 
there have been drastic alterations to the political system, and both 
economically and politically the country’s transition has been overshadowed 
by the at-times ambiguous effects of global neoliberalism and privatisation. 
The onset of such neoliberal capitalism means that inequality and uncertainty 
are the new structured norm, and the equality, social stability and regular 
income that characterised life during socialism is seemingly a thing of the 
past.  
Given the ramifications of these changes in Tikveš, most frequently 
summed up by use of the term ‘katastrofa’ (catastrophe), this chapter 
deconstructs this term—including the ‘connected’ network of actors who 
comprise the ‘catastrophic’ system—and elaborates upon the country’s 
transition both politically and economically. Indeed, the transition could be 
characterised by the shift to a ‘free-market democracy’, but what this term 
means and implies for governance and livelihoods is unclear. In fact, few 
ever claim that their life is better now than before nor that their overall 
standard of living has improved. Therefore, this chapter largely focuses on 
the root causes of the katastrofa at hand—privatisation and neoliberalism, 
and the false consciousness they proscribe—and incorporates evidence of the 
political transition to these ideologies and the theoretical consequences of it. 
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of globalisation’s effects on 





Katastrofa, vrski and the role of networks in Macedonia   
Use of the term katastrofa has undoubtedly been a catchphrase in local 
discourse for some years now, and it serves as an indicator of the general 
mood in the region. I thus assert that the ‘katastrofa’ in Tikveš and 
Macedonia is in direct response to the onset of neoliberalism. Where there is 
discussion of the corruptible leadership in government or industry, the sham 
that was the privatisation process, and individuals’ plight as a result of these 
factors, the term katastrofa was used to sum up most peoples’ feelings. 
Although this term is a key to further investigating the ‘crisis’ in the wine 
region and elsewhere in the country (and it is referred to not only in the title 
of this thesis but throughout it), what is arguably more important to 
understand is the social hierarchy in which Macedonians live out their daily 
lives. For it is not a meritocracy, where individuals acquire opportunities 
based on their qualifications and the merit of their character, but a society 
connected by networks. Such connections are called ‘vrski’ in Macedonian, 
and are directly referred to in spoken conversation.   
More specifically, vrski refer to the use of personal networks, 
connections and informal contacts to obtain goods and services in 
Macedonia100. As a form of social capital, however, the term is scarcely 
written about within the country (such as in media) and there is in fact little 
academic literature on vrski in Macedonia. Instead vrski are mentioned when 
a discussion ensues about an individual of means, and the term’s informal 
meaning is widely understood. If asked ‘How does s/he have…?’ the reply 
will often simply be ‘vrski’ and an explanation of someone’s or their family’s 
connections.  
For vrski are the connections one’s family has and as anthropologist 
Ilká Thiessen (2007) observed, they help individuals not only get a job but 
ensure that one will not be easily laid off. In fact, Thiessen noted that through 
vrski, work may be given to someone who is not only unqualified but who 
may never perform the expected duties. Expertise is thus not most important 
in acquiring work, but it is instead a matter of ‘who you know’. Indeed, 
Keith Brown wrote of vrski: ‘the reported prevalence and importance of vrski 
                                                 
100 This section is taken from a contribution I made to the forthcoming (2015) Encyclopaedia of 
Informality, edited by Alena Ledeneva at University College London.  
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is at the heart of many Macedonian critiques of how their society operates: 
vrski underpin corruption, nepotism, the black market, and every other 
obstacle citizens face in negotiating everyday life’ (2006, p74). Therefore, 
use of vrski can be both legal and illegal, and helpful when successfully 
transacted or a hindrance when formal mechanisms for a procedure are 
disregarded due to a lack of such connections.  
While the practice of vrski is seen as corrupting, the use of such 
informal connections is common and many Macedonians will instinctively 
call upon the contacts of friends and family in order to assure the best 
outcome in a situation, be it acquiring work, a public service (such as getting 
their child into the best school or completing a bureaucratic procedure) or a 
particular good. Shared origins are very important in a small nation such as 
Macedonia and in the capital Skopje, where many inhabitants are only one or 
two generations removed from their ancestral villages and towns. Therefore, 
if there is knowledge of such regional ties they will also be discussed and 
utilised.  
Once a connection is made, enacting the use of vrski often includes 
meeting the connection outside in public or just outside of their office (so as 
to be escorted in and better assisted), and the individual being helped might 
bring a small gift (eg, a package of Turkish coffee, chocolates or a bottle of 
brandy) as a token of appreciation. Occasionally, a bribe (mito) is necessary 
in the transaction, though this is not common for most Macedonians engaged 
in such informal transactions. Conversation about their connection is 
important as well, because the closer the connection, the greater the 
importance of the service or favour being successfully completed. In fact, the 
individual providing the service may feel particularly obliged to lend their 
assistance if the individual seeking such help has been sent by a particularly 
important acquaintance (eg, a mayor, godfather, or someone to whom they 
are indebted). The practice is thus cyclical, and helps maintain a social fabric 
and ‘economy of favours’ (Ledeneva 1998) comprised of cooperative, 
overlapping structured behaviour.   
 At the state and institutional level, use of vrski has contributed to the 
post-socialist restructuring of government and the economy, whereby the 
effects of vrski on state services have been intentionally deleterious. Through 
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ceasing to provide services the state is opening up opportunities to private 
actors—who are aware of these niche markets through their networks and 
connections. Consequently, politicians and their acquaintances have profited 
off of the state’s capital through the privatisation of its services, from utilities 
to higher education to agriculture (cf. Otten 2013). In another form of 
corruption induced by vrski, if a private business offers a particular service, 
its owner may be contracted by a government agency to offer such service, 
but both the bureaucrat and business owner will expect personal gain from 
the engagement and transaction. Vrski are therefore suitable for the current 
capitalist market economy, where profits supersede services in importance. 
This is particularly ironic given the neoliberal argument that privatised 
industries offer better services, as is discussed later on in this chapter. 
Additionally, Keith Hart (2009) has defined ‘informal’ economic 
practices as those falling outside of or which are invisible to bureaucratic 
form, and thus states that ‘the task is not only to find practical ways of 
harnessing the complementary potential of bureaucracy and informality, but 
also to advance thinking about their dialectical movement’. Further, Hart 
asserts that neoliberal globalisation has expanded the scope of informal 
activities, so that there must be an examination of the social forms which 
organise them and their relation to governments, corporations and 
international agencies. Of great concern then with vrski should be the 
development of what Saskia Sassen (2014) calls ‘predatory formations’, 
which are mixes of elites, global networks, laws and government policies, all 
of which help constitute a ‘brutality’ in the modern global economy and the 
‘expulsion’ of mass numbers of individuals from a decent standard of living. 
Such brutal predatory formations should be kept in mind when considering 
the effects of neoliberalism discussed in the following section. 
 
Neoliberal capitalism: a theoretical background 
Since the 1970s neoliberal capitalism (neoliberalism) has become the 
dominant hegemony in the United States and much of the world (Harvey 
2005, Saad-Filho and Johnson 2005), as during this time the classical 
liberalism that defined American economic and social policy during the 19th 
and early 20th centuries was revitalised and intensified, resulting in 
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government cuts to services and programmes, if not their dissolution. 
Furthermore, there has been the extension of an economic rationality to 
cultural, social and political spheres, and the redefinition of the individual 
from a citizen to an autonomous economic actor. Despite the economic 
inequality, lack of any increase in ordinary workers’ wages, significant 
growth in personal debt, as well as the massive shift in power from the state 
to multi-national corporations and global financial institutions, neoliberalism 
continues to be the dominant hegemony around the globe (Dumenil and Levy 
2005, Harvey 2005).  
Neoliberalism is defined by a drive for profit and efficiency, but is a 
broad and at times ambiguous term. It is used to encompass a variety of 
economic, social and political ideas, policies and practices, functioning on 
both individual and institutional levels. It is not so much a singular ideology 
as it is a plural set of concepts stemming from numerous sources that affect 
various aspects of society and political-economy (Plehwe, Walpen and 
Neunhoffer 2006, Saad-Filho and Johnson 2005). The policies and practices 
of neoliberalism are thus variable, and may operate at local, state, national 
and/or global levels, making their identification and elucidation difficult. The 
assemblage of various ideas, policies and practices that are in a constant state 
of flux in the neoliberal world confounds attempts to define a consistent set 
of fundamental aspects of neoliberalism. That is, neoliberalism is often 
amorphous, and manifests itself in unique ways depending on the time and 
place (Otten 2013). 
The expansion of economic rationality into cultural, political and 
social spheres is the most distinctive aspect of neoliberalism and one of its 
most powerful ideological tools, and the universalization of economic logic 
helps to create the appearance that it is the natural approach to the world. 
Since alternatives are excluded and the same logic is used in every aspect of 
life, it easily becomes assumed that such rationality must be in some way 
innate to human beings. This assumption is seen through the rise of ‘social 
Darwinism’—the belief that competition is part of human nature (Hofstadter 
1992), and the idea that unfettered free-market capitalism is an inherent part 
of a free world, as well as in the fundamental assumptions of certain rational 
choice and human capital theories that insist all action is guided by 
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cost/benefit analysis. The pervasiveness of economic rationality culminates 
in ‘saturation of our consciousness, so that the educational, economic and 
social world we see and interact with, and the common sense interpretations 
we put on it becomes...the only world’ (Apple 2004, p4). This Marxian false 
consciousness is the epitome of neoliberal ideology; neoliberalism defines 
not only the social, economic and political institutions and policies, but it is 
also used to dictate the manner by which individuals make day-to-day 
decisions and structure their lives.  
The root of neoliberalism—liberalism—comes from the classical 
liberal economic theory of Adam Smith, David Ricardo and the Manchester 
School that is based around free markets and minimal state intervention in 
the economy (Palley 2005). The ‘neo’ or new aspect of this liberalism comes 
from the ways in which it alters the liberal economic theory to correspond to 
new material conditions (Turner 2008). Neoliberalism is thus a return to and 
extension of the laissez-faire economic theory that reigned until the 1930s 
but was adapted to the post-Depression then World War II and post-war era 
of strong state control (Harman 2008). Indeed, the most powerful of these 
extensions is the expansion of economic rationality past the economic sphere 
and into the social sphere, where there is no longer a distinction between the 
market and the state, between public and private, between the individual and 
the social (Lemke 2001). Neoliberalism redefines the social as an economic 
domain, governed by the ‘rational choices’ of entrepreneurial individuals 
who see everything they do in terms of maximising their ‘human capital’. 
While neoliberalism refers to a varied collection of ideas, practices, policies 
and discursive representations (ibid), these are united by three broad themes: 
the benevolence of the free market, minimal state intervention and economic 
regulation, and the individual as a rational economic actor (Harvey 2005, 
Turner 2008).  
Such as in classical liberalism, a fundamental aspect of neoliberalism 
is what Karl Polanyi (1944) called the ‘self-regulating market’. Proponents 
of neoliberalism view the market as the natural and inevitable organizing and 
evaluative force in all social, cultural and economic matters, and they assert 
that competition and free trade will lead to economic growth and global 
prosperity to the benefit of all individuals (Shaikh 2005). If these do not 
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actually transpire, proponents will blame outside interference in the market’s 
operation, from regulations to trade unions to geo-political issues (eg, 
international conflicts). The free market thus allegedly ensures efficiency, 
maximum profits, and a fair playing field. Neoliberalism expands the 
classical liberal idea that the market is the governing mechanism of the 
economy to include every aspect of society, and Polanyi foresaw this in his 
discussion of the logical extensions of a free-market society when he stated 
‘instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are 
embedded in the economy’ (p60). The expansion of the market results in the 
commodification and marketization of not only goods, services and labour, 
but also of culture, relationships and social institutions. In a neoliberal world, 
everything is economic (Lemke 2001). 
If neoliberalism is the ideology, capitalism is the system in which it is 
put into practice. Petras and Veltmeyer (2011, p11) define capitalism as a 
wage-labour system of commodity production driven by the search for 
private profit. As a global system, it is comprised of four different 
institutions:  
1. Private property in the means of production; 
2. The social relation of wage labour comprised of two different 
classes: the owners (the bourgeoisie) and the workers (the 
proletariat);  
3. The state, which serves in a variety of ways to assist in the 
accumulation of capital, and to reproduce and legitimise the 
capitalist system;  
4. The market, which is an institution that serves as an economic 
exchange of society’s resources.  
  
As England and Ward (2007) state though, neoliberalism is a ‘current 
phase of capitalism’ (p1) and ‘binds together those with a stake in its 
continued reproduction’ (p2). Government ministers, venture capitalists, 
corporate chief executives, and officials in media and international 
institutions (among others) are involved in practicing neoliberalism 
(Bourdieu 1998, Harvey 2006). Most scholars refer to it as an economic and 
political orthodoxy marked by commitments to policies of free trade, 
privatisation, deregulation and welfare state retraction (p3). Peet (2001) says 
it is ‘the doctrine that economic growth is maximised when movement of 
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goods, services and capital, but not labour, are unimpeded by government 
regulations’ (p330).   
I concur with England and Ward when they make a distinction 
between neoliberalism as an end-state and a process, consisting of a 
multiplicity of openings and closures, and find that analysis of it is inter-
disciplinary. Indeed, Johnston and Saad-Filho (2005) contend that 
neoliberalism ‘straddles a wide range of social, political and economic 
phenomena at different levels of complexity’ (p1) and as Tickell and Peck 
(2003) describe, neoliberalism is ‘contradictory’ and has ‘the capacity to 
bring forth countertendencies…existing in historically and contingent forms’ 
(p165). They thus assert that analyses of this process should ‘focus on 
change…rather than on binary and/or static comparisons between a past state 
and its erstwhile successor’.  
This is in fact the intention of this thesis and is discussed throughout, 
and particularly in Chapter 6 where individual entrepreneurship and 
adaptation to current conditions are illustrated. For as Chris Hann (2006) said 
of neoliberalism, it is ‘the notion of everyone acting as an entrepreneur’ (p7). 
Neoliberal ideology, just as any successful ideology, is based partly in 
people’s lived experiences, where successful ideologies are grounded in our 
general individual experiences and attempt to reconstitute and represent them 
in a way that extracts consent to certain policies, institutions and ideas 
(Eagleton 1991). Through minimal state intervention in their lives 
individuals are ‘free’ to pursue their interests, though they must bear the 
costs and responsibility to do so.  
 
Neoliberal privatisation and the role of the state  
Privatisation has become a major part of a broader set of neoliberal reforms 
that have transformed society. Such reforms are connected to the 
globalisation of economy, and have contributed to the shift from 
Keynesianism to neoliberalism whereby public institutions have been 
encouraged (if not compelled) to adopt the principles of market dynamics in 
their management practices. The resulting new discourse and indicators have 
been ones focusing on gross domestic product (GDP), foreign direct 
investments (FDI), economic growth, and other market oriented economic 
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factors. Together, they provide the basis for a new managerial approach to 
public administration that redefines the relationship between the state and its 
institutions, and individuals and society as well. In Macedonia, this means 
that formerly state and socially-owned enterprises (SOEs) were sold off to 
private interests and were expected to restructure the way in which they 
make management and product decisions, all with a profit incentive in mind. 
And in agriculture this translates into a growing doctrine of reduced state 
assistance and intervention, despite the fact that the industry is subject to 
non-market, nature related volatility. Nonetheless, there is a belief that the 
state should no longer run agricultural industries, only subsidise them.  
Therefore, there is indeed a convergence towards a neoliberal 
discourse in which the idea of privatisation is located. For Foucault (1991), 
these ideas of privately managed economies represent a new form of 
governance, understood as a response to economic globalisation and a shift 
from Fordist to flexible forms of production. What he calls ‘neoliberal 
governmentality’ involves a redefinition of the relationship between state and 
society in which primacy is accorded to economic factors in addressing the 
totality of human behaviour. Foucault highlights the specificity of 
contemporary forms of governance premised on the active consent and 
subjugation of subjects rather than their oppression, domination or through 
external control.  Indeed, neoliberalism requires governments to reform the 
conduct of individuals to make them more competitive and efficient as a way 
of ensuring global economic advantage. As Hoogvelt (1997) claims, an 
awareness of global competition constrains both individuals and 
governments to ‘conform to international standards of price and quality’ 
(p154), which if they do not, they are marginalised and possibly penalised 
through sanctions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank.  
Therefore, the idea of privatisation refers to the transfer of services 
provided by the public sector to a range of private sector interests.  Having 
emerged in the USA in the 1970s in order to separate decision making in 
public policy from service provision, it has become globally pervasive, 
increasingly assumed to be the most efficient way in which services are 
delivered and industries are managed. Many activities can be construed as 
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privatisation, from selling state-owned enterprises to contracting out public 
services, and most of the reasons for privatising are thus economic. It is 
argued that privatisation leads to more cost-effective operations and even 
enhances the growth and productivity of government agencies, who must 
compete with the private sector to get the best human resources, who in turn 
work harder. However, such economic rationale cannot be easily 
substantiated, and conversely there is evidence of compromised quality when 
cost-cutting and profit motives come into play. Thus economic arguments 
cannot justify privatisation, nor the notion that the private sector is more 
productive than the public. And to try to do so excludes the other side of the 
coin—the political nature of privatisation and the role of ideology in 
promoting it.  Indeed, notions of freedom and justice also play into the 
neoliberal privatisation sentiment, which help perpetuate a mode of existence 
and the processes of governmentality described by Foucault.  
A range of theories underpin privatisation, such as theories of public 
choice, transaction cost analysis and property rights, among others. Each of 
these theories assumes the key rationale for privatisation to be the need to 
increase economic efficiency through better organisational performance. 
Collectively, these theories amount to what Waters (1995) refers to as 
‘organisational ecumenism’, which is a single idealisation of appropriate 
organisational behaviour and includes generic management skills, quantified 
performance targets, devolution and the use of private sector practices such 
as corporate plans, monetary incentives and flexible labour practices. 
Aligned to these concepts is the idea that private ownership of property 
results in superior profitability and effectiveness. Taken together, these 
theories make efficiency, productivity and profitability paramount, and 
backers of them feel they should apply to all kinds of organisations and 
industries. This is an issue of contention in agriculture, among other areas, 
and what these theories mask is the range of perspectives on how society and 
its institutions should be organised. Insofar as these diverse perspectives and 
the needs they reflect are obscured by the capitalist discourse of profit and 




 Neoliberalism as state restructuring 
England and Ward (2007) make the important point that neoliberalism is a 
process of state restructuring, not withdrawal, and to leave the state out of 
consideration is to ignore a significant aspect of neoliberal forces. This is 
certainly the case in Macedonia, where the state is not just subject to the 
effects of neoliberalism but shapes it in various ways, either through 
implementation of policy or shifts in bureaucratic structures, or the influence 
of private interests. As its former functions are redefined, the state remains 
strong, though the use of its power is now channelled in different ways using 
a different logic: economic rationality. It is thus important that scholars ‘keep 
the state clearly in view’ (Kingfisher 2002, p8) and I would add, to 
understand that neoliberalism is not necessarily imposed from outside of a 
country but instead exists as an international trend of sorts with various 
manifestations emerging from within.  
According to neoliberalism, state power should focus on facilitating the 
operation of the market and the securing ability of individuals to operate 
freely within it, including creating new markets through the use of the 
military (Klein 2007), establishing free-trade agreements with different 
nations (Harvey 2005), and restructuring the tax system and regulations to 
support corporations (Turner 2008). These are all legitimate uses of state 
power within neoliberal ideology, and all require a strong state. Therefore, as 
Colas (2005) claims, ‘developing countries are not hapless victims or passive 
objects of global neoliberalism; they are, like other states, populated by 
classes and social forces with their own interests and strategies’ (p78).  
However, England and Ward (2007) find that the more research done on 
neoliberalism, the more its vagaries and ambiguity are brought to surface, as 
it affects both the centre and the periphery and the relationship between the 
two. Nonetheless, they have outlined four different ways in which 
neoliberalism is used in scholarship: 
1. As an ideological hegemonic project: this refers to the places and 
peoples behind its origins that are involved in its apparent uptake in 
geographically discrete but socially connected parts of the world. 
Dominance is exercised through the formation of class-based alliances 
who produce and circulate a coherent program of ideas and images 
about the world, its problems and how these are best solved. Acceptance 
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of these perceptions and opinions by the subordinated class is what 
creates the hegemony of it. 
 
2. As policy and programme: this refers to the transfer of ownership from 
the public to private sector, and often involves a reworking of what these 
categories might mean. Policies involve such shifts in ownership to 
private interests justify it based on notions of market efficiency, and the 
notion that the privatised entities will perform better. It is not just states 
and local actors overseeing this process though, but the IMF and World 
Bank, along with myriad international actors. 
 
3. As state form: this refers to the quantitative and qualitative restructuring 
of nation-states, involving redrawing the boundary between civil 
society, market and state. This embrace leads states to denigrate their 
own capacities and potentialities, to restructure and to cut themselves, to 
engineer their own reform and downsizing.  
 
4. As governmentality: this refers to the ways in which the relations among 
and between peoples and things might be imagined, assembled and 
translated, to effect coordination at a distance. This process aims to 
transform recipients of assistance into entrepreneurial subjects, who may 
be motivated to become responsible for themselves. However, this may 
be based on a model of helping, training and empowering, or on a police 
model of governing every aspect of life. 
 
Neoliberalism in Macedonia seems to be a combination of these, where the 
upper class have accepted and benefited from free-market policies, 
encouraging and often through being a part of the government, 
deconstructing the state apparatus so that the forces of neoliberal economics 
and the ‘individual as entrepreneur’ can be best accomplished. England and 
Ward also state that it is important to consider networks and their role in 
neoliberalism, from its implementation to its practice.  
As for social inequalities, they have risen during this implementation 
of the new world order, leading to a social polarisation between the rich and 
poor in the distribution of income. However, as unequal accumulations of 
capital increase, welfare benefits decrease. Such issues are in fact endemic to 
capitalism but they can be adjusted with proper regulation, taxation and 
redistribution. Yet this transformation is occurring in Macedonia despite the 
fact that around the world neoliberal policies have wreaked havoc for several 
decades. Such policies are purely financial and seek to exploit resources, 
both in terms of human labour, natural resources and cheap commodity 
production. The last two decades of the 20th century could thus be 
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characterised by the installation of a new world order, several cycles of 
structural or policy reform, increased integration into a global process, the 
fall of socialism, as well as widespread resistance to the obvious inequality 
and social cost of neoliberal capitalism (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2011). 
In places where neoliberal policies have been implemented, there has 
concurrently been the influx of significant international capital. In fact, 
according to Petras and Veltmeyer (2011), ‘capitalism has become a world 
system, the latest advances in information technology and the policies of the 
neoliberal world order working to integrate economies across the world into 
one system’ (p3). Capitalism in its neoliberal form has set the stage for 
significant but uncertain change, and a struggle to organise and mobilise 
these forces of change in a new direction.  Indeed, there are several defining 
features of capitalist development in its current form: 
• The inequality predicament: this predicament can be summed up as the  
unequal distribution of wealth and income that results from  
contemporary neoliberal capitalism, which in turn threatens societal  
stability and equality. 
• A propensity towards crisis and unevenness in forces of production, as  
well as society in general through a class structure of rich and poor. 
 
Thus the ‘poverty problematic of capitalist development’ (ibid, p4) consists 
of a fundamental tendency in capitalism towards impoverishing the working 
class. A ‘war on poverty’ can then be engaged and development priorities 
ensure that the poor do not deviate from a capitalist path of resisting 
progressive change. Uneven development processes consist of the 
competitive struggle among different sources of capital to influence the 
system as they see fit, and capitalist development over the forces of 
production implies the transformation of a traditional agrarian society based 
on pre-capitalist relations of production. Such a process leads to the 
development of the owners of such forces of production and those who only 
have their labour to offer. Thus the process leads to the formation of a class 
of capitalist entrepreneurs who have seized or been granted a proprietary 
claim on the means of production, and whose success depends on the 
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continued reproduction of a working proletariat. As Petra and Veltmeyer 
(ibid) state, ‘the capitalist development process has been theorised in the 
mainstream of development thought and by the economists at the World 
Bank as the working of forces of progressive change promoted by ‘pro-
growth’ policies of structural adjustment and neoliberal globalisation.’  
Like most industries, the wine industry has not gone unchanged and 
while its privatisation in Tikveš is covered in the following chapter, outlining 
the key factors and concepts at work there and in the global wine industry 
will help clarify the lived reality of the region’s inhabitants and to what ends 
their labour is utilised.  
 
Globalisation in the wine industry 
Concurrent with neoliberalism, over the last 30 years the world of wine has 
been transformed by forces and processes of globalisation. The production, 
distribution and consumption of wine have all been transformed in profound 
ways by and through globalisation, which is itself made up of multiple and 
often contradictory dynamics. The result has been an increasingly complex 
wine world, both internally complicated and linked to other domains of 
economy, society and politics in increasingly diverse ways. The globalised 
wine world is full of contradictions, ambiguities and controversies.  
The globalisation of wine production has involved a whole series of 
interlinking transformations. Wine is a multi-billion dollar global industry, 
with huge profits to be made by those who are able to take advantage of the 
dynamics of regional and world wine markets. But there have also been 
losers in the new wine economy, most notably regions and producers that 
have engaged in over-production or have failed to represent their products in 
ways that new groups of consumers find appealing. As the world wine 
economy has changed, so too has the structuring of its geography—old wine 
growing areas have been changed profoundly in terms of how they grow 
wine and how they market it, while completely new locations for the 
production of wine have been created. Just as older areas have been re-
branded, with often ambivalent results, so too have new areas had to be 
presented as if their products are worthy of the ongoing attention of 
consumers. In both cases there has been a creation and re-creation of value, 
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with world wine markets operating on the basis of perceived forms of worth 
that in many cases were only recently invented.  
The economics of wine production are also being transformed by 
transnational forms of expertise and the application of globalised technology. 
New types of actors, such as viticultural advisers operating routinely across 
national borders, have appeared on the scene and become increasingly 
influential, bringing in their wake novel assemblages and apparatuses of 
science, technology, culture and nature. Concurrently, trends towards organic 
and biodynamic production highlight how the wine industry has responded to 
broader trends having to do with environmental degradation and risk, and 
consumer desires both for ‘authenticity’ and health, construed in various 
ways, and apparently virtuous forms of production and consumption. 
As production has in many ways become more homogenised across 
the world—with the development of mass market wines on an industrial 
scale in many territories—there has been a growth in resistance to the 
perceived detrimental consequences of such homogenisation in the forms of 
political resistance to the ownership of large wine-growing areas by 
transnational corporations. As a result, the globalisation of wine production 
has become a profoundly political issue in various countries, with 
ramifications both for the wider agricultural industries and for national and 
transnational types of politics. 
Just as the production of wine has become globalised in ever more 
complex ways, so too have the ways in which wine is socially organised and 
symbolically represented. There now exists both a worldwide cultural 
economy of wine, as well as more specific regional and national economies. 
At these various levels, wine has become mediated by a wide range of actors 
and institutions, all of whom both shape processes of wine globalisation and 
are in turn shaped by these. For example, wine tourism is an increasingly 
important sector within the broader tourist economy, attracting affluent 
visitors to wine growing areas, whose needs are catered for by an expanding 
viticultural culture industry that brands, markets, promotes and represents not 
only the wine itself but such factors as terroir, geography, tradition, local and 
national cultures, and family wine-making traditions. This culture industry 
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can have profound consequences for how wine is actually made, priced and 
consumed.  
The world wine economy is also structured through events such as 
wine fairs and the prizes awarded at them, these prizes carrying great 
economic and symbolic worth, and being able to create reputations that can 
be globe-spanning in nature. If such promotional devices now have global 
aspects, so too do the institutions of criticism and evaluation. For example, 
the American critic Robert Parker holds tremendous power in shaping not 
only which wine gets highly evaluated and consumed, but also how wine-
makers understand the nature of their own products. Relatedly there is now a 
worldwide system comprised of restaurants, bars and wine personnel such as 
sommeliers, the latter operating as brokers and intermediaries between the 
wine industry and on increasingly diverse array of consumers. In essence, the 
various social apparatuses which surround wine have become more 
globalised, leading in some ways to more homogenisation but also to new 
forms of complexity and difference. 
Both mirroring and to some extent driving the globalisation of wine 
production, the increasingly globalised nature of wine consumption is in 
need of serious attention at the present time. Many large-scale 
transformations have been and are taking place in terms of who drinks wine, 
why they drink it, and which wines they drink. Older class-, gender- and 
ethnically-based patterns of consumption have either been re-enforced or 
profoundly altered as both production and the social management of wine 
have changed. Whole new classes of consumers have arisen, often in 
response to the cultivation of tastes and aspirations by the wine cultural 
industry. From the lower classes in Europe to the new middle classes in 
China and India, the entry of new social groups into the field of wine 
consumption has had lasting effects on what sorts of wines are made and 
how they are presented to various publics. And in locations where wine 
drinking is a novel social activity, new consumers have been tutored in how 
to deal with wine. Relatedly, new forms of social distinction and 
cosmopolitanism have been created, as new types of consumers express their 
aspirations through the means of wine drinking. Such processes have been 
particularly spectacular in the case of China, where the consumption patterns 
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of both the hyper-rich and the new middle classes are having very large 
impacts on wine prices in various regions, including ‘old world’ production 
areas like France, Spain and Italy.  
But it is not only in the newly rich countries where new types of wine 
consumers have appeared—wine consumption has appeared relatively 
recently as a mass pursuit in parts of Europe, especially the Nordic countries, 
where hitherto it was merely an elite activity. How to stimulate a wine 
market in a context where wine was hardly drank before has been a challenge 
that the wine industry has often successfully risen to, and this process mirrors 
the creation of value being created from nothing (or very little), which has 
characterised the emergence of new wine-producing areas. New forms of 
production and novel modes of consumption are often entangled with each 
other, as is evidenced by the success of emerging regions’ wines in places 
with no strong tradition of wine consumption. Yet at the same time as some 
national contexts have exhibited very rapid increases in per capita levels of 
wine consumption, other locations have suffered a decline in consumption, 
such contexts often being those with long-established wine industries and 
traditions of wine drinking. New types of alcohol consumption are displacing 
wine in some countries, stimulating often anguished debates about the 
possibility of maintaining cultural traditions within a world of (apparently) 
open cultural borders and of trans-national drinks corporations which possess 
the financial muscle to promote successfully new drinking patterns. This 
again shows that wine is thoroughly bound up with multiple controversies 
and dilemmas, which are simultaneously cultural, economic and political. 
The worldwide wine industry is both increasingly homogeneous, yet 
complex and diverse too. An understanding of it must examine the 
production, distribution, social management and consumption of wine, 
analysing these from a wide range of disciplinary perspectives. The wine 
world thus intersects in diverse ways with other major domains of a 
globalised world, in political, economic, social and cultural ways.  
 
Conclusion  
In Macedonia, the wine industry has experienced such shifts in ownership, 
production, consumption, branding and marketing. Politics and economics, 
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both state-led and ideologically driven by the neoliberal market, have and 
continue to transform the wine world there. Indeed, neoliberalism is a tour-
de-force around the world, and as I assert in this chapter is the catalyst for the 
‘katastrofa’ in Macedonia. As discussed in the previous sections, it has 
embedded itself in every aspect of life, from society to government to 
economy, including the global wine industry, and globalisation and 
individual consumption are indeed key to it.  
The most distinctively neoliberal phenomenon is the redefinition of 
the individual as ‘homo oeconomicus’, a rational economic actor whose 
behaviours, both economic and non-economic, are determined by a 
cost/benefit analysis (Lemke 2001). In a neoliberal world, there are no social 
problems, only individual challenges, and there cannot be a social solution to 
an individual challenge without restricting the individual’s freedom. It is 
perpetuated through ideological control of all aspects of society, whereby 
there is an exclusion of alternatives and rival forms of thought (ibid). 
Consequently, neoliberalism so saturates consciousness that it defines 
common sense beliefs and becomes indivisible from basic ideas and 
fundamental assumptions (Apple 2004). The acceptance of neoliberalism is 
understandable; it is reasonable for people to desire change when the current 
economic system is apparently failing them, just as it is reasonable for them 
to believe the new system works when they appear to or more likely, are 
potentially able to benefit from it. Yet this is a neo-Marxian form of 
ideologically induced false consciousness.  
Indeed, all successful ideologies obscure the true economic and social 
impacts of their implementation (Eagleton 1991), and neoliberalism is no 
different. If more attention were to be given to the growing concentration of 
wealth, massive inequality, lack of a rise in real wages, growth in personal 
debt, and the restriction of most economic prosperity to wealthy individuals 
and financial institutions as a result of neoliberalism, people may be less 
willing to accept the ideology (Dumenil and Levy 2005, Harvey 2005). To 
ensure that the outcomes of neoliberal policies and institutions are removed 
from the dominant discourse, the media, schools, and other ideological 
institutions are utilised to hide and distort the true impact of the pervasive 
ideology (Herman and Chomsky 1988). The reality conveyed through these 
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institutions is only a partial picture of the neoliberal world, as they obscure 
the devastating impacts of neoliberalism while highlighting any beneficial 
outcomes that could possibly be related to it. When this occurs, people are 
more likely to accept the neoliberal regime, thus reducing any immediate 
need to question it or create alternative systems. 
Devoted followers of neoliberalism attempt to prove the legitimacy of 
the extreme disparities in wealth through a fairly simple argument, though 
one with extremely contentious premises that often go uncontested. The 
argument begins with the assertion that neoliberalism allegedly frees the 
individual from the oppressive interference of the state allowing each person 
to realise their personal autonomy, and individuals within neoliberalism are 
rational, autonomous economic actors (Lemke 2001). Next comes the claim 
that the market is self-regulating, ensuring that the distribution of wealth is a 
legitimate product of free competition (Turner 2008). Since everyone has 
equal opportunity and the means for acquiring wealth are just and fair, the 
unequal distribution of wealth is necessarily legitimate. A corollary to this 
conclusion is that any inequalities of wealth are a result of individuals not 
working hard enough, and they can remedy their situation by changing their 
personal approach to the world–the ‘pull yourself up by your bootstraps’ 
mentality. If in the rare chance someone does work hard and does not 
succeed, the assumption is that it is not due to any structural inequality but 
only to a deficiency in his or her natural abilities. Further, free market 
fundamentalists allege that the wealth that is created at the top of the 
economic strata will ‘trickle down’, believing that what is good for the 
wealthy is inevitably good for everyone else. This basic line of reasoning 
largely shields neoliberalism from claims that it intentionally helps the 
wealthy at the expense of the poor, uses the structural inequalities 
increasingly embedded in governments and societies around the globe to 
exploit individuals and social groups, and forsakes the welfare of the 
individuals for the sake of creating profit (Chomsky 1998, 2005).  
In the following chapters these claims are substantiated through 
evidence from and discussions of the wine industry, governance in the region 
and country, and adaptation to such conditions by grape producers. 
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Chapter 3  
In vino veritas: Tikveš grape and wine production in the 20th 
century and after 
 
I walk through the fields of Tikveš, Kavadarci town of wine;  
The grape growers were picking their grapes, the wineries making their 
wine; 
Wine is your destiny, with it you’ll live long and with the rakija cure your 
pain.101 
 
Introduction: History, traditions, land and labour 
In this chapter I discuss grapes and wine as they exist in contemporary 
Macedonia, giving a historical, cultural, economical as well as viticultural 
background. I discuss the agriculture surrounding their growth, maintenance 
and harvesting—and changes to these processes and factors, how particular 
growers sell their grapes, the production process which occurs at most 
wineries, as well as how the wineries get their product to market, and which 
markets those are. This chapter also begins a discussion on perceptions of 
grape and wine production (lozarstvo), and the labour, customs and traditions 
surrounding it, as well as what the transition means for growers and the 
industry in terms of new standards, laws, subsidies and expectations.      
The fermented grape beverage of wine reportedly dates back over 
8,000 years, artefacts of its oldest production being found in the Republic of 
Georgia. However, according to the director of the Kavadarci town museum 
and local historian, Petre Kamčevski, with whom I had many fruitful 
conversations, Tikveš is possibly one of the oldest wine regions in Europe. In 
one of his several books, ‘Grape and wine production in Tikveš throughout 
history’ (2007)102, Kamčevski discusses how wine production there dates 
back millennia, with the region among the first in Europe to grow grapes 
agriculturally. For although the oldest known grape production indeed 
originates in Georgia, the evidence points to its transport through and around 
the Black Sea into modern day Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece and Macedonia in 
the ensuing centuries.  
                                                 
101 From the song ‘Kavadarci, town of wine’ (Kavadarci, gradot na vino) 
102 Published as Lozarstvoto i vinarstvoto vo Tikvešijata niz istorijata 
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Ancient artefacts (including coins, tools and pottery) found in Tikveš 
(some of which date back four millennia) illustrate the role of wine in 
society, and show that it was a divine and sacred substance. Wine was used 
in ceremonies, celebrations and war, with burial chambers and other 
decorative stonework excavated at the Stobi archaeological site in Tikveš 
showing extensive use of grapevine imagery. With several layers of building, 
the site is an expansive exposé into centuries of life in the wine region, and 
includes streets, a basilica, synagogue and many artefacts from the 2nd 
century BC onward. Altogether, they show not only grape production but 
worship of the ‘god of wine’, Dionysus. Stone reliefs of him with other gods 
are ubiquitous, and one includes a rare image of vines growing out of the 
hand of Dionysus.  
The Macedonian ruler, Alexander the Great, was known to give wine 
rations to his soldiers, as wine was often drunk in place of water when the 
latter’s quality could not be guaranteed. Famous writers noted the region’s 
wine consumption as well, such as Homer who wrote in the Iliad about the 
consumption of ‘oinos’ in Macedonia and Plutarch, who wrote about ancient 
Macedonians’ constant imbibing of wine. From ancient to Ottoman times, 
wine was used as currency and a tithe to the state: taxes were paid and goods, 
including livestock, were acquired with it (Kamčevski 2007).  
 In several Macedonian folk songs and poems comes the mention of 
wine, and in Tikveš folk songs herald the livelihoods made from wine 
production and consumption. There is the song ‘Black Tikveš’ (Crno 
Tikveško)103, which is often sang in restaurants in chorus, as the words are 
drawn out ‘crno e, crno Tikveškoooooo!’ Another tune in the song ‘Daphne, 
red wine’ (Dafino, vino crveno), tells the story of Daphne’s lover, whose coat 
was stolen by a Turkish hajduk and sold for red wine and brandy. Among 
many others, there is also the famous ditty by poet Jovan Strezovski, which 
goes:  
 
Beautiful is the spring 
Beautiful is the blue sky 
But most beautiful of all 
                                                 
103 Red wine is traditionally called ‘black wine’, though ‘red wine’ (crveno vino) will be 
heard as well, referring to the same sorts of wine. 
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Is Tikveš wine! 
 
Wine is also referenced in the well-known Macedonian saying ‘plant a vine, 
drink some wine’ (bucni prčka, pij vino)—said to those expecting too much, 
too fast. And as I discuss here and in Chapter 6, many growers equate it with 
‘bread’ (leb)—as a life and livelihood giving substance.  
 A vast variety of grapes (grozje) are grown in Tikveš, some more 
recent introductions than others. Red sorts grow better than whites given the 
intense summer heat and aridity, and constitute the majority of grapes 
grown104. The sorts grown include white grape types such as Riesling, 
Traminer and Chardonnay, as well as Smederevka, Hamburg, Temjanika and 
R’katsiteli. Of the red grape types, one will certainly find Cabernet and 
Merlot, but more so Kratošija, Stanušina, Kardinal and Vranec—whose 
blend is called ‘blue blood’ (plav krv).  
Vranec, however, is Macedonia’s premier grape and constitutes the 
majority of Macedonian red wine. Grown in Montenegro as well, it is the 
primary grape in ‘cuvee’ blends and is seen as the industry’s most unique and 
thus marketable wine, and winery owners boast that it can compete with an 
Italian Sangiovese or Spanish Rioja. Dark with a full-bodied aroma, Vranec 
is the California grape brought nearly a century ago gone native (after the 
phylloxera epidemic, described below). It is in fact a cousin to Zinfandel–
which incidentally originated on the Balkan’s Adriatic coast and was brought 
to California by Croatian immigrants—and grows well in the long, hot and 
sunny Tikveš summer days.  
Vranec is perceived to be such a quality grape not only because of the 
full-bodied wine it produces, but because its sugar content levels are 
extremely high—usually anywhere from 20-28 brix105. Overall, the intense 
aromas of Macedonian wines are the result of the region’s terroir—the 
combined influence of the Mediterranean and continental climates on largely 
clay-like soil, with hot summer days, cooler nights and sufficient cool 
                                                 
104 Approximately 65 percent. 
105 Brix refers to the sugar content of an aqueous solution. One degree brix is one gram of 
sucrose in 100 grams of solution and represents the strength of the solution as percentage by 
weight. Comparatively speaking, sub-par grapes have sugar content levels of 10-15, and 
typical decent quality grapes between 15-20 brix.  
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mountain rain. The lengthy ripening process concentrates the sugar and acids 
in the grapes, ensuring rich colours and complex aromas in the wines. 
There is an irony but a tale to be told in current rates of wine 
consumption in Macedonia: they are in decline. To begin, statistically 
Macedonians drink far less than their neighbours to the north. This is ironic 
because of the immense production of wine and brandy in Macedonia—in 
both Tikveš and in other parts of the country—but it belies another fact as 
well: of the wine that is consumed in south-central Macedonia, much of it is 
homemade. It thus goes unaccounted for, as does the massive production of 
rakija brandy, which remains an annual tradition that has only increased with 
the crisis in the wine industry. That is, growers with excess, unpurchased 
grapes have made more brandy than ever before—but largely for trade (as is 
addressed in Chapter 6).  
Macedonians in fact are reserved in their consumption of alcohol, 
particularly women. Coffee, tea and juice are much more likely to be offered 
and consumed when visiting a home or meeting with someone in a café-bar 
during the day. Alcohol is only offered and drunk occasionally at the day’s 
main afternoon meal (ruček) or in the evening, and generally in minimal 
amounts. Men drink more than women, particularly if out in the evening, 
though the tendency is to drink beer (which has been cleverly marketed by 
large European producers such as Heineken as well as the domestic brewery, 
Skopsko). Until 2011, in fact, the Kavadarci harvest ‘grape-picking’ 
(grozdober) wine festival allowed beer to be served, and beer sales surpassed 
wine sales at the event.  
Unlike Georgia, for example106, the customs surrounding alcohol 
consumption at home are few, but brandy is drunk at the beginning of a meal 
only when one is eating salad, with wine or beer possibly to follow during 
the main meal. When toasting, it is imperative to look everyone in the eyes—
as it is bad luck not to—and to gracefully clink glasses with them, saying ‘to 
health’ (na dravje) or ‘to life’ (živeli). That said, rakija brandy may be drunk 
at a variety of times of day and is used for various purposes. I met several 
mostly older individuals who drink a small glass of it every morning and 
                                                 
106 The ‘supra’ as it is known, includes a series of toasts and traditions which combine both 
honour with humour and might address everything from the nation to politics to women. 
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claim that their good health is a result of this habit. However, it is also used 
when one runs a temperature—their socks are soaked in brandy and when 
worn, are said to bring down a fever. Indeed, it is made into medicinal syrups 
through ageing it with added sugar and certain herbs or fruits. Mastika, for 
example, is a liquorice flavoured brandy made with honey, anis seed and 
sometimes chamomile. Brandy is also commonly aged with walnuts, mint or 
fruit (most often cherries or berries), and my mother-in-law makes a variety 
of these annually. Different grapes yield different kinds of brandy though—
growers claimed that the Kardinal and Hamburg sorts were the best. And last 
but not least, sub-average brandy is used as a cleansing agent—on the skin as 
a disinfectant, and on other surfaces such as tables or glass.  
Growing the grapes which make the wine or brandy, however, is 
arduous work. Vineyards require a good amount of attention, from pruning to 
watering to spraying with pesticides to replacing. When new vines are 
planted, it takes at least three years for them to yield fruit. The initial pruning 
(krojenje) of mature vines is done in February, and in the summer bunches of 
grapes are actually removed to ensure that those which remain are of better 
quality. Further, large grape leaves covering the vines are cut away to 
increase sun exposure to the remaining grapes and to accelerate ripening.  
The average life of a vine is 40 years, but with no disease and 
temperate weather vines can live to up to 100 years. When branches or entire 
vines are removed, they are burned either on the vineyard or taken home and 
used as fuel in the winter, as old vines are in fact the size of small tree trunks, 
and the ‘wood’ is caloric and produces high heat when burned.  The work 
performed on vineyards is most often done with the help of both 
machinery—a tractor, namely—and kin labour. Couples work the land 
together, though with gender based restrictions: women do not drive tractors, 
nor prune the vines in the spring, as these are strictly the work of men. 
Women’s work in the vineyards is thus often subservient to men, and their 
duty is to prepare and serve lunch, tea and coffee as well 107.  
                                                 
107 Lunch on the vineyard is usually comprised of bread with either a pate like spread 
(pašteta), sliced deli meat and cheese (kaškaval), or one of Macedonia’s mild red pepper 
and eggplant condiments (ajvar, pindzur or lutenica) and feta-like cheese (sirenje). A small 
gas powered burner is brought to heat water for herbal tea or Turkish coffee in the cooler 
months.    
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I must state that the work I did in the vineyards during my fieldwork 
was far less than I imagined when I set out on my project, and this was for a 
variety of reasons. For one, I did not live with a strictly grape-growing 
family108, so I did not have daily interaction at home with grape growers 
(though I did otherwise in town). Two, the work growers do is often 
relatively solitary and unplanned—only during the harvest is a significant 
amount of labour employed for a set period of time in the vineyards. 
Otherwise, the attention vineyards receive depends on a variety of factors, 
from the weather to the need to water, spray or prune them. Growers will not 
venture out in a cold rain, and if there has been too much rain the clay-like 
soil becomes extremely difficult to work in—feet sink and nearly get stuck in 
it. Alternatively, too little rain calls for irrigation or transporting water in 
large, 2,000 litre tanks on the back of tractors. Planning to go is thus often a 
last minute affair, and the nature of society in Tikveš means that if I was not 
engaged with a grower at that moment, I was not kept in mind and called 
along. Furthermore, I am foreign, and despite my kin-relations through 
marriage to a local, I was eternally shown a sort of hospitable deference—
even our godfather said he did not want to burden me with the dirty work of 
grape growing (though I insisted on several occasions). Indeed, cut fingers, 
dust in the eyes and mouth, and long hours in the sun are just some of the 
burdens of working in vineyards.   
In terms of the seasonal labour (argati) hired for the annual harvest, 
their work is the most intense of all. Once it is decided that grapes should be 
picked—and this depends on everything from the grape type to its location to 
the grower’s or winery’s preference—anywhere from three to six labourers 
are employed to work from before sunrise until near sunset (though with an 
afternoon break for lunch and rest from the heat). They are indeed fed several 
times to ensure their productivity and as part of their compensation, which is 
600-800 MKD (10-13 EUR) per day. Men tend to be slightly higher paid, 
particularly if they are assigned to stacking the heavy crates of grapes into a 
truck or tractor-trailer. Although intense, such work can net an argat 300-350 
EUR per month, which is good pay for anyone in agriculture and an 
                                                 
108 The family’s vineyards were managed by my wife’s aunt and uncle, and harvested with 
hired help only. 
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incentive for young men and even retirees to get involved. In fact, although 
Roma families migrate throughout the country and region for such work 
(including in other industries) and constitute the majority of those employed, 
I knew several young Macedonians in Kavadarci and the villages I frequently 
visited who worked as hired day labourers during the harvest, and heard of 
older men and women employed as well. Yet the availability of employment 
for such labour was decreasing during my fieldwork as a result of the 
transitional crisis in the region.   
For grape growers and their families, their vineyards and the grapes 
they produce are what they toil for, and holidays and saints’ days are tied to 
beliefs about and work in the vineyards. For example, St. Trifun109 is 
considered the patron saint of the vineyards, and his day (14th February) is a 
celebration and beginning of the new grape-growing season. On the morning 
of it in Tikveš, growers gather at local churches to see the priest prune 
(kroje) the first vine of the season—a vine which has in fact been removed 
from the vineyards and brought to the church to be used ceremoniously. 
Thereafter it is divvied up and passed along to spread good fortune in life and 
vineyard labour, and brandy and wine are served. Some priests and certainly 
parishioners continue onto the vineyards themselves, pouring wine onto the 
soil as a ritual blessing. For it is after St. Trifun that growers should begin 
clearing the vineyards from the prior year, cutting and burning them—but not 
before the jubilation of the day has its way. Indeed, with the St. Trifun 
holiday being in mid-February, when snow may very well be falling, the day 
is more ritual than labour oriented, and brandy and wine are poured freely. 
Although most growers in Tikveš celebrate and the region’s main towns hold 
some sort of formal recognition by the Mayor, in Demir Kapija there is a 
large municipality-organised event that includes folk dances and speeches by 
guest (often diplomatic) dignitaries110.  
                                                 
109 Known as a healer in the 3rd century AD, he was from Phrygia in what is today western 
Turkey. Rumour has it that his healing powers were so great that, as a teenager, he was 
summoned by the Roman emperor Gordan to heal his ailing daughter. He did so 
successfully, but not long after he was forced to renounce Christianity under the rule of 
Emperor Decius. He refused, and was tortured and murdered for it. 
110 The event is one of the several clever ways in which the town has garnered attention and 
a name for itself (in addition to its wineries and outdoor activities, namely rock climbing). 
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Despite this rich history and tradition in viticulture and grape 
production, the mythological legends and proverbs from other parts of 
Europe are not mentioned in Tikveš in the present day, and glorifications of 
wine—such as perhaps the most famous ‘in wine there is truth’ (in vino 
veritas)—seem non-existent except for in folk songs. I assert though that this 
does not discredit the historical evidence of the region’s wine production, but 
it is due to the fact that although Tikveš is a wine region and has been one for 
millennia, it has undergone not just a post-socialist transition but a significant 
ongoing one in terms of politics, economy, religion, ethnicity and thus 
identity. The Macedonia of two thousand years ago was one of Dardanian, 
Illyrian, Thracian and Greek tribes, which in the ensuing centuries slowly 
mixed with Roman, Slavic, Bulgar, Byzantine, and then Turkish and other 
ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire.   
Indeed, historically Macedonia was clearly a wine producing region 
during Roman times and saw agricultural development via the establishment 
of latifundia—parcels of private land for the sole production of grain, 
produce or wine. And by the 14th century the villages of Tikveš were given to 
monasteries which were known to have the highest standards of wine 
production (Kamčevski 2007). However, these shifted hands and purpose 
during the Ottoman Empire’s development, and wine production fell as the 
Middle Eastern, Islamic empire brought in new varieties of grapes and with a 
general prohibition on alcohol111, produced grapes more for juice, raisins, 
preserves and use in desserts (many of which are still found in 
Macedonia112). The pride, tales and traditions of wine production were thus 
likely lost for many during that time, as were any religious associations—one 
                                                 
111 The prohibition waxed and waned in its enforcement, and Christians continued to 
produce and consume alcohol, and at times so did their Muslim overlords. Indeed, some 
Ottoman nobility were known to be lax about alcohol, while some Sultans, such as 
Suleiman ‘the magnificent’, strictly prohibited it, had vineyards ripped up and fined 
producers during his reign in the 16th century. Of lasting effect were the declaration and 
condemnation by Mustafa the III, who in 1760 had producers’ homes burned, and fined and 
arrested them and buyers of alcohol. Such strict regulations lasted into the 19th century 
(Kamčevski 2007).   
112 Syrupy desserts, called ‘sweets’ (slatki) in Macedonian, include raisins and aubergines, 
and raisins are used in sweet breads as well. Further, there is a syrup (madžun) made from 
the boiling down of grapes that is considered both medicinal and a delicacy. It is akin to the 
‘must’ (mosto cotto) made by Italians for ageing into balsamic vinegar, but is not taken to 
that level. The syrup is usually eaten with fried dough (mekici or pešii), but is considered 
healthy and a traditional bronchial medicine. 
 104 
never hears mention of the pagan pantheon (be it South Slavic or Greek) and 
its gods (such as Dionysus), which if not lost in the centuries after 
Christianisation (9th-14th centuries) were certainly suppressed and forgotten 
during the Ottoman era (14th-20th centuries).  
At present, rest from work in the vineyards is only taken on Christian 
holidays, including ‘forgiveness day’ (pročka)—when individuals should 
seek forgiveness from one another, and when couples and/or their children 
should pay visits to their godparents—as well as on the Thursday before 
Easter (Veliki Četvrtok) and Easter (Veligden) itself. Of further significance, 
on Orthodox Christmas Eve (Badnik Večer, 6 January), the loaf of bread with 
a coin inside (pogača) baked for the dinner is split in two—‘one side for the 
house, and one side for the vineyards’—and whichever side contains the coin 
is seen as a blessing for it in the coming year. 
Wine production therefore dates back centuries in the region, and one 
researcher-visitor to Tikveš in the early 19th century (Jovan Cvijik) labelled it 
a proper wine region and the largest wine producer in all of Macedonia even 
then. He stated that Kavadarci was the centre in terms of sales and 
distribution of both the beverage and grapes for its production elsewhere 
(Kamčevski 2007). That is, grapes were grown then as they are today: not for 
domestic consumption so much as for export. Cvijik wrote of the many inns 
(anovi, from ‘an’ in Turkish) built for the traders, which were mostly 
occupied during the harvest when buyers came from north and south for the 
region’s wine113. Furthermore, as is discussed in Chapter 1, a significant 
boon came in the 19th century with the rise of industrialisation in Europe 
alongside the Ottoman Empire’s immersion into a more global economy. 
During this period railroads were built in the Balkans, including through 
Tikveš, allowing for the transport of products to markets throughout 
Macedonia and the wider region.  
To compare Tikveš to Bordeaux or even Napa Valley though 
misrepresents it. Tikveš is a significant wine producing region because it has 
the right climate and was actively made into one during the growth of 19th 
century trade networks, followed by the monarchical then socialist Yugoslav 
                                                 
113 Traders came all the way from the Serbian city of Niš, 250km to the north, and the 
majority from Skopje or Salonica, 110km to the north or south, respectively. 
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era when land was appropriated, divided and redistributed to both individuals 
and the large, state owned enterprises. Indeed, since the end of the Balkan 
Wars of 1912-13, the region has seen the coming and going of several 
armies, states and their policies, along with various ruling classes and the 
institutionalised history they possessed and imposed. Consequently, with the 
wine industry there has been a drastic shift in not just the production of one 
product (wine) but a shift in the culture, traditions and political economy 
surrounding it. 
 
A century of change: Tikveš since the end of Ottoman rule 
By the end of the Ottoman Empire, Tikveš produced one-seventh of the 
grapes grown in the vilayet of Salonica (Kamčevski 2007). Yet in this era 
surrounding World War I not only was there significant political change at 
hand as a result of the Second Balkan War and demise of Ottoman rule, but a 
ravaging phylloxera (filoksera)114 outbreak annihilated the region’s 
vineyards. There was thus a consequent period of stagnation, which along 
with WWI led to a drastic decline in wine production. It was not until the 
1920s that the industry was partially revived with the import and growth of 
grapevines brought from California. The post-Ottoman, inter-war years saw 
slow growth but a shift back into greater wine production, though it was not 
until Macedonia’s incorporation into the Federation of Yugoslavia that grape 
production increased exponentially.  
Indeed, modern agricultural policy began with the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia (1918-1943), which conducted land reform after the demise of 
the Ottoman Empire, resulting in small plots of three hectares on average. 
With the onset of socialism, food security then became a priority and the 
government sought to increase state owned property. Maximum land 
ownership—which had grown by the 1940s—thus decreased to ten hectares 
of cultivable land, and more land came to comprise state farms, given the 
government’s plan to see agriculture drive industrialisation. A form of 
                                                 
114 This outbreak was well known among today’s grape growers, who fear another such 
epidemic and/or fungal illness (bolesti)—which grapes are very susceptible to—but spray 
pesticides despite their cost in order to prevent it. For more information on phylloxera 
please see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phylloxera  
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collectivisation, yes, but those owning land were allowed to sell it115 and the 
collectivisation project was abandoned in Yugoslavia by the mid-1950s. 
Nonetheless, two-thirds of the land was redistributed to 320,000 families, 
and the rest went to the creation of such state farms and enterprises. 
Consequently, by the 1960s the majority of state-owned land had 
been developed into the vertically integrated, state run agriculture enterprises 
(kombinati, pl.). Each region had its own kombinat (if not several, such as in 
Tikveš), as the organisation of food production was not based on efficiency 
but on the four main principles outlined in the Introduction to this thesis. 
While the kombinati employed many workers, they were never collectives in 
the strict sense of the term, such as in much of the former Eastern Bloc. 
Instead such collective enterprises were just large swaths of land developed 
and used by a state industrial production facility. While they were the largest 
farms of their time, altogether they only took up one-thousand hectares in 
Tikveš, whereas private plots made up nearly eight thousand hectares 
altogether—clearly the majority of the region’s agricultural production. Such 
a system stands in similar form to this day, though the former kombinati are 
now largely private. 
In terms of development of the wine industry during socialism, 
Kamčevski writes that ‘immediately after the country’s liberation [in 1946] 
the new government made increasing the production of grapes, wine and 
rakija a priority in Macedonia’ (p84), and the construction of the largest and 
now infamous Tikveš Winery (Tikveška Vinarija, formerly ‘AG Kombinat 
Tikveš’) in Kavadarci followed in 1947. Its production was modest in its 
incipience, but grew annually alongside modernising expansions to the 
facility in 1956, 1966 and several times in the 1970s. Indeed, the kombinat 
produced a variety of non-alcoholic juices and foodstuffs, and its winery was 
satisfying increasing demand from not just other Yugoslav republics, but 
Germany as well116.  
The Tikveš Winery began as a family owned winery in the 1880s, 
when much of the region’s grape growers grew grapes and produced wine 
                                                 
115 By the 1980s the allowed land ownership increased to up to 30 hectares, though it is 
extremely rare for most individuals to have even one-tenth of this.  
116 Under Yugoslav President Tito’s rule, contracts were made with German importers—
relationships which continue to this day. 
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individually. However, with nationalisation under socialism, its purpose and 
indeed production shifted significantly: primarily, its facilities were invested 
in by the government and townspeople117, and it began to source grapes from 
the industrialising towns and villages of Tikveš rather than just its own 
vineyards. Overall, the key feature of the Tikveš Winery during socialism 
was that it only maintained ten percent of the town’s vineyards, as they were 
a part of the kombinat; otherwise, it sourced its grapes during the late 
summer harvest from over two thousand of the region’s Tikveš growers and 
their families.  
Lasting over two months (from approximately mid-August to mid-
October), these growers sold their grapes to the winery during the annual 
grape harvest (berba, which literally means ‘picking’). The selling process 
transitioned along with technology over time, but the growers came and went 
an average of fifteen times during each harvest (Kamčevski). They would 
pack a tractor-trailer (prikolica) full of grapes, drive them through town to 
the winery and queue all day (in a line up to a kilometre long) to have them 
weighed and inspected—a situation the author saw for several years until the 
winery’s transition to contracts after 2009. The inspection during the 
Yugoslav era and into the 2000s was basic and rudimentary though—the 
grapes’ weight and appearance being of primary concern118. Growers were 
then given a payment slip (potvrda) through which they would receive 
payment at the bank.  
In terms of wine production, socialism meant guaranteed supply of 
such inputs and more so, government payment for the growers’ grapes. At 
the height of the state’s purchasing, the grape harvest of 1984 was so 
abundant that the city swimming pool (drained for the season) opposite the 
Tikveš Winery was fully filled with grapes. The federation was clearly going 
through other political and economic turmoil at the time, but such poorly 
planned and needless production was no doubt part of what, in local 
                                                 
117 It being employee owned and built was an issue of contention during my fieldwork, as 
many claimed that when the modern winery was constructed it was with the mandated 
assistance of the town’s families, who had to each pay a portion of their income toward it. 
When it was privatised, however, they received nothing in return. 
118 And because they were paid based on weight, growers were known to under prune and 
over water their vineyards in the weeks prior to the harvest, fattening up what is a greater 
quantity of grapes but consequently reducing their sugar content and thus quality. 
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discourse there, is now called ‘hyper-production’ (hiper-produkcija).  Such 
hyper-production is in fact touted as part of the problem with grape 
production in the post-socialist era.  
To compare production over three decades, the Tikveš Winery 
produced approximately 300,000 litres of wine in the late 1940s when it went 
from being family to state-owned, whereas by 1984—at the height of the 
winery’s utilisation—this number had risen to 70 million litres, making it the 
largest winery in Southeast Europe119. The winery’s growth did not occur 
due to ‘market forces’, but as a result of the socialist government’s planned 
economy. With a growing population, increased consumption of factory 
produced goods and guaranteed employment by the government, the region 
and Tikveš Winery thus serve as an excellent example of development in the 
wine industry during and after the Yugoslav era. Furthermore, the winery 
was and remains a source of both pride and contention. 
 
Privatisation of the Tikveš Winery & wine production today 
Tikveš Winery was first de-nationalised and put on the path to full 
privatisation in the late 1990s by distributing shares (akcii) of the kombinat 
to its employees, thus being made into a public, employee-owned entity 
(akcionersko društvo). However, it continued to buy nearly all of the grapes 
grown locally at higher prices until the winery was fully privatised in 2004, 
when a shareholder and millionaire businessman (Sveto J.) bought a majority 
stake in and took full control of it120. What followed was the liquidation of 
employees, decreased production and thus grape purchasing, contracts with 
certain growers, and a shifting of the winery’s ownership and administration 
to the country’s capital, Skopje.  
According to locals, the privatisation of their winery best exemplifies 
the ‘catastrophe’ (katastrofa) in the region, but is just one example of 
privatisation in Tikveš. The result of the process though is that the Tikveš 
Winery of today has changed significantly. It was indeed fully privatised in 
                                                 
119 To put this in a comparative perspective, one of the largest wineries in the world (and 
certainly in California) is Ernest & Julio Gallo, which produces 70 million cases a year, 
which is equal to 168 million gallons or 638 million litres of wine. 
120 Sveto is the CEO of M6, a large conglomerate investment firm, which produces the 
country’s most popular beer, Skopsko, as well as Coca-Cola beverages, and owns franchise 
rights for McDonalds. 
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2004, and over the ensuing years shifted its administration to the capital, 
Skopje, altering its entire system of sourcing grapes and producing wine as 
well. Two acquaintances who still work for the winery complained of strict 
management practices, where they must either comply with what are intense 
demands or face dismissal121.  
Outside the winery, the previous long queue of local growers was 
replaced in 2010 with appointment times for contracted growers to drop off 
their grapes. The contracts, however, come with strict terms of agreement 
and penalties if the growers fail to comply with them. Namely, if the grapes 
are damaged or their sugar content differs from that specified, the growers 
may lose any payment for their crop. Incidentally, although such a loss is 
devastating, with growers earning only 150-175 EUR per tonne of grapes this 
main ingredient in wine is only a very small percent of the cost of wine 
production itself. 
As for the quantity of wine produced, the winery has maintained 
significant exports (roughly 80 percent of its wine) but decreased overall 
quantity considerably, to 35 million litres annually122. However, the winery 
has shifted to less bulk and more bottled wine in a move toward ‘quality over 
quantity’, and because of the increased profitability of bottled wine: whereas 
bulk wine is sold for 0.25-.30 EUR per litre to foreign bottlers (primarily in 
Germany or Slovenia), domestically bottled wine is sold for anywhere from 
3-10 EUR per bottle (.75 litre), depending on its quality. With glass bottles 
(imported from Bulgaria or Croatia) only costing .30 EUR each, the profit is 
clearly greater with bottled wine sales.  
At the Tikveš Winery facility in Kavadarci there are essentially two 
wineries in one. The first is the old winery which, although updated and 
calling upon more modern forms of technology for inspection, processing 
and storing, produces the winery’s average traditional wines. These cost 3-5 
EUR per bottle or are exported in bulk, but as the winery seeks to increase 
both its bottled and high-end wine production and sales, the sale of bulk wine 
is being phased out. There is thus the need for the ‘second’ winery: a state of 
                                                 
121 However, these informants said that despite this along with periods of understaffing, the 
winery is in fact more efficiently managed than previously.  
122 Allowing locals and growers alike to vilify ‘Tikveš’, given how far fewer grapes the 
winery now purchases. 
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the art facility which uses modern Italian technology and machinery to 
perfect the wine production process. Additionally, as opposed to the decades’ 
old two and a half metre tall barrels in the older part of the winery, the newer 
winery’s oak barrels are used to age the wine for two years only.  
Prior to production though the ‘special selection’123 occurs: only 
grapes of desired sugar content (which depends on the kind of wine or blend, 
or cuvee, they are making) are chosen, which then go through a stem and 
seed removing machine. The grape crusher gently crushes the grapes so as to 
only take the best of the juices (and less of the pulp) from them, a kilogram 
of grapes yielding enough juice for one bottle of wine124. The juice is then 
treated with a varying amount of yeast and enzymes before going into large, 
temperature regulated, metal cisterns for initial regulating and fermenting.  
Although the largest winery in Macedonia, the Tikveš Winery is but 
one of dozens in the region, and there are an estimated 75 wineries in the 
entire country. In Kavadarci, its transition to a privately owned company was 
a hard pill to swallow: the winery was built with the help of locals and it 
‘bought’ their grapes for decades; to the inhabitants of the town, 
Kavadarčani, it was therefore ‘our winery’ (naša vinarija). One friend, 
Dragan, lamented its loss, saying it was built with the equivalent of 
‘thousands of euros from local families’ and then sold for a pittance, ‘below 
one million euros, which does not even amount to the value of the equipment 
within’. Given its value, its director at the time—who Dragan claimed ‘hides 
out in his villa and won’t dare show his face in town’—made a small fortune 
off it. Indeed, there is clearly a bitter resentment toward the corruption which 
oversaw the winery’s privatisation, and toward the wineries which use the 
growers to subsidise their business today.  
 
Vinarii & vizbi: wine producers and the grape purchasing middlemen 
I use the Tikveš Winery as an example because of its notorious privatisation, 
as well as its location in my field site. But as I attempt to evoke in this 
chapter and those that follow, the industry and its ongoing transition has been 
                                                 
123 The winery has a ‘special selection’ label for a series of its wines.  
124 Otherwise, grapes may be pulverised to the extent that one kilogram yields enough juice 
for two bottles.  
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much more complicated than it may appear, for the number of ‘wineries’ 
(vinarii) above includes ‘vizbi’, where grapes are bought but not necessarily 
turned into wine. Further, the vizbi have sought grapes from growers in a 
franchise-like way, increasingly going to villages to ‘buy’ the grapes, which 
are sold at a purchasing point (punkt). For example, another large kombinat 
turned private winery and vizba, Povardarie (from nearby Negotino), was 
aware of the surplus of grapes in Kavadarci due to the Tikveš Winery’s use 
of contracts, so for the first time in 2010 used a logging facility in Kavadarci 
to purchase grapes. Such purchasing alleviates the burden on growers, who 
usually have to use their tractors to make what are sometimes ten mile 
journeys to sell their produce (and which would have been more for many 
Kavadarci growers had they had to travel to Negotino). Furthermore, it 
allows the purchasers to get grapes from what are increasingly sceptical and 
impoverished growers, and I am aware that some of the most notorious—as 
in, the wineries who have significant debt to the growers—were using such 
methods in purchasing grapes as well.  
Overall, the Tikveš wine industry can be characterised as significant, 
with roughly 250,000 tonnes of grapes being grown on 24,000 hectares of 
land. Although the word has not been adopted in the local wine lexicon, there 
is essentially a move towards terroir—the notion that wine quality comes 
from the very specific geographical location of the grapes125. While 
knowledge of geographical origin (poteklo) and its importance in 
determining the wine’s overall quality is nothing new, the competitive global 
wine market and trends in the industry have meant that wineries must 
promote not just themselves but the vineyards from which particular types of 
grapes come. Therefore, the Tikveš Winery now has an entire label of wines 
from their ‘Barovo’ vineyards (which sell for three times the average price of 
a bottle of wine), for example, and other wineries have followed suit.   
Yet in addition to this, the wine industry has faced what I call inter-
nationalist competition: due to Greece’s ongoing opposition over use of the 
                                                 
125 Terroir refers not just to the region but the hillside, its specific location and amount of 
rain and sunlight, the soil quality, etc. For those with an understanding of it, it becomes 
evident that many large Tikveš vineyards are not well positioned—they are essentially 
fields of grapes, which receive less sun and air than those on a hillside, and which are more 
susceptible to illness as a result. 
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name ‘Macedonia’, a new label for Macedonia’s Povardarie (Vardar River 
region) wines was adopted in 2013 through collaboration among the ‘Wines 
from Macedonia’ trade association. The association had been working with 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to help resolve 
not just Greek opposition to the name Macedonia, but their threats to 
European (eg, Slovenia, Germany) importers of it that they could end up in 
court. The association therefore developed the new moniker, and claims that 
the label, ‘Vardar Valley’ wines, which pinpoints the geographic origin of 
the wine rather than its country of origin, will boost its value. As an FAO 
representative claimed, ‘(w)ith the geographic qualifier Vardar Valley, 
Macedonian wines will be able to compete worldwide. It remains for the 
wine producers to accept, use and promote this tool and to profit from what 
they have’ (Marusic 2013). Others, however, disagree with such a seeming 
capitulation, and competition over use of the name Macedonia in the wine 
industry is just one aspect of the larger ‘name dispute’ between the country 
and Greece. 
In terms of land ownership, seventy percent of vineyards are owned 
and/or maintained by individual growers, and the rest controlled by former 
kombinati and newer wineries who have leased or bought land for their own 
production. One newer winery for example, ‘Stobi Winery’, has led the way 
in purchasing land for controlled production, and several others source 
grapes from their own land only. Nonetheless, the industry in Tikveš is still 
comprised of an estimated 10,000 grape growers, roughly 1,000 individuals 
employed by wineries in administration and labour, and an additional 15,000 
seasonal labourers employed during the harvest. The latter are often domestic 
migrant workers and predominantly Roma, but also include both young 
(unemployed) and older (retired) Macedonians.  
As for the ‘hyper-production’ which exists in the region, it is arguable 
that such over-employment and excessive production of grapes and wine 
have left Macedonia as a whole in the dark, and unable to compete with the 
European wines that have entered the market in recent years. On the one 
hand this is true, but on the other hand the wine is being sold in one form or 
another, and the government is still incentivising growth. The shift has 
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therefore been in capital and its distribution, and control over it and the 
wineries; namely, who gets subsidies and how as the wine industry has been 
reconstructed to suit a more neoliberal, free-market style of business.  
 
From lozar to loser: laws, subsidies, pricing and profits 
For decades grape growing has offered primary or secondary employment 
opportunities for local citizens of the Tikveš region: for many, growing 
grapes has been their main form of income, while for others (such as my 
parents-in-law) it is supplemental income. This latter notion of hobby grape 
production comes from the significant incentives setup during socialism and 
the initial need in the 1960s for as many locals to contribute to the industry 
as possible. Today, regardless of whether one grows as their primary or 
secondary form of income, the Macedonian government has turned away 
from supporting the industry in such a way. Instead, they now give subsidies 
to both grape growers and wine purchasers and producers. To spin it 
positively, by subsidising the industry while stepping aside otherwise, the 
government may be indirectly contributing to an improvement in wine 
production by fostering competition among wineries. Yet as this section 
shows, such unregulated competition and transformation is catastrophic for 
the region’s grape producers (lozari), as privatisation has meant higher 
standards expected by what are now private wineries, decreased grape 
purchasing overall, and severely low prices paid—when growers are actually 
compensated. Indeed, growers are unwillingly subsidising the wine industry 
through their arduous labour and expenditures.  
For what has occurred in the past decade is essentially a separation of 
the grape growers from both the state and the beverage toward which their 
labour in grape growing contributes. Whereas they used to be paid by the 
state and kombinat for their crop, and wine was a standard beverage (albeit 
most of it average in quality), now wine producers are organised, high-class 
and have established their own trade associations, such as that called 
‘MakVino’. Through an interview with one of MakVino’s representatives 
(below), I learned a significant amount about the industry’s perceptions of 
the market and their product. First of all, most of the wineries are owned by 
well-off (if not very wealthy) individuals, who are socially and politically 
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connected, and this has resulted in grape growers labelling them ‘wine mafia’ 
(vinska mafija). Yet this is really just an example of how the post-socialist 
transition coupled with free-market and EU accession mandates have 
affected the industry, juxtaposing the grape growers against the wine 
producers. Indeed, a great disparity exists in terms of not only wealth and 
control, but an understanding of the industry as this transition occurs: many 
growers do not know about the marketing of wine and where it goes beyond 
the winery, while wine producers indeed contrive new ways to market and 
sell their product, and hence increase their profits and market share. Thus 
your average grower (lozar) has lost out, going from lozar to loser.  
As approximately eighty percent of wine is sold abroad (wine being 
the second largest export in Macedonia after tobacco), grape growing and 
wine production statistically deliver approximately 20 percent of the 
country’s agricultural GDP and therefore are crucial to consider in planning 
agricultural policies126. Such policies include property management—the 
leasing of state owned land—and subsidies, which despite the government’s 
laissez faire approach to the industry they are continuously involved in. 
Subsidies must be distributed because the cost of grapes has decreased 
significantly in the last five years, and pricing for various types has seen 
incredible volatility. For example, prior to 2008 most grape varieties were 
sold for 20-25 MKD (.33-.41 EUR) per kilogram, but since then have 
dropped to an average of 8-12 MKD (.13-.19 EUR). Based on their sales and 
what they have in their cellars, wineries may one year claim need for a 
particular grape type but not another, leaving an entire grape sort 
undervalued and unpurchased.  
In fomenting a form of nostalgia and seeking the security of state 
wine production, grape growers still want the government to participate with 
price setting and buying, and demanded such in their first set of strikes in 
2010 (discussed in Chapter 4). Yet this is no longer the case, at times to the 
wineries’ chagrin as well. For example, one day while I spoke with a 
neighbour, Georgi, who is the owner of a smaller winery, he received a call 
for a meeting he was to attend that afternoon to discuss grape prices. These 
                                                 
126 Tina Ericson, Erik Pelling and Yves Surry ‘Support to agriculture in FYR Macedonia’ 
[2009] RSIE, 164, 156 
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were the prices he and his colleagues would pay for grapes in the upcoming 
harvest, as well as the quantities and sorts they would need for that year’s 
production. But his comments after taking the call showed a reluctance and 
hesitation in the matter. As he stated, ‘this is a very difficult matter because 
here we [wineries] are competing with one another but also working 
together. We don’t want to see the industry and grape growers destroyed 
(uništeno), but we also have to justify our business and earn enough to make 
it worthwhile’. That said, he added that the wine industry is run at the top by 
criminals (kriminalci) who are taking advantage of everyone, and this 
meeting was a case in point: winery owners such as himself were being 
summoned to a meeting to hear what the wealthier winery owners had 
decided. Further, he agreed that it is unfair to expect the growers to wait for 
their payments. ‘Granted it’s not socialism any more, but they need their 
money and I paid the growers who supplied me last year within a month. 
Tikveš [Winery] blames its distributors in Serbia and poor wine sales on its 
not paying growers, but this isn’t true—they have millions in the bank’.   
A member of the MakVino association, his sentiments were similar to 
the association’s main representative whom I interviewed in June 2011127. 
Divna, whose family began one of the first private wineries in Macedonia128, 
had a respectable understanding and appreciation of the wine market and 
industry. But she spoke of so many failures as well—the failure of the 
neighbouring Negotino municipality to keep up the wine information centre 
that had been setup in 2005; the disabling of the last website (setup through a 
USAID project129); and the government’s overall inability to plan for the 
long-term and make appropriate investments in what must be a state 
supported branding and marketing programme—as is the norm around the 
world—for Macedonia’s wine industry. As she said, ‘the promotion of the 
wine sector is the final link [after subsidies, other support of the industry, 
etc] which is missing. It is good to support agriculture but they must target 
sales appropriately’. She mentioned as an example the small grants the 
government gives to individual wineries so that they may promote 
                                                 
127 This interview took place in Kavadarci, and was had in a mixture of both English and 
Macedonian. 
128 Which could not seemingly compete and/or which was forced to sell itself off in 2010.  
129 See Chapter 5 for more on this project. 
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themselves at wine fairs abroad, saying ‘it just doesn’t do any good if it is not 
consistent and holistic. Foreigners don’t know much about Macedonia let 
alone its wines, so if there’s a tasting by one winery in the centre of London 
once every few years it’s useless, because the market is so challenging and 
competitive. We must work together as a country’. 
 This led us to speak about the vinska mafija and first off, whether it 
exists. She retorted: 
No, it’s not mafia because nothing is prohibited! This is a free market 
economy now—no one has to do anything anymore, such as buy all the 
growers’ grapes. There’s understandable confusion among growers 
because of the transition—they were used to selling their grapes based 
on quantity, not quality, so when Tikveš Winery, which was built with 
local money in the 1960s, was privatised and introduced sugar content 
levels it almost caused a revolution! And with older growers it’s 
understandable, they’re not used to it. But younger growers need to learn 
that quantity isn’t important, but factors of quality —the land130, brix, 
variety and age of the vines. Yet the winery is private now, it’s no 
longer theirs as they claim. It produces based on the market and pays its 
growers when it can.  
 
In discussing this topic—the late or lack of payment to growers—she 
admitted that it is a problem, but she claimed that the wineries have invested 
a significant amount of money and are not always getting it back. However, 
they know—though it is difficult to tell sometimes—that if they do not pay 
the growers then the grapes will eventually stop being supplied and the 
industry will suffer. She confirmed as well that smaller wineries, such as 
Georgi’s, do not generally withhold payments—instead paying the growers 
within a month or two because they do not have the leverage to act 
otherwise. In addition, such winery owners usually know their growers 
personally and may have kin connections with them, potentially altering the 
business relationship significantly.  
 When I asked Divna about increasing government subsidies though, 
such as the current government continues to give in light of EU entry and the 
European wine market, she stated:  
It’s good, but there’s so much development that needs to be done. There 
must be long term investments in wine tourism because the EU and its 
wine market are so competitive. Even though there’s hyper-production 
                                                 
130 This is essentially a reference to notions of terroir, but is expressed as the ‘land/earth’ 
(zemjata) or ‘geographical origins’ (geografsko poteklo). 
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the government is giving subsidies to increase the number of new 
vineyards. This is good on the one hand because there are old vineyards 
which need replacing, but it’s being done because there’s an EU 
regulation which says that upon EU entry a country cannot increase the 
number of hectares of vineyards of typical varieties, only indigenous 
varieties. 
 
This last point she made is significant for a couple of reasons. One, this EU 
regulation is there to in fact protect traditional wine producing countries like 
France, Italy and Spain, as well as to avoid a sudden in-flow of wine into the 
EU. Two, it means that there is an ironic situation occurring: an increase in 
grape production at exactly the point where it should—according to the 
market—continue declining. Bulk exports may be increasing but bottles are 
less so (despite the Tikveš Winery’s marketing campaigns at home and 
abroad), thus even Stobi Winery, because they have so many vineyards and 
source their own grapes, have sold some of their excess grapes for cheap to 
smaller bulk wine producers—such a scenario which only hurts individual 
grape growers all the more.  
Therefore, a situation exists today in Tikveš in which grievances are 
aired yearly by growers whose primary income derives from the selling of 
grapes to wineries, a practice that is increasingly declining as there is less 
interest among wineries to source grapes in this manner. Instead, many 
wineries have begun to acquire more vineyard land in order to consolidate 
production processes, and using modern technology are able to quickly test 
grapes for quality and then make up to 50 percent more wine from them131. 
Pleas by growers for state intervention to require wineries to buy their grapes 
or at least mandate prices have become progressively more desperate since 
the full privatisation of large, formerly state owned wineries such as the 
Tikveš Winery, which has left many formerly stable families with stockpiles 
of unsellable grapes and put severe restrictions on their financial security and 
purchasing power.  
Thus it is evident that, due to aggravations from low prices set for 
crops before the harvest to rejection of their grapes by collectors with refined 
demands from wineries and corrupt instalment payment plans, growers have 
                                                 
131 Per discussion with Jane G., former Director of Tikveš Winery and now private wine 
producer. 
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suffered financially and emotionally. The situation is ongoing, but in autumn 
2010 Tikveš was at an unprecedented low in its post-socialist transition: at no 
time in recent memory had the region and its grape growers seen such chaos, 
confusion and hurt. The local weekly paper titled and subtitled its end of 
October 2010 piece ‘A catastrophic year for grape production in the Tikveš 
region; The wineries’ single-handedly will destroy a centuries’ old tradition; 
The vineyards will be dug up, but what should be put in their place[?]’132 
 
Crisis in 2010 and after 
The year I began my fieldwork in 2010 was in fact a particularly pivotal one: 
having gone largely unpaid for their 2009 harvest, growers protested and by 
late October (passed the end of the main harvest) approximately half of them 
had left their grapes unpicked. Further, strikes and protests saw symbolic 
quantities dumped in streets and on roads. While some of those who did 
expend the time, money and energy to pick their crop were able to ‘sell’ it, 
the prices they were offered and consequently owed were indeed lower than 
the previous year, and the wineries were generally not taking their entire 
harvest. The latter claimed that this was due to excess wine being held as a 
result of the 2008 global financial crisis, but many growers and other 
specialists in the industry, such as an agronomist (agronom) I knew, doubted 
this; they felt that since Macedonian wine is not a luxury product, it was 
unlikely to be a significant expenditure for its consumers133. But with no 
timeline for payment, growers have been essentially subsidising the wine 
business and, until payment, getting nothing in return. The most common 
consequence is that growers have been left with several tonnes of grapes—
                                                 
132 ‘Katastrofalna godina za lozarstvoto vo Tikvešijata, monologot na vinariite ke ja uništi 
vekovnata tradicija, lozjata ke se kopačat, no što da se sadi na nivnoto mesto’ (Kav’darečki 
Vesnik, 22 October 2010). 
133 Nor did the 2008 global crisis even severely affect the Western Balkans. Living in 
Skopje at the time, from 2008 to early 2010, there was much discussion about whether 
Macedonia’s and the region’s economies were suffering from the collapse of the financial 
markets. However, despite some lost migrant worker remittances when their jobs dried up 
and reductions in FDI and demand for some industrial products, for the most part the 
economy of Macedonia remained rather insulated given its lack of integration with the 
global financial marketplace.  
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leading many to take up or increase home wine and brandy production—and 
little to no money in their pockets134.  
As Divna of MakVino mentioned, there is an interesting paradox 
occurring in Tikveš: although the number of grape producing vines and 
vineyards has been decreasing since the mid-1990s, the percent of wine 
being exported is on the rise—bulk wine having nearly doubled in 
production from 1998-2008 (Macedonia in Figures 2009, p31).135 And by 
April 2012 it was reported that the Tikveš Winery was earning record profits 
on its sales136, claiming that ‘Tikveš’ netted twice as much in the first quarter 
of 2012 as compared to the first quarter of 2011, going from 1.24 million to 
2.58 million MKD (20,328 to 42,295 EUR). Coming from both the domestic 
and foreign markets, their market presence grew by 14 percent over the year 
prior, and the largest gains in income came from foreign markets. A small 
part of this was due to sales in the US where the company had been selling 
through an importer there, and they claim to be looking into market 
opportunities in Russia and China—both countries’ markets being seen as a 
panacea to the region’s woes. Interestingly, and perhaps indicative of 
misinformation about the industry, the article added that Tikveš Winery had 
entirely paid off its debts to growers for the 2011 harvest and was 
intensifying its cooperation with them.  
Thus this situation merits the question: even if exports are on the rise, 
where are wineries’ significant profits coming from? In fact, it is not from 
just increased sales and wine prices for bottled wine—of which little is being 
exported—but from government subsidies. The Macedonian government 
began giving subsidies in order to cushion the blow that their withdrawal 
from grape purchasing (among all other agricultural production) was. But 
                                                 
134 There was an estimated four to five times as much rakija being produced in homes 
around Tikveš in 2010 compared to 2009. As the grape growers’ nominal leader and 
President of the Agro-Tikvešija union stated: ‘There is now more rakija than water coming 
out of grape growers’ homes. There’ll be enough for export—enough to flood the whole 
Balkans’ (‘Lozja se prodavaat, nema koj da gi kupi.’ Dnevnik, 4 November 2010).  
135 Bulk wine production increased from 583,207hl in 1998 to 924,348hl in 2008, with 
exports of it growing steadily, from $24.2 million in 2004 to $42.6 million in 2007. 
Macedonia’s exports of bottled wine also grew from $9 million in 2004 to nearly $17 
million in 2007. 
136 Vo ‘Tikveš’ rast na dobivkata  vo prviot kvartal od godinava, Dnevnik, 28-29 April, 
2012 
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while subsidies tend to be strong for tobacco137, for example, they have 
fluctuated for grapes: growers have traditionally received a certain subsidy in 
order to plant more grapes, as well as based on the amount of grapes they 
produced and sold—not the size of the land on which the vineyards are 
located. However, in recent years the EU accession process has meant 
changes to these subsidies, and they are now given based on the vineyard’s 
size in order to subsidise quality, not quantity. Subsidies are still given for 
new vineyards (and with protest that such funds should go to growers in 
another form), but whereas state subsidies used to go to growers directly in 
terms of price paid per kilogram of grapes sold, they now go in order to 
subsidise the difference between a ‘fair’ price and what the private wineries 
and vizbi are willing to pay—a very contentious issue for growers because of 
the apparent collaboration between industry and government138.  
Nonetheless, by 2011 subsidies for grapes had increased substantially 
so that of the top three companies receiving agricultural subsidies in all of 
Macedonia, wineries took second and third place. Although the Tikveš 
Winery was number three, receiving 495,000 EUR, it was another winery-
vizba that took the lion’s share, ‘Dzumajlija’. Dzumajlija is a vizba located 
just outside of Tikveš which, in buying the most grapes out of any winery or 
vizba, managed to rake in 608,000 EUR in subsidies in 2011. Yet as is 
addressed in the next chapter, Dzumajlija was notorious for not paying their 
suppliers and eventually closing its doors in 2012 despite its debt. It was their 
debts that were partially blamed for the 2010 strike-protests in Tikveš, and 
several growers I knew had ‘sold’ their grapes to this vizba only to see no 
remuneration.  
In 2011 there were 85 million EUR of subsidies distributed by the 
Ministry of Agriculture in total. But for grape production there were three 
main subsidies given:  
• 40,000 MKD (645 EUR) per hectare of vineyard tended to, given to 
growers or wineries for the land they tend  
                                                 
137 Tobacco, Macedonian’s number one export, receives nearly 50% more in subsidies than 
grapes and other fruits combined.  
138 For example, if the price was deemed to be nine MKD per kilo (such as for the common 
Vranec grape) but the vizba was only willing to pay seven, the government would give 
growers the extra two MKD per kilogram.  
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• 140,000 MKD (2,257 EUR) per hectare for new vineyards, given only 
once and to either growers or wineries who are expanding production  
• 2 MKD (.03 EUR) per kilogram of grapes that have been ‘sold’ to a 
winery or vizba, given to growers (who must provide proof of ‘sale’) 
 
The first subsidy, for pre-existing vineyards being tended to, benefited both 
growers and wineries equally—except that overall, this income combined 
with the third subsidy based on kilograms of grapes sold was a net reduction 
for growers compared with their previous earnings.  
For example, if a grower harvested three tonnes of grapes on two 
hectares of vineyards, he received approximately 500 EUR for the grapes139 
plus 1,290 EUR for his two hectares, totalling 1,790 EUR. Although this 
amount totals more than what a grower received prior to the subsidy system 
when the government was purchasing grapes (at double the price, thus 1,000 
EUR) in lump-sum payments, what is not factored in is the fact that 
additional inputs are no longer supplied or reduced in price by the 
government like they were previously (not to mention inflation in food and 
energy costs). These inputs primarily include petrol for their tractors, 
pesticides for spraying, as well as crates (which cost 2 EUR each) for use 
during the harvest (which were previously supplied by the winery-kombinat, 
many of which are still being used)  
Furthermore, the irrigation system setup during socialism no longer 
functions—the small paved canals cracked and dry—therefore hauling water 
to one’s vineyards plus insuring them (primarily against hail and drought, 
both significant annual threats) must be done, and are additional expenses for 
the grower. The fact that the grapes must be sold to a winery or vizba to 
claim the subsidy combined with the delayed payments to the growers by 
both the wineries or vizbi and from the government, mean that the growers 
must shoulder the costs of grape growing far longer than they did before. In 
doing the math, the inequality in subsidies is evident: the top wineries and 
vizbi altogether took several million euros in subsidies in 2011, while 
growers averaged less than 2,000 EUR each.  
                                                 
139 Assuming a total sale price of 10 MKD per kilogram, including the subsidy. 
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Additionally though, in speaking with a couple of individuals at the 
Kavadarci Rural Development Agency (Agencija za ruralen razvoj)140, an 
additional subsidy for wineries in 2011 was pointed out to me. As an 
example, they described the activities of ‘Povardarie’—the aforementioned 
Negotino winery that setup a buying station in Kavadarci in 2010—which 
was buying as many grapes as possible because the winery was getting 5.7 
MKD per kilo for every kilo they bought over their previous year’s 
purchase. What this meant was that they reaped incredible subsidies in 
purchasing, while also gaining control of the local grape market. They were 
then selling the grapes they bought to smaller wineries which did not have 
the capital to purchase so many grapes, but prohibiting those wineries from 
earning subsidies on those grapes. For if such wineries and vizbi are buying 
hundreds of tonnes of grapes then they are making a significant amount off 
of subsidies, all the while growers are receiving only 5-10 MKD per kilo as 
the sale price. Thus it costs the winery nearly nothing to produce a litre of 
wine(which they are able to produce from one kilogram of grapes), meaning 
that wineries have gone from barely doubling their earnings a decade ago—
when wine prices were lower and grape prices higher—to now selling wine 
for five to ten times its production cost.  
The reason that the Macedonian government has been giving subsidies 
for the expansion of vineyards, despite the hiper-produkcija and evident 
over-abundance of wine and grapes, is that European Union wine production 
and marketing are a looming threat and challenge, and wine from the EU 
began entering Macedonia’s market tariff-free in 2013. Therefore, although 
exports of Macedonian wine are on the rise, it is due to EU regulations which 
will restrict Macedonia’s ability to increase its wine production once in the 
Union that the government is seeking to expand it now as an investment for 
later. As Georgi, the neighbour and owner of the small winery previously 
mentioned, explained to me in 2011:  
I’m not optimistic, but the government is giving subsidies for new 
vineyards because once the country joins the EU new vineyards cannot 
be planted. Why do they want to do this though? I’ve wondered, but it’s 
because while there’s a quota on exports of bulk and bottled wine at 
present and tariffs on imports, those will be lifted upon EU entry. This is 
                                                 
140 Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  
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important and advantageous for Macedonia because the country exports 
all of its bulk wine and consumes little of its wine anyhow. Bottled wine 
is a problem, as the current export quota for it—five million bottles—is 
never fulfilled, and in fact only ten percent of it usually is. The current 
crisis is thus in part the result of the government here stretching the 
industry thin in order to prepare it for the day when it can export freely 
and in large quantities. 
 
While a stimulus to business and investment for the future is not necessarily 
a bad idea, such collaboration between the grape buyers (vizbi), wineries and 
government angers grape growers in Tikveš. In addition, the growers point 
out the hypocrisy in the wineries and vizbi saying they have no need for all 
grapes grown in Tikveš when they cost above 10 MKD per kilogram (such as 
they have in prior years), yet are willing to double their purchase when the 
price is half that141. Growers remain dissatisfied with the little finances that 
the government gives them per year for owning vineyards and for each 
kilogram of grapes that they ‘sell’, as well as because they are given their 
grape sales’ subsidies based on the ‘purchase receipts’ they receive from the 
wineries—even if, as is nearly always the case now, growers are not paid 
immediately by the wineries. In not implementing adequate laws nor 
attempting to alleviate the consequences that result, this matter is a serious 
weakness for the country’s wine industry and is addressed further in Chapter 
4.  
Overall, in purchasing grapes the wineries will not say how much of a 
particular grape sort they need until the harvest comes, disclosing no 
analytical information to better assist growers and the region in determining 
what they should plan for, both in the short nor long term. The transition is 
thus not only a catastrophe fraught with uncertainty for the growers, but one 
filled with continuous ambiguity and disinformation, and such illicit 
behaviour and consequent inequality has infiltrated the judicial system as 
well. Indeed, lawsuits and legal intervention have done little to force the 
wineries to pay for the grapes they purchase, even with the 2010 ‘law on 
wine’ (zakon na vinoto) passed in tandem with the crisis that year. The law’s 
various articles control the production and trade of grapes, wine and their 
                                                 
141 Most grapes that year were sold for five to seven MKD—between .08-0.10 EUR—per 
kilogram; ‘the cost of one egg’, many say. 
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products; the description, designation, marking, presentation and protection 
of wine; and it regulates the national register of vineyards as well as the 
rights and obligations of the legal and other entities that are producing and 
trading wine in the region142.  
Although in theory the law seems an attempt at appropriate 
regulation, in hindsight the section of the law on the production and trade of 
grapes appears to have only been a carrot used to quell the grape growers and 
keep them working. But just a year later, before it could even be enforced, 
the law was deemed interference in the marketplace and overturned by the 
country’s constitutional court (ustavniot sud). More precisely, one of the 
law’s main articles insisted that grape buyers (such as wineries) pay for the 
prior year’s purchase by the 30th of April in any given year. The 
constitutional court thus decided that the relationship between the grape 
growers and wine producers is founded on obligatory rights between the two 
different parties, and as a signatory to that contract and therefore adopting a 
law that will protect only the grape growers, wineries are put in an unequal 
position since no law was adopted that would guarantee that they will be paid 
by wine buyers.  
Such a ruling makes it evident that if there is a silver lining to the 
cloud which rests above the Tikveš region, it is not visible to the majority of 
those below. Even though it is the wineries who owe the money, the growers 
are the ones who have found themselves both in debt and under siege, with 
no institutional authority seemingly at their side, from the Ministry of 
Agriculture to the judicial system with which they should be able to seek 
remuneration and justice. They fear that by taking legal action they stand to 
lose what semblance of business relations they have with buyers, and those 
who have attempted to sue (tuži) have only found their cases held up in court 
for not just months but years. As an example, in 2013 one informant was still 
awaiting a response from the court for his unpaid 2010 harvest, for which he 
had filed suit in early 2011. When asked about it, his response to the situation 
was ‘there is no law, only tyranny’ (nema zakon, samo tiranija). 
 
                                                 
142 Law on Wine [2010] Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia 50/10. 
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Conclusion 
The remarkable thing about the transition in Tikveš is not that growers have 
ripped up several hundred hectares of vineyards—for it seems a natural 
response—but that so many continue to ‘work for bread’ and toil in their 
vineyards. Undoubtedly there is some value in the crop (particularly if sold 
and paid for) and the brandy they can produce from it, but their persistence in 
working speaks to the true nature of habitus—the arguably irrational habits 
which comprise a group of people within a particular culture and society143. 
As I have attempted to relay throughout this thesis and chapter, it is the 
indirect effect of privatisation in the grape industry on livelihoods that has so 
significantly altered the face of the Tikveš region and the habitus of those 
living there. The result is thus much nostalgia and bitterness as growers, their 
families and others whose businesses had thrived alongside the wine industry 
in previous decades wonder in disbelief at the changes occurring. For 
example, two men whom I frequently saw at the čaršija, Pero and Atanas, 
openly lamented the changes in the Kavadarci economy. They claim it used 
to be one of the wealthiest towns in the [Yugoslav] region, but now has 
‘fallen [from grace]’ (propadnal). The crisis thus extends beyond the 
wineries and growers’ ability to pawn off their crop—it has affected the soul 
and identity of the people and their past. Furthermore, as Pero and Atanas 
explained, factories and companies have been privatised and closed down, 
with foreign owners coming in and not paying the workers. The new owners 
then pocket the profits, and sell the factory off to a friend who claims no ties 
with the former owner and says he cannot do anything about pay in arrears. It 
is a common story and cycle, and as one hears often there in terms of the 
transition, a ‘catastrophe’ indeed. 
Concurrently, despite disinformation about the effects of the 2008 
global financial crisis, the wine market has thrived. MakVino’s 
representative, Divna—whose family winery declined because of 
                                                 
143 According to Bourdieu, habitus is composed of ‘[s]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes 
without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in 
order to attain them’ (1990). 
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competition from larger wineries, selling off its production units and 
remaining wine in 2011—admitted that it is in the wine industry’s lack of 
regulation and its consequent competitiveness that her family’s winery could 
not compete. Larger wineries with more money are able to market more, and 
pay restaurants and even servers to sell their wines, using incentives and 
bonuses. As an example, she referred to the café-bar where she and I met in 
Kavadarci, which has an all wood bar from Villa Marija, a Demir Kapija 
winery. With ‘Villa Marija’ and imagery of grapes carved into it and all 
around the island station that the terrace-bar was, there were also small wine 
refrigerators with the winery’s name on it. What she then pointed out that 
was not visible is the money switching hands—servers there and elsewhere 
usually get 50 MKD (.85 EUR) per cork (bottle of wine) they serve, so it is 
in their interest to sell from whichever winery that will pay them the most. 
This lack of restriction differs from in the US and EU, where such 
promotional items can only be used to target the consumer as marketing, not 
payment to distributors and business owners to be partial toward one winery 
over another.  
 So when I asked what privatisation has meant to her, Divna said ‘it 
presented an opportunity that didn’t exist before’. At first it was ‘exciting 
though difficult’, she claimed, because laws were based on socialist wineries 
and her family were able to let ministry officials know how much needed to 
change. And along with others in the fledgling private wine business, they 
did so successfully—restrictions and regulations were lifted. Yet the lack of 
regulation means wineries can now get away with far more than they should 
be able to, particularly if they have the resources and money to do so, and 
Divna’s family’s winery is an example of one of the victims of this process.  
She mentioned the Stobi Winery—owned by wealthy businessman 
Menče J., who invested 20 million EUR into building it, and bought up a 
former state company and its land to make way for 200 hectares of 
vineyards. Tikveš Winery, with an investment and real estate holding firm at 
its helm, has invested heavily too, overhauling their entire system of 
production, employing a French oenologist and allocating resources to 
marketing and product design. Indeed, they have spent heavily on 
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marketing—taking out full page spreads in the newspapers and using a 
Croatian pop-star model speaking French in their adverts on television.  
 Overall, Divna said there is a clash of values, ideas and norms, and that 
her work is a challenge because of various development strategies, which 
often conflict and are not well connected. For one, more recent EU accession 
measures and laws have meant increased restrictions yet again, such as the 
employment of an oenologist at every winery—something which is certainly 
not the case nor are there enough trained individuals in the country to satisfy 
such demands. In addition, ‘there must be a long-term wine tourism 
strategy’, she expressed, as she lamented the government’s unwillingness to 
assist the industry in marketing itself internationally.  
As for the fledging wine tourism industry, she seemed to represent 
her MakVino consortium’s resentment toward the one major success story in 
the region, that of the Napa Valley style winery, Popova Kula, in Demir 
Kapija. Its owner, Jordan T., is not a member of MakVino, and regardless 
she said the winery was a great example of what the region’s tourism 
industry should be like. Yet her opinion was that he is not seen as a team 
player—‘he wants to be first in everything, which he cannot be, and this 
makes people dislike him’. This seemed contradictory to notions of 
competitiveness in the industry, but as my neighbour Georgi’s meeting was 
evidence of, there is indeed collaboration among the winery owners. Yet 
having the only full service winery-hotel-restaurant I asked why people are 
not copying Jordan’s style, and she said they will when the demand arises. 
Indeed, wine tourism is still in its infancy, but its development may be a 
saving grace for the region in the coming years144.  
The irony behind the transition is that the business of wine production 
and the increased luxury associated with wine has helped to distance grape 
growers all the more from the end product they help produce. For the image, 
marketing and cost of wine stand in stark contrast to the diminishing standard 
of living for the growers. The little income and appreciation they receive in 
return for the intensive labour involved in grape growing has left them both 
figuratively and literally ‘in the dirt’. The toil of their daily labour and the 
                                                 
144 See thesis Conclusion for a further discussion of future opportunities and possibilities. 
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frequently heard ‘suffering’ (maka) thus helps support a hierarchy in which 
they must defer to the power holders—the winery owners, businessmen and 
politicians. The latter group, and the power they wield, are the subject of the 
next chapter, where in explaining their function it is hoped that the structure 























Authority, wine mafia and the thieving state: tension and 
power at the crossroads of neoliberalism and democracy in 
21st century Macedonia145 
 
Introduction 
If any single characteristic defines authoritarianism in all its forms over 
time, it is hostility to opposition. By contrast, a central feature of democracy 
is that is must incorporate difference and opposition…in order to legitimate 
itself as political form. –John Borneman, Princeton University146 
 
In this chapter the theoretical discussion of neoliberalism from Chapter 2 is 
brought together with the political implications of the transition and 
privatisation that has occurred since the 1990s. As will be discussed in this 
chapter and the next, the transformation has not only been economic, but 
political, with those affected claiming that there is a new sort of 
authoritarianism at hand. With the ongoing ‘democratic transition’ in 
Macedonia, notions of authoritarianism are relevant in that there is a fine line 
between them and what constitutes democracy and the liberties which 
accompany it.  
Hence I discuss further these developments in regard to the 
privatisation of the Tikveš wine industry and the so-called ‘wine mafia’ 
(vinska mafija) behind the process. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the wine 
mafia is a label frequently used by the region’s independent grape growers 
(lozari), who have suffered the wrath of manipulative winery owners and 
politicians. The ‘mafia’ have received such a moniker because, since the 
financial crisis of 2008 in particular, they have used their power, authority 
and connections as leverage against the grape growers. Yet as was stated of 
them in Chapter 3, they are ‘not mafia because nothing is prohibited’. 
Indeed, they have been able to get away with taking a grower’s grape harvest 
and not paying him for anywhere from one to two years, if at all, yet they 
                                                 
145 This chapter is a synthesis of several papers given at the SOYUZ and AAA conferences, 
as well as one published in the Anthropology of East Europe Review (AEER).  
146 Taken from the manuscript of the keynote address at the SOYUZ Conference, held at the 
Harriman Institute at Columbia University, on 22 March, 2013. 
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face no prosecution for their misbehaviour and illicit dealings. The ‘wine 
mafia’ are thus the owners of the wineries, as well as various politicians who 
profit off of the region’s wine production, and one of the most notorious 
wineries, Dzumajlija, was in fact owned until 2012 by an individual whose 
brother is a member of parliament. As a result of such connections and 
limited opportunities for the majority of citizens, there are shifting notions of 
state legitimacy and what private enterprise means in Macedonia. I allude to 
these here in describing privatisation’s ongoing manifestations and the 
opposition and reaction to it in the form of street or café conversations 
(muabet), protests and perceptions from the villages. Indeed, shifting forms 
of identity and a clear separation of three interest groups have come into 
play, where besides the wineries and the grape purchasing vizbi, the growers 
constitute a weak majority whose voice can only be heard locally and in 
person.  
This chapter thus includes content from interviews and conversations 
with a variety of actors—winery owners, the grape growers themselves, and 
agricultural and governmental agency representatives. From these 
conversations a discussion emerges on the role of neoliberal, free-market 
capitalism and various forms of the democratic transition and change at hand 
in Tikveš, such as—whether intentional or not—there is the development of 
authoritarian governance in the region and the country as a whole.  
 
Oppositions and the democratic conundrum 
As the Borneman quote helps elucidate, democracy must incorporate 
difference and opposition under a system of rule of law, and not be hostile to 
it. In discussing the ‘oppositions’ with which we are familiar from the 20th 
century though (such as those which ended the Cold War), Borneman stated 
in the address from which this quote was taken that ‘(o)pposition today is 
different…less coherent, more diffuse, and perhaps more various in its 
forms, as are the kind of authoritarian movements and regimes which it 
opposes’. He proceeded to give examples of current ‘disruptions’ which 
stand in contrast to notions of opposition against nation-states and their 
ideologies in the 20th century, but through which the authority and legitimacy 
of a ruling government is brought to the fore.  
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I call upon Borneman’s work because it has been a goal of this 
research project to clarify what features of an ideal democracy have been 
gained or lost in Macedonia since its independence, and how legitimate the 
state is as a result. Yet given the neoliberal nature of post-communist 
political and economic systems—namely their exclusivity and tendencies to 
benefit a small minority—it has become evident that the subject matter is a 
two-sided coin, with democracy on one side and authoritarianism on the 
other. With severe ramifications for the state and its citizenry, the most 
important question is thus: when does the state go from having authority and 
enforcing the law to abusing authority, law and thus the people? It is indeed 
one goal of this chapter to discuss such perceptions in Tikveš, and what sort 
of subtle ‘oppositions’ exist. Such an assessment is similar to James Scott’s 
(1985) notion of various ‘transcripts’ at work in society, but is more 
systematised in that it calls upon various criteria that exist as part of the state 
structure.     
Borneman discusses the work of Juan Linz (2000) on the topic of 
authoritarian tendencies and includes these interrelated criteria: a 
concentration of power at the top, maintained through repressive means; 
submission to authority; unaccountable if not unchecked exercise of power; 
and intolerance of meaningful opposition. Yet Borneman admits that both his 
and Linz’s work is based on a top-down, political science perspective and 
that ‘if seen phenomenologically or ethnographically…our analytical 
perspective might change, especially if we want to account for the variability 
in forms of authoritarianism, the modes of relating what they foster in 
everyday life, and the diverse ways in which groups of people depart from 
authoritarian rule and introduce more democratic rule’.  
In this chapter, I therefore call upon both the work of others in 
Eastern Europe and my own fieldwork to address these criteria, and to 
illustrate the forms of disruption and opposition at work in the Tikveš region. 
However, in discussing developments, oppositions and disruptions around 
authoritarianism in Macedonia, it must be reiterated that opposition is key to 
democracy and state legitimacy (Borneman 2011), and only without it or 
when it is oppressed do we see the tendency toward abuse of authority. 
Therefore, in this chapter it must be considered how forms of opposition both 
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exist and are subject to abuse, and what tensions exist between the different 
strata which comprise the region’s power structures.  
 
The state of the state in contemporary Macedonia 
In October 2011 the New York Times published a story titled ‘Concerns 
grow about authoritarianism in Macedonia’ (Brunwasser 2011). The Times’ 
article discussed the increasing concern by the international community over 
‘growing authoritarianism’ via insufficient protection of the rule of law and 
media freedom in the country. Citing an International Crisis Group (ICG) 
report from two months prior, the worry was the result of the ruling 
nationalist government’s state capture, and their role in rising ethnic 
Macedonian nationalism. Given as an example of media suppression was the 
shutting down of one of the country’s main television networks (A1), 
allegedly due to tax evasion, and three newspapers owned by its parent 
company, all known for their vocal opposition to the government. An EU 
report was then cited, claiming that journalists were being intimidated and 
that political, governmental and business interests reign supreme.  
Although the Times’ article raised legitimate concerns about freedom 
of expression in Macedonia, bullying the press there is nothing new. During 
the Yugoslav era the media was run from Belgrade by Tanjug147, which 
strictly regulated the production of national news. And as Levitsky and Way 
(2010) point out in their book, such authoritarianism emerged soon after 
Macedonia’s transition to multi-party rule in the early 1990s, as the press 
were subject to intimidation then under the present political opposition party 
SDSM, just as they are now under the ruling nationalist party, VMRO-
DPMNE.  
What has occurred then in the last decade is the monumental shift in 
economic policy and governance with the transition to a ‘free-market’. One 
acquaintance who works for a large media network in the capital explained to 
me how the shutting down of the A1 news channel was due to that station’s 
reporters calling up ruling party members in various towns around the 
country, posing as party officials, and asking how much they had bribed 
                                                 
147 Telegrafska agencija nove Jugoslavije 
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various individuals and how they had convinced others to vote for the party. 
When they got immediate responses, they of course had proof that this was 
occurring and brought it forth in their reporting—to the Prime Minister’s 
displeasure.  
Thus not only have economic and political policies changed in the 
past decade, but so has the citizenry’s awareness of and response to them. 
One could therefore say that democratic tendencies have been fostered 
among the media and people, and that these create opportunities for such 
expressed disappointment and dissent. For in contemporary, post-socialist 
Macedonia there has been both the promotion of 20th century political and  
economic liberalism—regulated markets tied to a democratic state—
alongside the implementation of largely neoliberal, ‘crony capitalist’ 
policies. Coupled together, they have resulted in an economic reorientation 
for the country’s inhabitants, and for the majority of people  this has meant a 
relative reduction in their income, purchasing power and thus life 
opportunities, along with a greater cognisance of just what these should be.  
Yet at the same time, individuals with connections (vrski)—which 
frequently include ties to the former socialist state apparatus—have 
successfully created new enterprises and through privatisation, taken control 
of those which were formerly socially owned and managed.  As Keith Brown 
wrote of such connections:  
The reported prevalence and importance of vrski is at the heart of many 
Macedonian critiques of how their society operates: vrski underpin 
corruption, nepotism, the black market, and every other obstacle 
citizens face in negotiating everyday life (2006, p74).  
  
While the practice of vrski is lamented, the use of these informal connections 
is indeed common and many Macedonians will instinctively call upon the 
contacts of friends and family in order to assure the best outcome in a 
situation, be it acquiring work, a public service, or a particular good. 
The contradiction and conflict in this paradigm is evident: the 
combination of neoliberalism, including privatisation, with networks, 
democracy-cum-political authoritarian governance and media suppression, 
has led to what Andrew Graan (2013) claimed to be a ‘counterfeiting the 
nation’. Although Graan uses this term to primarily describe the process of 
 134 
re-historicisation and identity development occurring at present in 
Macedonia, I borrow it in order to help illustrate the extent to which it 
demonstrates a conflict between the state and its people.   
 
Untangling the terroir-ising transition: neoliberalism, privatisation and 
power 
As addressed in the previous chapter, although the word has not been 
adopted in the local wine lexicon there is essentially a move towards terroir 
in Macedonia’s wine industry. That said, there is a seeming ‘terroir-
isation’148 occurring in Tikveš—growers are falling victim to modern wine 
standards and a government and privatised industry intent on seeing such 
standards bear fruit as the country undergoes a neoliberal transformation and 
moves toward the EU wine market, a most challenging foe. For it is through 
both the illicit, post-socialist privatisation project and then more recently, the 
EU’s pre-accession measures, that the industry has been subject to a variety 
of regulations and limitations on the names of its wine, how much of it can 
be exported, and most of all, control of the country’s industry. Indeed, 
alongside the EU’s measures lay the profit-seeking of oligarchs and other 
businessmen, who have either acquired formerly state-owned wineries or 
branded entirely new ones. They support a consolidation of capital among 
the already connected elite, which is a double-edged sword for the growers 
who work their own small plots of land in order to supply the wineries. For 
as Winters (2011) found, oligarchs are defined by their wealth and seek only 
to defend it, and politically they are entrenched within the so-called 
democratic system—perpetuating but always needing to be tamed by it.  
Given the significance of privatisation, the challenge in it is to 
understand what the meaning of the process is for different communities and 
individuals, and how its implementation affects life in general (Kideckel 
1995). It was on this note that I setup my research project, yet along the way 
I discovered several anthropological ethnographies, mostly from the 1990s, 
which offer insight into the process of neoliberalism and its societal undoing 
during the era of post-socialist transition. These were, for example, works in 
                                                 
148 Borrowed from Veseth’s (2012) use of ‘terroirists’. 
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countries such as Bulgaria (Creed 1997, Kaneff 2002, etc.), Romania 
(Kideckel 1995, Sampson 1995, and Verdery 1996, 2003, etc.), and Hungary 
and Poland (Hann 2003, 2006; Lampland 1995).  
Yet more recent works such as Hann’s 2006 text, ‘Not the horse we 
wanted!’ Postsocialism, neoliberalism, and Eurasia (2006), clearly lay out 
the connection to post-socialist neoliberalism in its title and contents. Hann 
argues that the spread of neoliberal economic principles and identity politics 
alongside private ownership, multi-party politics and the proliferation of non-
governmental organisations are poor compensation for a decline in the 
substantive material and moral conditions of post-socialist citizenship. 
Stephen Collier’s reworking of neoliberalism with social modernity and 
biopolitics in Post-Soviet social (2011), takes the analysis one step further. 
Collier, however, steers away from the focus on the 1990s privatisation of 
the post-Soviet sphere and its effects, and instead draws upon Foucault’s 
lectures from the 1970s on biopolitics, examining neoliberalism as a central 
form of political rationality in contemporary societies.  
I see rational explanations of neoliberalism in the work of both 
scholars, in the sense that I find various micro and macro level 
manifestations of its effects touching and shaping every level of human 
experience and society. I therefore take neoliberalism to be a particular set of 
phenomena—political, economic, social, and historical—and consequent 
lived experience, which on the one hand are strategically implemented within 
a unique set of circumstances, and which on the other hand emerge in 
random manifestations. Given the nature of today’s interconnected, global 
markets and the resulting competition, I see neoliberalism as a reaction to 
and function of this economic structure and strategically speaking, as a 
particular way of organising these markets in order to benefit particular 
interests—all in the name of economic rationality.  
I thus turn to Hann’s conclusion, where he decries the drastic changes 
in standards of living throughout the post-socialist world and emphasises the 
specificity of local history in viewing these on-the-ground transformations. I 
also move forward with Collier’s vision of neoliberalism as a tour de force in 
the early stage of the 21st century which must be examined in regard to its 
specific form of political rationality—how within a society it can be 
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rationalised and supported through political systems and their actors. 
Because neoliberalism is undergirded by arguments of such logic and 
systematicity, an ethnographic examination of its permutations in practice, 
such as Borneman suggests, contributes to problematising its claims (Otten 
2013b).   
Understanding the overarching circumstances of the transition in 
Tikveš —namely privatisation in the wine industry as the country prepares 
for EU entry—is essential in order to better examine the on-the-ground 
reworkings and negotiations linked to the neoliberal privatising yet EU 
development-oriented transition at work in Macedonia. Indeed, a series of 
steps designed to supposedly streamline markets and create opportunity for 
workers at all levels has actually led to a more stratified society: growers are 
being left out while winery managers and owners reap the profits of the 
privatised wine market.  
Such (re)development and privatisation have been implemented in a 
variety of ways in post-socialist spaces, though in many countries beginning 
with a ‘decapitation of the state’ (Chavdarova 1999, p186) alongside the 
infamous post-socialist ‘shock therapy’ experienced in Russia and elsewhere 
in largely the post-Soviet sphere149. What we find in Tikveš though is similar 
to what Scott (1985) uncovered in his fieldwork, where we are dealing with 
the ‘ubiquitous struggle against the effects of state-fostered capitalist 
development in the countryside: the loss of access to the means of production 
(proletarianisation), the loss of work (marginalisation) and income’ (p241). 
Concerning privatisation, Macedonia’s was delayed given the 
violence that ravaged its former Yugoslav neighbours, and by the books there 
were strict labour laws with high dismissal costs into the beginning of the 
21st century (Bartlett 2007). Nonetheless, it was an early economic reformer 
legislatively, implementing pro-market policies which tried to reduce the 
barriers to small and medium enterprise entry and growth. Yet as Bartlett 
found of privatisation legislation in Macedonia, while it was enacted in 1995 
the ‘financial deepening’ (p204) of it was not evident until 2003. By that 
time 1,678 enterprises had been privatised, with the main method being 
                                                 
149 Sampson (1995) wrote of the transition in Romania though that there was ‘shock but not 
much therapy’ (p160). 
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management and employee buyout. The most profitable though—234 
enterprises with assets of €705 million to be precise—were ‘sold at 
substantial discounts, often on the basis of severely undervalued asset 
valuations’ (p204), and were then bought out by management. Such as with 
the Tikveš Winery, ‘managers had acquired by far the most valuable part of 
the privatized company base.’ Further, there were just 155 companies with 
assets of only €25 million which were sold to foreign owners, meaning that it 
was largely the connected elite in Macedonia who were benefiting from the 
privatisation process (ibid).  
The latter is indicative of Macedonia’s status as a tenuous state, 
where the mix of its institutions is unstable and ambiguous, and exacerbated 
by the significant presence of organised crime. The creation of this 
tenuousness is undoubtedly comprised of the networks and connections 
which lead to compromised quality in governance, policy and project 
implementation, while ‘lining the pockets’ of the politicians and businessmen 
involved in state-led endeavours. Like in other countries, the result is that the 
majority of Macedonians have become worse off financially, and less 
trusting and certain of things. In short, they have become defined by a 
condition of ‘precarity’ where there is little to no financial certainty and 
security. Indeed, the ‘transition’ in Tikveš and elsewhere in the country is a 
transformation in the basis of the growers’ domination. Control and power, 
once based on the dependencies of government production, are now far more 
the subject of coercion, market forces, legislation and political patronage. 
The consequent reality of the present situation is thus the seeming inability of 
individuals to make plans given poor and uncertain economic conditions, and 
for the most part there is a high rate of distrust in the government and 
politicians. The rich have violated the social contract, and it is now they who 
have all.  
Since privatisation, a number of factors have converged to influence 
the dynamics of the emerging wine industry. First and foremost, the process 
of privatisation itself was assumed in economic and political discourses on 
transition to naturally lead to the efficient and rapid integration of post-
socialist spaces into Western market like economies, including growth and 
wealth. Behind these beliefs are Western assumptions that capitalist notions 
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of property and ownership are somehow superior to other forms of 
production and management, and are necessary to an efficient and productive 
society. As several researchers (Verdery 2003; Alexander 2004; Creed 1998, 
Hann 2006, etc.) have shown though, the process of privatisation and 
development of ‘free-market democracy’ in former socialist contexts is far 
from a natural course of events and is always mediated by historical 
circumstance, socio-cultural factors and political-economic interests.  
Therefore, borrowing from Chavdarova’s research (1999) in Bulgaria 
(which experienced rapid privatisation in the 1990s and then EU entry in 
2007) on ordinary Bulgarians suffering from externally imposed governance 
and rules combined with local, informal relationships, I put forth that there 
are two post-socialist ‘games’ (Kideckel 1995) going on simultaneously—
that of rural, peasant survival as a result of ‘pro-market’ government policies, 
and that of ‘inside privatisation’—the process through which such policies 
are created. I focus here on the latter, whereby ‘inside privatisation’ refers 
not only to the de-nationalisation of former socially-owned enterprises, but 
the power play and shifting of responsibility from the state to the private 
companies which increasingly control it. Such inside privatisation affects not 
just the market but the democracy the country claims to be, and thus its 
judicial system, rule of law and legitimate governance. For as one US 
diplomat told me, ‘there’s not rule of law, but rule by law’ in Macedonia150.  
 
Conversations in Tikveš 
During my fieldwork I conducted several interviews and more often had 
informal conversations about the transition and its effects, from that with a 
neighbour who ranted (as many did) that with privatisation ‘things were 
given away—our winery, factories, jobs for thousands of people’, to a seller 
at the town market who, in discussing why live chickens are no longer sold 
for home butchering, replied that ‘we lost that somewhere in the transition to 
democracy’. Yet there was also a local historian who claimed, on the note of 
Graan’s notion of ‘counterfeiting the nation’ (2013), that ‘our history has 
been privatised’—meaning that it had been co-opted and was being re-
                                                 
150 Stated during informal conversation at a Peace Corps event I attended during my 
fieldwork in July 2011.  
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written151. Thus such ‘inside privatisation’ has unequivocally been the 
predominant form of not just industrial ownership transition but an alteration 
to how people see themselves—their identity, livelihoods, history—and 
many are aware of how these aspects of their daily lives have been and 
continue to be altered.  
I discuss such details because since the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the 
standard of living, pay, legislation and protection of labour, created under 
decades of socialism, have decayed. Given decreasing government assistance 
(despite the introduction of subsidies) alongside increasing debt, this has 
been a reactionary process. Combined with privatisation and market forces it 
is proving devastating to many. As one acquaintance, a young man named 
Vane who works in a nearby wire factory explained: 
Privatisation has meant people work six days a week, and with worse 
pay. And some people aren’t paid for months at a time. Fortunately I get 
my pay regularly, but it’s hardly enough to live off of. If I go out for an 
evening in town I’ll spend several days’ of it!  
 
His salary was the equivalent of 230 EUR per month, though this was in fact 
an improvement from his prior job laying tile where he had earned just 170 
EUR monthly. As a woman who works at a local NGO (funded by the EU, 
incidentally) confirmed, ‘these are the rights Macedonian workers have lost 
with the transition: companies can more easily fire people; hire without 
contracts, benefits, retirement, insurance; and they force employees to work 
more hours than they’re paid for’. Therefore, despite strong labour laws into 
the 21st century, the country has significantly shifted course and indeed 
become largely deregulated. 
Being in Tikveš and seeking out the experiences of the region’s grape 
growers, it was with them that I received the greatest insight. That said, it 
must be stipulated that I came to realise how their opinions were affected by 
personal experience, and political and economic views among other things. 
Some were members of the ruling party (VMRO-DPMNE) and others of the 
opposition (SDSM); some bought into the notion of privatisation and 
benefited from it, others (most) did not. Despite the many conversations I 
                                                 
151 Stated during the commemoration ceremony at the ‘12 children/comrades’ monument in 
Kavadarci (discussed in Chapter 1.) 
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had with such individuals, the situation did not immediately become much 
clearer for me. For, as one individual in the following paragraphs states, ‘it’s 
not black and white’ and one cannot say precisely who is to blame. In fact, 
the flurry of activity and fluid discourse makes deducing such a conclusion 
difficult, and as I explained of neoliberalism, it is an amorphous assemblage 
of systems at work and its permutations are often equally ambiguous.  
An example of this random execution of policy came at the start of 
the 2011 grape harvest in late August of that year. After several years of 
delayed payments or unpaid debts, the Ministry of Agriculture and its 
inspectors announced that three of the larger wineries would not be allowed 
to export their wine unless they paid off their 2009 debts to the grape 
growers by 22 September, 2011. This announcement naturally set in motion 
a sense of government intervention and assistance on behalf of the growers, 
and thus temporary faith in the system. It was also of course a time to express 
their discontent, disbelief and disapproval (at best) of how the wine industry 
was being run. The conversations I proceeded to have152 brought forth the 
following comments:  
It’s a fact that something smells (smrdi) and it’s not like it should be. 
But don’t just blame the wineries. Ask why in the time of SDSM153 
there was a higher price and the grapes were paid for by New Years? 
And today with VMRO it’s the other way around! The government, not 
the wineries, is controlling agriculture (zemjodelie). Today if you don’t 
appreciate the state, they don’t appreciate our product, no matter the 
quality! The minister should help, not fine us. If they want to keep 
fining, they need to fine those government promoters (promotori) who 
spend tens of millions of euros for nothing. They haven’t opened any 
new markets or done any deals! 
 
Fines (kazni) and threats of them have in fact become a recent trope in the 
transition’s discourse, as such fines can be significant—at thousands of 
euros, they are up to a full year’s average income. Although they are rarely 
levied, their existence is one more reminder of how the government is able to 
                                                 
152 The conversations were held mostly in the town centre around its main square (ploštad) 
and in cafes, as well as with neighbour acquaintances. As addressed in Chapter 1, such 
individual diatribes are quite common in Tikveš, and establish a competitive and at times 
contentious form of conversation.   
153 SDSM, as the reformed communist party, governed Macedonia throughout much of the 
1990s and until the current Prime Minister and VMRO-DPMNE came to power in 2006.  
 141 
use threats and to leverage what it and the private enterprises it represents 
seek.    
Such as the above individual, who accused the state of inefficiency and 
corruption, the following growers induced notions of lawlessness, fraud, theft 
and trust:  
A: This is a clear criminal example of theft—the wineries took 
something and didn’t pay. I don’t know how that the inspectors are 
napping and then you’re supposed to have trust in them and the police. 
With these double standards?! And then if some little shop doesn’t give 
a receipt154 they’ll seal it shut right away (plombiraat odma)! 
 
B: Only with a million fines for the wineries will the problem of paying 
for the grapes be solved once and for all. Better is the complete 
confiscation of their whole property. A winery can’t have a business 
worth millions of euros and yet have three years of unpaid grape 
harvests.  The grape growers can’t finance the buying of their grapes—
but only in our country does that exist! 
 
C: How are they not ashamed? They still make out the people (narodot) 
and agriculturalists to be mindless (neumni). By 22 September the 
grape-picking (berba) will be done, and after that there’s no paying. 
Nothing functions in this state of ours—only fraud (izmami). 
 
A disagreement between a local businessman (A) and a grower (B) about 
how the growers should respond: 
A: Why are the growers crying? Because they must pick the grapes, for 
two reasons: to take the subsidies from the government, and to take 
money from the grapes handed over. That is, they must give the grapes 
to some winery. Why don’t they sell them instead for cheaper but in 
cash on their own scale (na vaga) instead of waiting for the 
‘predetermined’ (utvrdeni) prices which they’ll be lucky to receive in a 
year or two? Isn’t that more logical and easier? They don’t do so though 
because it’s not black and white with trade, not here nor in the EU—it 
depends on how they market it. From the other side, the wineries set 
conditions for the quality of the grapes, because however greater the 
quality and the richer in sugar, then it’s better for them and they’ll make 
better wine. I guess because of the global economic crisis, importers 
aren’t buying the wine like before with that kind of intensity, which is 
filling up our wineries with wine to be exported. Everything just 
coincided in a period of a few years and the crisis (kriza) is felt by all of 
them, unfortunately. 
  
The grower’s heated reaction to the above comment: 
                                                 
154 The government enforces the use of receipts and the machines which produce them, in 
order to ensure tax payment and collection.  
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B: Maestro155, you probably don’t know anything about the grape and 
wine industry. First, if grape growers give their grapes to random buyers 
in cash then they can’t get subsidies. Second, last year the price of those 
grapes were only around 4-6 MKD (0.07-.10 EUR) a kilo while the 
prices the wineries were giving were 6-8 MKD (0.10-.13 EUR) and 
sometimes more, and of course you get the subsidy. You do the math! 
And something else: go work in the vineyards for a few days in 
temperatures of around 40C without any shade and then ask whether 
you’d give away your grapes for those prices! 
 
Some growers were even more vocal and descriptive than others however, 
decrying their plight and suffering: 
Since 2009 my grapes aren’t paid for. I gave them to the winery for 
three years and I still haven’t received a denar. How do I live, does 
anyone ask me? This government needs to tell the wineries: if you have 
money for purchasing, deposit it in the bank and start with your buying. 
Don’t take our grapes for three years and not give us any money! Well, 
from where do I eat? My kids and I burned in the fields (izgorea po 
nivite) for those…They should open the borders and allow for the export 
of our grapes, and give the subsidies to those buyers. Don’t please our 
wineries anymore—they’ve already got some thousand hectares of 
vineyards; because of that they’ve cooled it (se ladat) with us…I don’t 




Am only I to ask whether this year we lozari need to buy the rope for 
hanging (jažeto za besenje) ourselves on our own or will the wineries 
again give it to us for free? So the last couple years of harvests were 
difficult for the wineries? Where is there this kind of situation, where 
you can take raw material and not pay for it? Not paying for grapes is a 
black hole for the entire industry (stopanstvo) into which we’re all 
falling if something’s not done right away to save us. Take and don’t 
pay? Everywhere else that’s called theft, and here—business? They 
know nothing’s going to happen to them. The courts are [supposedly] 
disputing? I’m suing (tužam) a company for a small debt and still after 
three years there’s no decision (presuda)…There wasn’t money for the 
wineries to pay me? ‘Blink Asan’156, look in the parking lot and you’ll 
see—those who owe the most drive the most expensive cars.  
 
All of these comments help illustrate the tension and emotion surrounding 
the wine region’s transition, yet the latter testimony is one of the more 
                                                 
155 Majstore—said sarcastically. 
156 This is a local Turkish-Macedonian saying, which in full goes ‘blink Asan, so I can trick 
you’ (miži Asan da te ba’am) and which is used when one suspects they’re being lied to.  
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gripping. It hits home the reality of several years of unpaid grape harvests: 
the oft heard of ‘wine mafia’ and their rule, the incurred debt and the 
ineffective legal system. However, the others touch on the depression and 
suffering, and the anger with the powers that be for not assisting the growers 
and their livelihoods.  
In hindsight though, the likely reason for the entire announcement 
from the ministry to withhold the licenses of the wineries might have had to 
do with the grave concern in the inner circles of winery owners and 
government officials that the growers might in fact revolt as they had done 
the year before and not pick their grapes, as many had been claiming up to 
that point. Having lost faith in the system, why would they bother to invest in 
the labour (their own and the hired argati) that it takes to complete a seasonal 
harvest? With the ministry’s announcement however, the growers were back 
on their feet and feeling, although obviously bitter and sceptical, also 
invigorated. I recall vividly that week because the tension had become so 
palpable, and then there was the outpouring of commentary in homes, 
gardens, cafés and on the streets as the government apparently shifted its 
weight behind the growers. While this saw most of the grapes harvested, the 
‘game’ of [inside] privatisation was merely being played out one day at a 
time.  
 
Punishing the privateers: a ‘special selection’ 
As the latter interlocutors stated, there were more than just the three wineries 
which should have been included in the ministry’s actions. Yet of the 
wineries that came under fire, which owed debts from two years’ prior and 
were forced to pay them off, they then proceeded to collect grapes in 2011 
and not pay the growers for them until mid-2012—for those who received 
payment (and par for the course, not at all for some growers157). At the same 
time, the wineries themselves began complaining that they were being 
unfairly treated, were being selectively chosen and blamed for the crisis, and 
were in unenviable positions (as one informant above testifies to). There was 
some truth to this though: as my winery-owning neighbour, Georgi, said in 
                                                 
157 This information was collected through personal correspondence and return visits to 
Tikveš in May 2012 and May 2013.  
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August 2011, they were still trying to empty two large cisterns which held 
some 50 tonnes of wine. Further, he commented that he felt the laws must be 
respected but that some sort of ‘emergency decision’ (vonredna odluka) 
needed to be made to assist with this crisis, which in his opinion had to do 
with the inability of wineries to export freely. In stating such, he was 
referring to foreign buyers who were seeking to buy Tikveš grapes but were 
not allowed—some actually trying and having their purchased grapes 
confiscated at the border.  
The whole situation is thus a seeming return to a pre-socialist way of 
living, but one with potentially illicit and authoritarian intrusions: in free-
market fashion, the government does little to control prices or assist with 
exporting the country’s second largest crop. Instead, it relies on the often 
variable and unpredictable nature of the market instead and only intervenes 
sporadically and through mediocre subsidies, thus prohibiting the export of 
its crops unless officially sanctioned.  
Such concerns came up in a conversation with the owner of one of 
the region’s newer but successful luxury wineries, Bovin, who stated ‘(i)t 
would help if there was an international campaign to promote our wines’158. 
However, in discussing the problems of exporting to the large, sought after 
markets of Russia and China, the owner, Goran P., then commented that it is 
best to go it alone: 
I don’t think there’s any sort of problem, if we follow all government 
laws then we don’t have trouble getting it from here to there. But in 
financial terms we have to show that we have good wine for the money 
and we have to deal with the fluctuating price of wine. We and the 
markets set the price though, not the government. 
 
This statement, however, collided with the reality for growers. Although 
Goran repeatedly stated that cooperation with the growers was of great 
importance, what his winery has done is increasingly cease their sourcing of 
grapes from individual growers and instead create their own vineyards. As he 
said below, these vineyards in fact comprised ‘90 percent’ of their grapes in 
2010, and is consistent with the model for most of the world’s wineries (as it 
allows for better regulation of the grapes).  
                                                 
158 Conducted in April 2011 at the Bovin Winery in Negotino. 
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Such regulation is therefore the pivot point in the Tikveš wine industry: 
it has shifted from the government’s once socially-owned wineries, where 
grapes were largely bought from individual grape growers working a few 
hectares of vineyards on average, to private wineries who must compete with 
one another in both the domestic and international marketplace. Sympathy 
for the region’s famous independent grape growers is thus political—the 
wineries cannot merely dismiss them, as it would negatively affect their 
reputation in the wider region and country as a whole (as much sympathy has 
been extended to the growers’ plight, particularly by other agriculturalists in 
Macedonia). As Goran stated: 
We need to maintain good production and partnerships domestically 
with grape producers for the sake of the quality of the wine. But this 
situation, such as what happened last year, must not continue and it must 
be regulated. However, we have here 60 ha of vineyards which provide 
90 percent of our needs. Looking at the situation, it has a negative effect 
on the industry yet we have quality wine at a good price. What remains 
is for us to work together and bring positive results. The government 
needs to play a role in making this happen, investing in the marketing 
and promotion of wine, and regulating the industry so that the lives of 
the growers and those involved with wine production improve.  
 
Goran implicitly admitted to the benefits of cheap (if not free) labour in the 
statement ‘we have quality wine at a good price’, yet he alluded as well to 
the tension between not just the growers and the wineries but the latter two 
and the state: both seek the state’s assistance in improving their business, 
either in terms of marketing and profiting (wineries), or receiving their due 
payment and earning a living (growers).  
Therefore, what constitutes the crisis in the Tikveš wine industry 
differs between the growers and wineries, though both must play a game 
with the state. But respect for the state of yore—during socialism and into the 
2000s—has seemingly been replaced by the bitter resentment on the part of 
growers, as the state’s lack of support and regulation, not to mention 
interference, leaves growers baffled and the game one-sided. As the 
comments from the growers illustrate, they feel manipulated and used in 
giving their grapes away and subsidising the wineries. As one individual 
quipped of the state: ‘the government is like a church here. People must 
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respect it, they pray it will give them something for doing so, and if they 
question it they’re a heretic!’ 
What lies underneath this mix are changing perceptions of moral and 
political economy, including power relations as well as buying power. 
Similar to what Hann (2006) noted in his work in Poland and Hungary, 
enthusiasm for privatisation coupled with a weak state which disregards 
equality and a healthy standard of living has left many in post-socialist 
countries concerned. It is as if ‘the community must give way to the 
sovereign individual’ (p13), and as I add—the powerful sovereign individual 
then goes unchecked as he and his acquaintances accumulate wealth and 
assets on the backs of others.  
Further, even if there is increased production and wealth in a country, 
people will point out that prices—particularly for food and energy—in the 
era of a market economy are far less stable than they were during socialism, 
are more expensive overall, and that many have lost the security of 
employment and a regular salary (ibid). Indeed, Hann found that property 
and laws passed requiring farmers to account for every litre of wine produced 
resulted in bankruptcy, abandoning vineyards, producing for self-
consumption or decreasing production altogether. Strong anti-EU sentiment 
therefore ran among them.  
In Tikveš, I have found a situation similar to that which Hann 
discovered in rural Hungary—feelings by farmers that they were not 
benefiting from new subsidies and were seeing land privatised and exploited 
by outside interests. So-called ‘euro-scepticism’ thus runs high given the 
crisis in nearby Greece159, and few find merit in joining the EU given known 
high prices, unemployment, corruption and mafia in neighbouring Bulgaria 
(an EU member since 2007). The effects of the Union’s policies (or lack 
thereof)—not only in terms of grape and wine production but in acceding to 
Greece over the name issue—leave many pushing forth on their own accord 
and hoping that the state does so on their behalf. That said, some would say 
                                                 
159 The Greek crisis has directly affected many individuals and families in Macedonia. From 
severing the rail line on the Greek side to the Macedonian border, which was used by many 
labourers to head into Greek Macedonia, to the shrinking of wealth and opportunities, 
Macedonians—as cheap labour—have been nudged out of the picture. 
 
 147 
that the powerful in Macedonia prefer to keep the country out of the EU, 
proffering: ‘They control everything here and have all the power, so why 
would they want to destroy that with competition from other European 
companies and countries?’  
Regardless, one example of the contrast between the daily lives of 
Tikveš villagers and the national (Macedonian) and international (EU) focus 
on industry is that of a village on the eastern side of the Vardar River north 
of the region’s second largest town, Negotino. Just 200 metres from the 
country’s main E-75 motorway corridor—on which people and goods make 
their way daily between the city and ports of Salonica up into the Balkan 
peninsula’s markets—the village was made inaccessible when the bridge to it 
was washed away by floods in November 2010. The locals went a month 
without being able to cross the river, and only after materials were collected 
locally was a foot bridge built, over which they had to haul all of their 
groceries and other goods. However, it was washed away in March 2013, and 
even worse of course is the fact that the village has gone without a proper 
bridge for several years to date.  
Thus in this case, the state has proven itself unreliable and 
unsupportive at best, meriting the question: When a bridge is washed away 
and the people have to build themselves a footpath over the country’s main 
river, yet hundreds of millions of euros are taken from the state budget for 
maintenance of the motorway, identity building projects, subsidies and state 
building (largely in the capital), what are the people to think? This situation 
and question encompass much of the sentiment toward the state: that it is 
‘thieving’ (apaška) and unreliable, with politicians in Skopje just wanting to 
enrich themselves (se zbogatat).  
Regionally, the most notorious of such cases of self-enrichment as 
presented in Western media (and perhaps factually) are those in Bulgaria. 
The New York Times has reported both on the development of a term coined 
from the name of the two Galev brothers, galevizacija—which refers to the 
ability of criminals to act with impunity and to manipulate state, political, 
municipal and judicial institutions (Brunwasser 2010b). Though perhaps the 
most incredulous example of connections and abuse of power in that country 
is that of Delyan Peevski, whose mother heads one of the country’s main 
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media companies (and some would say empire). Through her connections 
she had Delyan appointed head of the large Black Sea port at Varna at age 
21, and then by age 32 he was appointed to head the State Agency for 
National Security (Brunwasser 2010a). His last appointment has been the 
‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ in Bulgaria, and the cause of repeated 
protests throughout 2013. Yet as I have attempted to evoke in this chapter, 
there is evidence of similar occurrences in Macedonia, and of a power 
struggle between the state and the elite which run the country’s various 
industries and conduits of power. These powerful interests backed by a 
neoliberal world order are a undefeatable foe for the majority interest group 
of growers who supply the wine industry with its crop. 
 
Village visits, protests and the thieving state 
In this section I discuss further the perceptions of theft as experienced by 
grape growers, and the protests they waged as a result. My fieldwork was 
riddled with experiences that strengthened my resolve that such change as I 
have discussed was at hand. In town or village, I spoke with individuals 
whose lives were undergoing an uncertain transformation. I have already 
discussed a handful of these events, but I attempt below to use additional 
ethnographic vignettes to relay the experience and observations of growers 
from a couple of Tikveš villages so that the reader may better understand the 
ambiguity, uncertainty and overall difficulty surrounding this era of life in 
country’s premier wine region.  
In late August 2010 just at the beginning of that year’s grape harvest, 
I biked with a friend, Ilija, to the small Tikveš village of Begnište. Nestled 
five miles down a dead-end road up in the hills above Lake Tikveš, the 
village has been acutely subject to the effects of the wine industry’s 
privatisation: except for the school and a couple of shops, the inhabitants of 
Begnište are nearly all grape growers who have until recently brought their 
carts or tractor drawn-trailers of grapes down into town upon harvest. Upon 
arrival at the village centre, Ilija and I stopped to rest and converse with the 
mostly older men who were staring curiously at us. We sat near them to 
drink some water and be brought into the conversation. Speaking about the 
lack of payment for their prior harvest, one individual exclaimed ‘hell, the 
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price of grapes is so f—king low and we’re not even paid! Fifteen years ago, 
five years ago even, they’d give us 15 denari (MKD, equal to 0.25 EUR) per 
kilogram; now it’s seven or eight!’ The grower was literally up in arms, 
orchestrating his monologue through gestures, but eliciting responses from 
those around him. When I confirmed that they were grape growers (lozari), 
one replied ‘we all are, but we’ve not seen one denar of last year’s crop, and 
have no money at all. We can’t pay bills, so the electric company (EVN) 
turned off our electricity. It hasn’t been so bad since Turkish times (Tursko 
vreme)!’  
This was not the first or last time I would hear such a comparison, but 
the suffering and uncertainty were clear. From privatisation of the wineries to 
the electric company—which has become both more expensive and stricter in 
severing service if payments are not made—the process of privatisation has 
cast the state into the realm of the burdensome, uncharitable and seemingly 
thieving. This is not only in Macedonia, however, as the resignation of 
neighbouring Bulgaria’s prime minister in February 2013 came on the heels 
of fierce protests about their privatised energy costs, and there are regular 
protests in Kosovo over energy prices as well. Regardless, this trope of a 
‘thieving state’ (apaška država) was uttered frequently in Tikveš when the 
behaviour of the state and its functionaries was inferred. Thus when I asked 
growers why they thought they were not receiving more attention from the 
state and why the wineries were not being condemned, they always lamented 
the vinska mafija, privatizacija and politicians’ connections to them both. 
Indeed, to return to this chapter’s earlier discussion on corruption in the 
media, it is believed that the attention of the general public and the media is 
intentionally focused elsewhere, as nowhere in the country’s main daily 
newspapers will someone find reference to the ‘wine mafia’ who are so 
commonly blamed for the crisis. Further, as many grape growers retorted: 
‘What do the politicians care about us? They just want to get rich’160.  
Through such statements and with the most notorious wineries taking 
the lion’s share of subsidies (up to €2 million each), the situation slowly 
became clear to me while in the field: media suppression and focus on 
                                                 
160 Ne im e gajle za nas, samo sakaat da se zbogatat.  
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government dictated issues—from economic development to EU entry to 
national and international politics—meant the country’s primary wine region 
was undergoing a neoliberal, privatisation process whose effects were only 
known to those living there. Indeed, although subsidies were meant to be 
encouragement for wineries to purchase from grape growers, from the 
perspective of the latter it appears to only be further evidence of the wine 
mafia at work in business and government, enriching one another on the 
backs of those labouring in the vineyards.   
An older couple in Begnište who I came to know during my 
fieldwork, Vesna and Pero, condemned both the political parties and state for 
corruption and theft, saying that they see little interest by the government in 
their village. Whatever they get is left-over, they claim: ‘If they’re building 
something in town—new sidewalks—and they have enough bricks they 
might bring them here and fix part of our street, otherwise we see nothing. 
Half of us don’t have regular electricity, the school has broken windows and 
is nearly abandoned, and anyone who can, leaves’. These comments in fact 
followed the brick-laying of a mere 20 metre stretch of road in front of their 
and a neighbour’s home, but were in reference to the shattered school 
windows and lack of young women, in particular, in the village161.  
Conversations such as those in Begnište were had on several 
occasions, yet every grower was affected and reacted differently. For the 
many who work elsewhere and grow grapes on the side, or who have a 
spouse, sibling or parents with a job (rabota) or pension (penzija), they are 
able to get by better. But for those such as the older men in Begnište, they are 
isolated in many senses of the word—in terms of geography, political 
affiliation, economic standing and gender. ‘The state doesn’t do anything for 
us’162, they claimed that day. Simply put, they only respect the state so long 
as it assists them, for there is not the mindset nor desire to support and be a 
part of the state structure if it does not do the same in return. From a rural 
perspective this is understandable —as Vesna and Pero testified, the state 
does little in terms of reaching out and developing infrastructure, improving 
                                                 
161 Women are sent to live, marry, work and do their schooling in Kavadarci or other 
towns, with young men being more likely to stay behind and work the land.   
162 Državata ništo ne pravi za nas. 
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schools, standard of living and rural livelihoods. All the while the 
government spends hundreds of millions of euros on renovations to the 
capital city, Skopje, not to mention lining their own pockets. ‘Left hand, right 
pocket’ (leva raka, desen dzep), many say in lamenting such corruption. 
Indeed, to the average rural Macedonian, democracy is a farce. A close 
friend commented on this when he quipped that the word democracy in 
Macedonian, demokratija, where demos is people (in Greek), and krati is ‘to 
cut’ (in Macedonian), is in actuality a cutting [off] of the people from the 
system.  
 Having reached a meltdown after two years of unpaid harvests, the 
Tikveš grape growers reacted in September 2010 by ‘striking’ (štrajkuva) at 
first, and then revolting. At the so called strike, protestors placed signs 
making a variety of political statements, from directly addressing the Prime 
Minister, Nikola Gruevski, by saying ‘We’re grape growers, Grujo, come see 
us’, to ‘we’re bringing our grapes to Skopje without money’. Yet when that 
did no good they realised they were at a turning point: for although the 
government was involved in quelling their three days of protests through a 
compromise, and peacefully breaking up the blockades they had setup on the 
region’s roads, the growers were left to deal with the situation and adapt in 
the end. That is, none of their demands—for set grape prices, timely 
payments, and the exclusion of sugar content levels (brix)—were met. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, in symbolic revolt an estimated fifty-percent of 
growers left their grapes to rot on the vines, unwilling to even consider 
putting forth the labour and costs associated with harvesting them. Others 
began using their grapes to produce vast quantities of the region’s famous 
brandy (rakija), or replacing vineyards with other cash crops or tradable 
produce.  
The production of mass quantities—a ‘flood’ (poplava), as many 
said—of the local rakija brandy could not have come at a worse time though, 
and serves as an example of the state’s increasing control at the behest of 
business interests. Whereas rakija making for personal use was tolerated and 
its distribution little regulated before, the leaders of the private wineries—
who also produce brandy—have lobbied hard to reign in on such bootleg 
production. I was made aware of this through an informant who translated at 
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a meeting with the multi-millionaire head of the conglomerate which now 
owns the region’s largest, formerly state-owned winery, the Tikveš 
Winery.163 At the meeting, the company head claimed that private brandy 
production was detrimental to the sale of the winery’s own brandy, and that 
he was doing all he could to pressure government MPs to implement 
restrictions on it. His efforts were fruitful, as police checkpoints on the 
country’s main roads have become commonplace in recent years and are 
used to flag down suspicious looking cars whose license plates indicate their 
origin to be in Tikveš (which might be carrying the homemade spirit).  
I have therefore seen a form of authoritarianism arise in terms of the 
state’s indirect approach as the ‘wine mafia’—of which the Tikveš Winery’s 
owner is one of the most notorious individuals—has taken hold. Grape 
growers are being subjugated and subject to a process they have no say in but 
of which they experience the lobbying, closed-door decisions and consequent 
policies. Laws made in the capital—where the Tikveš Winery is now run 
from as well—such as those which regulate the sale of homemade brandy but 
which fail to regulate the wineries themselves, make it clear to growers that 
the state has in fact become not just authoritative but semi-authoritarian. 
When the model of law and its rule no longer apply equally, such 
authoritarianism arises and indeed, rather than work on behalf of its citizens, 
the state currently works on behalf of the winery owners (in this case).  
Furthermore, there is a spread of disinformation to growers, and a 
constant use of a national and international financial crisis (kriza) in the 
discourse surrounding (inconsistent) grape purchasing. These do as they 
intend, to instil fear and uncertainty and prevent due payment for growers’ 
grapes. These changes in policy, production and protection represent a shift 
in the role of the state in its markets, both domestic and foreign, and signifies 
a further push into the realm of the burdensome bureaucracy at best, and 




                                                 
163 As well as the rights to Coca-Cola and McDonalds, the nation’s largest brewery, and other ventures. 
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The state and its markets 
Changing markets and systems of production bring to light the research of 
Alexander (2004), who argues that one cannot dislodge questions of value 
from the holistic context in which market production and distribution take 
place. Writing about Kazakhstani industry, she argues ‘without transport, 
supply and distribution networks, an industrial enterprise is a bloodless 
pound of flesh’ (p255). Such a scenario could be translated into the problem 
of small-scale production in Macedonia where, along with the 
retraditionalisation of landowners, the obtainment and creation of wineries 
by groups of inexperienced individuals (some with few to no previous 
connections to wine or the communities in which the wineries exist) has 
created further fragmentation between the new winery owners and local 
grape growers. In addition, there are few ways to get new products to market, 
and as I discuss in Chapter 6, the new crop (peaches) and industry which has 
shown promise has already been hijacked by middlemen and traders.   
Privatisation in Macedonia has taken place within the context of an 
infrastructure that was not only made temporarily inoperable due to the 
destructive force of war throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s but 
which, as in other former socialist spaces, had long been formally suited to 
the imperatives of Yugoslav socialist production and distribution (which 
were not guided by larger market imperatives). The difficulty of foreign 
(mostly EU) competition and the integration of Macedonian wine production 
into new ‘markets’—be they local, regional (Southeast European) or 
Western—cannot be understood without reference to large-scale processes in 
which business, government and social relations become entangled. Indeed, 
in the last decade the informal, grey economy in Macedonia has grown, 
leaving less to regulation and more to exploitation. Therefore, there is an 
ambiguity surrounding who or what is at fault for the current situation in 
Tikveš and regardless, the outcome is a disaster for the country’s ordinary 
citizens, who often suffer at the hands of both business and the government.  
Yet the wine market is particularly complicated, as Beckert (2009) 
asserts. He focuses on the social preconditions of capitalist economies and 
their core institutions, and discusses ‘coordination problems’ that actors face 
in market exchange. Using wine as an example, he states that: 
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In the case of the market for wine, similar social processes lie behind the 
possibility of differentiating a product that is perceived by outsiders…as 
largely homogeneous. Assigning vastly different values to wine based 
on the grapes used, the producer, the location of the winery, the year of 
production…is a complex process without which this market would not 
exist at all (p41). 
 
There is thus a discord in valuations of a product such as wine between those 
it is marketed and sold to and those who produce it, or at least grow the 
grapes for it.  
The need to maintain control over the producers of its main input 
therefore becomes a necessity, yet who maintains power over rural [peasant] 
production? The state, who as Alexander (2002) argues, has ‘a monopoly on 
legitimate coercion and lawmaking, acting on its own interests or those 
controlling it’ (p4). It is therefore worth considering the legitimacy of the 
state in Tikveš, the wine mafia’s involvement, as well as the separation of the 
‘governors from the governed’ (Hann 1990).  
Wine as a product plays only one part in the changing livelihoods of 
Tikveš growers, for indeed most have grown grapes to serve the state—the 
former SFR Yugoslavia now the Republic of Macedonia. From this transition 
there comes forth an example of Creed’s ‘conflicting complementarity’ 
(1998, p29)—where the market is viewed as problematic to the former 
socialist system’s ‘inner logic’ (Verdery 1996, p30)—yet creating a market 
economy has become synonymous with the move toward democratisation 
and choice. Hence, the post-socialist marketplace raises the question about 
individuals’ economic freedom: now that the neoliberal market is dominant 
and state production in decline, have individuals engaging in market 
activities experienced an increase or reduction in their economic choice? 
This is addressed further in Chapter 6, but while product choice may have 
increased, the means of acquiring such goods—income—has clearly declined 
for many. A lack of income also means a lack of power and agency in the 
new socio-economic landscape.  
In fact, in her work on the Turkish state Alexander says that in order 
to understand political systems we should heed Foucault’s internalisation of 
power relations where, ‘the focus shifts to the micro-workings of power, 
certainly the traditional domain of anthropology’ (p4).  She argues that the 
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state is more than an arena where institutions and individuals jockey for 
power, and is an institution which acts on its own interests ‘even if not 
coterminous with societal preferences’ (ibid). It is in states in which the 
owners of capital hold great influence that the division between those who 
own capital and those who sell their labour creates two classes (Stiglitz 
2005). Such is the relationship between oligarchs and democracy which 
Winters (2011) discusses as well, where various production roles carry 
different income and prestige, but the most important feature is the difference 
in the power that they confer. Economy and distributions of wealth (or lack 
of) mean that a small capitalist class has the power to organise and direct the 
economy, while workers have little control in the market, politics or culture. 
It is thus the state’s and private interests’ control over means of 
production that, when combined with a historically fruitful relationship (such 
as earning a state salary or receiving inflated subsidies for crop production), 
leaves grape growers feeling devastated. Further, the former relationship of 
co-dependence between the state and growers is what I argue threatens the 
state’s influence, legitimacy and power. Memory of such positive relations 
along with the state’s present unwillingness to intervene when power is 
shifting into private hands means that the state is not responding to the needs 
of its citizens, and is consequently delegitimising itself through this past-
present contrast and the installation of class differences.  
An additional repercussion of this transition is indeed the return to a 
bourgeois class, largely in urban areas, and how their lifestyles compare with 
those in poorer parts of town, rural areas and villages. Such as Creed (1999) 
saw after 1989 in Bulgaria, there was a reversal of allegiance whereby a 
return to the peasantry fuelled a polarisation between villagers and 
urbanites164, tension which seemed to be leading to a major restructuring of 
community relations at the local and national level. Whereas with socialism 
villagers had ‘ceased to think of themselves as peasants and identified 
instead with their non-agricultural occupations’ (p233), severance from their 
                                                 
164 A change which is coming about in Macedonia: during the significant protests by the 
grape growers in September 2010, where the growers blocked a major thoroughfare in 
Tikveš for several days, there were such epithets, slurs and even a few punches thrown their 
way; tensions and comments at sports’ matches between locals and spectators from the 
capital are also frequent. 
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work was tantamount to severance from the state. In Macedonia, such a lack 
of commitment and attachment to the state casts grape growers and other 
rural inhabitants into a sustenance based economy, and clearly threatens the 
state’s legitimacy if not existence, constituting it as a ‘thieving state’ in the 
eyes of many.  
 
Conclusion 
A subtle form of authoritarianism has taken hold in Macedonia. 
Accompanied by the shift to neoliberal economic policy, this form of 
governance works alongside and within the democratic system. 
Neoliberalism is malleable in the sense that its implementation depends little 
on the political-economy in which it is being realised, and according to 
Canterbury (2005) a closer look at authoritarian states through the prism of 
global capitalism shows how neoliberal democratisation has led to such 
authoritarian rule. He contends that the Euro-American justification for the 
free-market is that through liberalism, economics will encourage political 
participation and overcome the potential for tyranny. Such notions are in line 
with modernisation theory—how as a society modernises, it should 
concurrently become more democratic.  
While neoliberalism and democratisation hold to the notion that 
authoritarian states interfere with economic development and that policies 
and politics determine economic outcomes, Canterbury points out that why 
democracy must have any connection with economic policy is questionable. 
For when a controlled economy fits into a larger market economy, such as is 
the case with modern China and the global economy, there is little need for a 
democracy to be in place. In other words, according to Silva (1999) ‘there is 
no unilateral relationship between economic development and the form of the 
state’ (p48). Thus to maintain their authority and power, a political regime 
must control the economic apparatus.   
Therefore, neoliberalism should not be seen as a rigid institution 
through which 21st century ‘free-market capitalism’ functions, yet it is an 
institution and system of governance in the sense that when allowed, it 
manifests itself with unique effects. Citizens may vote, but the oligarchic 
businessmen and politicians—‘wine mafia’ in the case of Tikveš—seek 
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profits and the freedom to dictate the country’s path. As a result, the state’s 
authority may continue to increase, but so do its notoriety and questions of its 
legitimacy as it becomes an enforcer of policy created elsewhere in order to 
secure profits for its elite.  
To return to this chapter’s introduction with Linz’s and Borneman’s 
systematicisation of authoritarianism, we can see in the transition in Tikveš 
and the power play at work (‘inside privatisation’) that indeed, there is a 
concentration of power at the top (the winery owners and government), 
maintained through repressive means (withholding of payments and an 
ineffective judicial system usually unwilling to prosecute winery owners); 
submission to authority (the growers being forced into submission—unable 
even through strikes to exact change); unaccountable if not unchecked 
exercise of power (again, the ‘wine mafia’); and intolerance to meaningful 
opposition (from the grape growers).  
Through the grower interest group’s opposition and disruptions, from 
striking, protesting, leaving their grapes unpicked, and making demands on 
the wineries and the shield of state power which protects them, they are on 
the one hand participating in a democratic system. But on the other hand, 
largely due to the oppression they face and lack of success they have in 
advancing their case, they are subject to a subtle yet modern form of 
oppression. It is one which, unlike the nationally touted, explicit draconian 
authoritarian measures of the 20th century socialist era—where in the case of 
Yugoslavia, political prisoners were publicly denounced and locked up on 
the Croatian island of Goli Otok (naked island)—today’s opponents, 
disruptors and ‘prisoners’ are left as they are: to accept a false consciousness 
that they have any voice or real choice, and to continue to play the game of 
privatisation whereby they are fed with disinformation in the media, 
excluded through poverty, and otherwise largely ignored. Instead, the 
government and its global, free-market oriented ruling class litter the media 
with stories of the country’s seemingly ceaseless and certainly questionable 
advance into the European Union, Euro-Atlantic integration, and the like. 
Indeed, both the grape growers of Tikveš and the country’s thousands of 
other agriculturalists are largely being shunned, with the knowledge that they 
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have virtually no power to change the rules of the game of neoliberal 
privatisation at work.  
By using Macedonia as an empirical case to illustrate the 
neoliberalising process, the latter’s promotion is thus revealed to be a causal 
factor in the country’s inability to consolidate democracy during its 
transition. Brought about under the rhetoric of economic development and 
growth which should benefit all, this preoccupation serves as a smokescreen 
behind which lay the interests of political and other elites who stand to profit 
at the citizenry’s expense. Individuals such as the Tikveš grape growers may 
fiercely contest these particular interests in a quest for the democracy they 
are so incessantly offered, but observations from outside the spheres of 
power such as the ethnographic vignettes in this chapter yield insight into the 

























Contemporary Macedonia is unique for many reasons already stated, from its 
geography to its ethnic makeup to its history, but also because the 
privatisation process as a whole and in this case, in agriculture, occurred 
much later than in the rest of the post-socialist world. With privatisation and 
‘transition’ happening within the past decade primarily, the country stands in 
stark contrast with neighbouring Bulgaria, Romania and the other countries 
of Eastern Europe studied by so many scholars since their transitions began 
in the early 1990s. There is much to be learned from those studies, but it was 
one goal of my fieldwork to focus on how such variables as economic and 
development policies, local power relations, as well as the experiences and 
perceptions of the growers were affecting the transition and being played out 
in Tikveš. Only this gave a clearer picture of the implementation of changing 
domestic, EU and other foreign policy, which while seemingly distant from 
the vineyards of the wine region has been one cause of the transition and its 
effects on the identity and livelihood of the grape growers. For as Kogut and 
Spicer have shown, the post-socialist transformation has overwhelmingly 
been shown to be a neoliberal economic ideology that framed foreign aid 
strategy in post-communist countries (2001), and there has been a significant 
‘land-grab’ in the past decade in Eastern Europe, where corporations and 
financial groups have seized public lands and farms for the sake of 
expanding EU industrial agriculture (Scozs 2014). Yet in Macedonia, with 
the last embers of the explosion that was the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s all but extinguished, the country has entered into a new phase of its 
transition that draws us to seek an answer to Creed’s (1998) question of ‘a 
transition to where?’  
Indeed, for a variety of reasons to be discussed, Macedonia sits in a 
liminal position at present. The country’s independence is over 20 years 
running, but bitter neighbourly relations over issues such as who are 
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Macedonians and their language (contested by Greece and Bulgaria 
primarily), to the rights of the significant and provocative Albanian minority 
in the country and region (contested within and by Albania and Kosovo), 
mean that the country’s political structure exists as a fragile peace. 
Furthermore, the country’s eight year-old EU candidate member status has 
long since lost its appeal as the Union batters its way through its fiscal crisis 
and the effects of austerity measures in neighbouring Greece.  
This chapter therefore discusses the extent to which joining Europe 
(as an EU member) is still seen as a legitimate and suitable goal for the 
country, and what the effects of European integration and development are 
on the wine region. I illustrate these concerns through locals’ experience with 
EU accession and development programme procedures, namely the 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) under the Common 
Agriculture Policy (CAP), as well as from their testimony to the concerns 
they have based on the ongoing crisis in the euro-zone. Indeed, I expand 
upon not just euro-scepticism in Macedonia, but the justification for it based 
upon the unsatisfactory experiences of EU member-neighbours Greece and 
Bulgaria. With half of the CAP subsidies going to a small percentage of 
[large] farms (Scozs 2014), this question merits attention. 
 In order to join the EU, Macedonia is waiting alongside neighbours 
Montenegro and Serbia (among others165), both of which gained candidate 
status later than Macedonia but which may well enter the EU prior to it. This 
is because, due to Greek opposition to the use of the name Macedonia, the 
country is wading through pre-accession measures (and was denied NATO 
entry in April 2008). Yet despite repeated recommendations for its entry into 
the Union, no date to even begin accession talks has been offered and will 
likely not be until the country ‘resolves the name dispute’ with Greece. 
Having spent so many years in Macedonia, however, I am fully aware that no 
government—be it the current nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party or the 
opposition, SDSM—would commit political suicide by allowing the country 
to compromise with Greece on this matter. For Athens is not only seen by 
Macedonians but much of the international community as being irredentist 
                                                 
165 Iceland and Turkey are other EU candidate members 
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and a bully about the name issue. Therefore, in Tikveš there is a perpetual 
sense of uncertainty not only due to the wine region’s transition but also 
because of the future of the country’s EU and NATO membership. 
Nonetheless, European development policies with the EU’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) at the forefront, seek to boost the competitiveness 
of European agriculture and to develop rural economies beyond their 
production of crops by stimulating rural industry and tourism. However, to 
call on long-time EU member Greece, for example, the CAP has been 
considered detrimental by many (Demoussis 2003). This is because CAP 
funds have generally accounted for almost half of the country’s total 
agricultural value, providing too much government support and control over 
agricultural production for the EU. With the persistent structural problems of 
the Greek agricultural sector, such as its small and fragmented land holdings, 
an ageing farmer population, the seeming inability of farmers to form co-
operatives and the bureaucratic public administration, it seems only natural 
that the ‘competitiveness’ of agriculture there has not improved and that the 
CAP is partially to blame (ibid).  
Such problems already do and could continue to apply to Macedonia 
as well, unless it can avoid doing what Greece has, and not intervening with 
national policies in areas of agriculture that were not directly addressed by 
the EU’s agricultural policy. That is, there is a fine balancing act necessary in 
agriculture, whereby the government (ideally through an informed and 
educated Ministry of Agriculture) helps guide the country’s production in 
order to keep its rural communities productive, necessary and competitive. 
Greece has therefore been at one extreme of this spectrum—too much 
government control, and Macedonia at the other end with not enough in 
recent years.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the combination of the 
government’s non-interventionist approach with the distribution of subsidies 
illustrates that at present, and for better or for worse, Macedonia is steering 
clear of the path of its southern neighbour. Yet a notable problem has arisen: 
while on the one hand Macedonia is addressing structural changes through its 
distribution of subsidies, on the other hand the situation can be characterised 
as a seeming aiding and abetting of the elitist element behind privatisation in 
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the wine industry and the country overall. Indeed, the government has been 
subsidising not only grape production but by giving subsidies to grape 
collectors and wineries when buying grapes, wine production as well. At the 
same time, wineries are consolidating land holdings and reorganising 
business operations in order to ensure a higher level of wine quality for 
export, and to meet international and European ‘standards’ (standardi or 
merki) that are increasingly seen as central to the new wine industry’s 
success. One significant part of the transformation in Tikveš is therefore 
occurring as a result of EU accession preparation, including the EU’s 
Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA).  
With the country receiving tens of millions of euros annually from 
IPA funds, and political rhetoric and institutionalisation instilling European 
pride and awareness in citizens, support of European integration comes 
through the opportunities it would offer in terms of education, travel and 
trade. Yet with the country in accession limbo, integration may be a step in 
the wrong direction—devastating for the grape growers of Tikveš, among 
other agriculturalists in the country, and corrupting to the political apparatus. 
With EU entry framed through neoliberal opportunist discourses, it is seen as 
an incentive for the Macedonian wine industry to reorient itself to the world 
market, meaning that the burden of this ‘transition’ in the form of the 
severance of wineries’ connections with rural producers is often obscured in 
the name of economic development.  
With prior involvement in international trade prior to the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, Macedonia is thus the ‘under-developed’ country targeted by 
development agencies, priorities and measures. Wineries may continue to 
‘purchase’ grapes from the growers yet the standards, connections and power 
of the former give them indisputable strong-arm leverage. As Macedonia’s 
position on the EU candidate stage is unique though, I hereby discuss the 
overarching goals of both European and other development initiatives within 
the country, and give examples of their implementation in Tikveš. 
 
Tikveš re-developed: European and international policy at work 
It is within this particular context that a combination of state, private and 
international development interests have converged in an effort to revitalise 
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and reorient the country and in this case, the Macedonian wine industry. In 
particular, the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) 
Macedonian Competitiveness Activity (MCA) served as an incredible 
conduit for information, restructuring, partnerships and exploring markets. 
Lasting from 2003-06, the MCA helped six small wineries band together to 
create a business partnership, which included funding the creation of their 
websites, sending several winery owners to Napa Valley and the University 
of California-Davis for training and demonstrations in American wine 
production, and developing a new market for niche wines and wineries. 
Among others, USAID also sought to boost the country’s privatising 
wineries, and gave Tikveš Winery an award for ‘introducing contracts and 
quality criteria in grape purchasing’ (MCA Quarterly Report 2006). Yet 
these are precisely the sort of criteria that growers detest because of the 
extent to which such changes demonstrate corruption at the governmental 
and developmental level, and which worst of all, have greatly compromised 
their livelihoods.   
More specifically, the USAID project’s ‘wine cluster’ sought to 
improve Macedonian wine quality and to help shift exports from bulk wine 
into higher value bottled wines. Strong emphasis was put on the promotion, 
new marketing techniques and a specialised export test market programme, 
and as part of these efforts, in September 2005 five small and medium sized 
wineries formed a consortia under the name of ‘The Macedonian Fine Wines 
Export Group’ and presented their best wines to the UK market. 
Furthermore, the MCA was ‘working with its Macedonian partners to create 
better strategies, better products and stronger companies with better access to 
international markets through improved production, operation and 
quality…helping Macedonia to choose prosperity’166. 
As my fieldwork did not coincide with the MCA project’s work in the 
wine region, however, I only know of the programme from USAID publicity 
for it during my residence the decade prior, and again during my fieldwork 
when hearing from informants who had participated in the programme. I will 
address those individuals and their experiences later on in the chapter, but 
                                                 
166 http://macedonia.usaid.gov/en/sectors/economic/competitviness.html  
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hereby state that such development remains one of the central organising and 
defining systems of Macedonia’s recent transition. Globalisation and the 
competitiveness of the wine trade mean that development projects such as 
the IPA and MCA programmes merit attention from anthropologists because 
they seem nonsensical to the free-market’s logic, and I call upon Chris Hann 
to show how these programmes stand in contrast to the controlled economies 
of socialism. Hann states of the former Yugoslavia that where there was ‘a 
major variant of a political society with development at its core’, neo-
liberalism is ‘the notion of everyone acting as an entrepreneur’ (Hann 2006, 
p7).  
This therefore brings into question how much ‘development’ is being 
done under the guise of transitioning to a free-market ripe for exploitation, 
and who is in fact able to be an entrepreneur when the local economy is in 
shambles? Indeed, upon greater consideration development seems to be a 
diverse institution often with a judgemental, evolutionary sense to it, and it 
can be associated with ideas about the increasing social, economic and 
political complexity in transitioning from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies 
(Lewis 2005, p473). Macedonia lies between the former and the latter, but 
such planned social change, or the intervention of one group (usually 
foreign) in the affairs of another in order to ‘improve’ or ‘produce positive 
change’, is also a common feature and example of the disruptiveness of such 
development priorities.  
It is therefore apparent that intervening groups such as EU, 
governmental and other development agencies are using economic and 
political muscle to change what they perceive to be a less-developed system 
than their own (in Macedonia) into the form they see fit. Unfortunately, this 
is seemingly done without concern for the consequences it brings upon the 
large majority of people who live within it, as while there are undoubtedly 
‘gains’ and ‘advances’ to be made from this transformation (particularly if 
one ascribes to modernisation theory and its notion of the development of 
self-sustaining growth), dependency theory suggests that under-developed 
economies on the periphery are integrated on unequal terms—with the favour 
of influential individuals or parties gained—and to ‘provide cheap raw 
materials for export to rich countries’ (ibid, p475). While wine may not be 
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considered a raw material, I wager that when exported in bulk—as most 
Macedonian wine is—it becomes such, and overall the country’s rich 
produce (not to mention natural resources) are indeed ‘ripe for the plucking’. 
The need for modern industry and technology thus presents perfect 
opportunities to EU member-state companies.  
Additionally, there is a hierarchical element to the economic value 
systems put in place in recent years, whereby one system dominates all 
others167. Calling upon Scott’s (1985) notion of ‘transcripts’ and the use of 
deference by a less powerful group of people, I observed in Tikveš an 
acceptance of the European and international financial system only so far as 
it is seen as beneficial to the country’s population, and otherwise it is 
disregarded as unnecessary and burdensome. Certainly the country’s political 
apparatus has accepted EU accession measures and mandates for various 
reasons—from the benefits it may bring to their country to the financial and 
status benefits it brings to the politicians themselves. Yet the majority of 
Macedonians must merely express deference to the overarching [European 
and global] financial system at work, for the value systems in place 
combined with the dependency upon networks is seen as unofficial at best 
and illicitly criminal at worst. As I illustrate below in terms of implementing 
the pre-accession measures of the IPA, however, there is a mixture of these 
systems and the customs surrounding them at work in Tikveš.       
In terms of the EU, every country entering or already a member of the 
Union differs in its history of production and trade. For example, prior to its 
entry, Slovenia (the northern most former Yugoslav republic) already had the 
EU as its largest trading partner, had high prices given little liberalisation and 
                                                 
167 Economic systems are based on customs, relationships, resources and varieties of 
consumption, making the understanding of such cultural variables a necessity. They may be 
monetary or not, and although a system may work for one group, community or country, it 
may not for another. This calls to attention notions of ‘use value’ versus ‘exchange value’, 
which are explained by Chibnik (2011) in the following: ‘production for use value aims at 
the acquisition of specific goods; production for exchange value…aims at the accumulation 
of general “wealth”’ (p45). This applies to the wine industry in that there are essentially 
both systems at work in Tikveš: the government, businesses and wineries holding the reins 
of the monetary financial system, while the agriculturalists do the grunt work of feeding 
society and being intertwined with both economies of capital (cash) and of favours 
(connections). Indeed, even though earning profits and doing business might be universal 
human traits, how such trade is conducted and with what currency (be it monetary, goods-
based or in-kind) is a cross-cultural affair full of potential misunderstanding. 
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imported more than it exported. It was therefore an easy transition for the 
country to EU membership. The country’s earlier wine industry, which 
largely handled and marketed imported Macedonian bulk wine, held an 
arrangement whereby there were mutual preferential trade concessions via a 
special wine agreement (Bojnec & Münch 2000). Yet because Slovenia was 
a net importer (compared with the EU as a net exporter), market price 
support was delivered through import measures and state marketing systems 
rather than export subsidies (ibid). In contrast, given the cost of extending 
CAP benefits being laid on Polish consumers, low production intensity there 
meant Poland needed restructuring to increase ‘production to a level which is 
rational in the EU economic environment’ (Piskorz 2000, p87), and farmers 
only received increased subsidies incrementally as their output has increased.  
I discuss these examples because overall, Hann (2006) has found that 
the ability of states to shape agricultural economic policy has been curtailed 
with EU entry and adoption of European agricultural policy, and while 
farmers in a small town in Poland where he worked were satisfied with EU 
subsidies in 2005, they were concerned that such subsidies would be 
withdrawn given a centrally planned, EU-wide policy. Such curtailing could 
unequivocally be applied to Macedonia as well, given the EU pre-accession 
measures being undertaken there. A further explanation of these measures 
will thus help to lay the foundation for understanding their effect on rural 
communities like those in Tikveš.  
 
The IPA(RD) programme in Macedonia: an overlay 
In preparation for eventual entry into the European Union, the Macedonian 
government has been complying with the IPA and through it, has received 
half a billion euros since 2007 for five components, from institution building 
to rural development. My fieldwork research focused on the rural 
development (RD) component, known as the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance for Rural Development, or IPARD. 
The IPARD programme was adopted by the European Commission 
(EC) in February 2008 through the National Agriculture and Rural 
Development Plan. Its overall objective is to ‘support implementation of 
policies to promote competitive and sustainable agriculture; develop strong 
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and sustainable communities, and a diverse and sustainable rural 
environment’ (Delegation of the European Union, Fact Sheet 2010/03). In 
addition, the IPA Rural Development component supports the preparation for 
implementation of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)168, including 
management of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD). Although the bulk of the funding comes from EU taxpayers, the 
management of the IPARD is the responsibility of the national authorities—
the Macedonian government and its respective ministries. Together they 
should ensure the existence of sound financial management and 
implementation of the funds, including the required structures, rules and 
procedures. In 2009 the European Commission confirmed that the 
institutional capacities were in place and adopted a decision to confer the 
management of the IPARD to the national authorities in Macedonia. 
The IPARD’s operational programme has been covered by budgeting 
for a period of seven years (2007-2013), and includes a financial allocation 
of over 42 million euros, including co-financing by the Macedonian 
government. Overall, the IPARD programme is designed to ‘improve the 
technological and market infrastructure of commercial agricultural holdings 
and the food processing industry, aiming to increase the added value of agri-
food products and achieve compliance with EU quality, health, food safety, 
and environmental standards, whilst at the same time assuring the quality of 
life of the rural population, increasing rural incomes and creating new 
employment opportunities’. Furthermore, ‘the main beneficiaries of the 
measures’ are to be ‘agricultural holdings, agriculture cooperatives, the food 
industry, rural economic operators, rural entrepreneurs, and the rural 
population as a whole’ (Delegation of the European Union, Fact Sheet 
2010/03). 
 The IPARD programme is thus significant for a predominantly 
agricultural country such as Macedonia, and its clearly stated aims are to 
indeed transform not only the agricultural industry in Macedonia but also the 
communities in which they exist. Yet such reorientation of production is 
difficult, as rural producers are rarely capable of generating the required 
                                                 
168 The CAP is the overarching European policy for agriculture, which once a country joins 
the EU they are thenceforth subject to.  
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capital needed for change themselves, particularly such as the IPARD 
programme calls for. Further, the EU’s policies, reflecting the open ‘free-
market’, seek to incorporate Macedonian agriculture into an international 
financial market that scarcely exists there—and one which seems to in fact 
be in decline. Namely, Macedonian agriculture had until recently looked 
more like the European policy of two to three decades ago: protected by 
government price setting, subsidised by and for government-owned industrial 
production, and not meant to be competitive. This has all changed with the 
selling off of state-owned wineries and the hands-off approach taken by the 
state, yet this process has occurred with great speed—in the past decade 
primarily. Although many have called foul on the strong-armed businessmen 
behind the wine industry’s significant transition in Macedonia, the wine law 
passed two years ago to help the struggling grape growers receive a fair price 
for their crop (discussed in previous chapters) was struck down by the 
country’s Constitutional Court, which considered it interference in the 
market. 
 As David Kideckel (1995) observed early on in Romania, however, 
agriculture is a unique branch of industry because land is a fixed and limited 
resource, and influenced by local customs and conditions which growers 
cannot quickly adjust to external demands such as those imposed by market-
development priorities. For example, in Macedonia several grape growers 
were advised through the media publicity of a USAID agricultural consulting 
report to grow edible, table grapes for the Western market. Yet of those who 
did, few found a market for them: ‘Nema plasman’, they said—“there is no 
channel/outlet”169. Indeed, in Macedonia it takes personal connections with 
traders to get a product to market, and therefore the extent to which grape 
growers can sell their produce depends not just on demand but on access to 
the markets themselves. 
 Social relations and different customs surrounding production mean 
that growers see little incentive at present to shift to another crop, 
                                                 
169 Another example comes from Hungary, where in writing about Hungary’s Tokaj wine 
region, Hann (2006 p134) saw that the small-scale production of the socialist era had no 
future if EU subsidies to agriculture declined, and that investments in vineyards there were 
thus in vain and should never have happened given competition from other European wine 
producers. 
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particularly when grapes are not only what they have produced for so long 
but like other crops, require a significant initial financial investment and 
several years of growth before literally ‘bearing fruit’. Who would rip up 
their land in order to plant other produce which might take just as long to 
create revenue at best, and which in all probability will not have a solid 
market in the near future? This question harkens to the general discussion on 
government involvement in agriculture and the fine line between regulation 
and protectionism, but no one can blame growers in Tikveš for lacking the 
inclination to take chances with a new crop. Indeed, the current transition 
there is a game of chance with few rules, and an international affair whereby 
most grape growers are anything but confident in the future of their 
livelihoods. They continually ask whether there will be demand for their 
grapes or other produce in the future, and wonder whether the country will 
ever even join the EU. Only a few business-minded growers and traders 
consider EU membership in terms of market opportunities, though with the 
European financial crisis euro-scepticism runs high and the Europe of a 
decade ago seems to be an increasingly distant utopian ideal170. Moreover, 
agricultural support for current EU candidate countries has been decoupled 
and limited compared to that provided to the countries which entered the 
Union previously. 
 In addition to the IPARD programme, the rural development plan for 
Macedonia is outlined in great detail in a 486 page document produced by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). One of 
many observations within the text is the following: ‘Wine grape producers 
suffer from several management problems. Grape producers do not have the 
ability to obtain credit, or to influence raw materials supply, exert price 
control of the grape, and ensure timely payments for their deliveries’ (EBRD 
FYR Macedonia Strategy 2010, pp.70-71). What we thus see here are 
powerless growers facing a multi-pronged EU policy perspective that is 
essentially intent on downsizing wine-grape production through 
                                                 
170 This is due to several reasons: the crisis in the Union and neighbouring Greece, Brussels 
itself expressing doubt that it can afford to take on new member states, anecdotal evidence 
from EU member neighbours of the decline in their standard of living (often heard when 
traveling through Bulgaria and Greece), and last but not least, the Greek government’s 
staunch opposition to the Republic of Macedonia’s right to self-determination and use of the 
name Macedonia.  
 170 
standardisation and regulation. From an EU perspective, this aim is 
somewhat understandable, as the European wine-market is saturated171. Yet 
whereas Macedonia overall stands to fare well in the near future with its 
agricultural production in tobacco, fruits and vegetables, given abundant 
produce and niche markets in the former Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Russia, 
one study states that ‘the only direction in which trade with Southeast Europe 
is expected to occur with EU countries172 is in viticulture and the wine trade’ 
(Totev & Shahollari 2001).  
 That is, direct competition with other EU grape growers and wine 
producers was expected to significantly challenge the country’s wine 
industry from 2013—when Macedonia had to cease its tariffs on EU 
member-state wine imports—yet Macedonia does not stand to gain much 
ground within the EU from its other agricultural produce due to domination 
by suppliers in Spain, Italy, and Africa. Further, because the EU’s 
agricultural policy has traditionally rewarded farmers who produce more, 
larger farms (of which there are few in Tikveš) benefit more greatly from 
subsidies than smaller ones, such as the family-labour holdings of Macedonia 
and the former Yugoslavia in general (OECD, 2010). Therefore, Tikveš is in 
transition yet the blueprint for the region’s future may not be the most 
compatible with the EU nor viable for the country’s wine industry. 
 It thus becomes apparent that the complications associated with the 
transition to European agricultural standards in Tikveš are deep-seated, and 
make it essential to look at the balance of power, the social relations of 
production and the local experience with the transition there. In reality, 
policy coming from Brussels and implemented through Skopje seems to 
result in something akin to the children’s game of ‘Chinese whispers’ or 
‘telephone’, where a sentence whispered from ear to ear among a circle of 
children ends up rather different at the last child than what it began as. The 
same could be said of European policy and how it is ‘translated’ and 
implemented as well. This is not only because the government has its own 
                                                 
171 The European and global wine markets are incredibly profitable and thus competitive. 
New World wines—from North and South America, as well as Australia—have surpassed 
European wine sales in the UK, for example, showing the strength of their marketing 
efforts. 
172 Italics mine.  
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interests and concerns with how its agricultural industry is run, but because 
the on-the-ground reality of implementation depends greatly not just on 
bureaucratic measures and funding but social relations and connections. In 
short, there is an ‘economy of favours’ at work in Macedonia which most 
individuals must dance around, and even at the administrative level they 
must express deference, utilise connections and return favours for assistance 
with whatever endeavours they partake in. For the Tikveš region of 
Macedonia, although in the Balkans173 and part of the former Yugoslavia, is 
(as addressed in Chapter 1) also very Mediterranean in character, and such as 
elsewhere in Southern Europe there is a social collectiveness that dictates 
norms and customs. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I therefore not only look at how the 
IPARD’s focus on rural development is implemented and utilised, I consider 
the cultural influence and testify to it through ‘pointing out the obvious’ from 
a local perspective. For although national ministers and EU bureaucrats may 
idealise that rural agricultural development measures (such as those of the 
IPARD) can be taken advantage of by any citizen with the will to do so, this 
simply does not reflect the economic reality, both in terms of familial 
finances and connections.  
 
Implementation of the IPARD in Tikveš 
The procedural steps for the IPARD application include gaining access to 
credit; providing documentation that verifies ownership of the land to be 
worked or built on, necessary permits and official registration as an 
agriculturalist (zemjodelec); and last but not least, having the connections to 
see through the combination of these into a viable and successful application.  
These are indeed obstacles for many individuals, but I observed two 
problems with the IPARD separate from these: poor advertising and the 
                                                 
173 I use Balkan here not in the pejorative sense but to refer to the countries of Southeast 
Europe and the former Yugoslavia in all their cultural and geographical diversity. This 
includes the cultural milieu there that results from the geography, customs, rural livelihoods 
and isolation of its peoples. The latter make the region unique in comparison with Central 
Europe, or those countries considered Mediterranean—which have different climates, 
cultures, international affiliations, and so on. Macedonia and Tikveš are in fact on the 
dividing line between Balkan and Mediterranean, and inhabitants of southern Macedonia 
have indeed long looked toward Salonica (and the Aegean Sea) as a regional destination for 
commerce as much as they do Skopje.  
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consequent drawing of potential applicants to the presentation sessions held. 
Throughout the bulk of my fieldwork in 2011, during which there were four 
rounds of applications and funding for the IPARD, only in a few locations 
did I see posters advertising the programme beyond the Rural Development 
Agency (Agencija za Ruralen Razvoj) office. Although in central locations, 
they had only been placed in the windows of either the local library or 
cultural centre in the two largest Tikveš towns, Kavadarci and Negotino, as 
well as in a central, local café in the smaller town of Rosoman. On one 
occasion they advertised the presentation to be made in a nearby town only a 
day in advance, and as I further discuss below in the first ethnographic 
vignette, for those that I knew who were aware of the programme and 
attended such presentations, they perceived the application process as 
extremely complicated at best and often impossible given a lack of official 
documentation, a solid business plan and accessible funding needed to match 
the IPARD grant. 
 
Demir Kapija: ‘for people with big cars’ 
The poorly advertised presentation mentioned above occurred in Demir 
Kapija, the small town mentioned in previous chapters that has seen 
significant development. Besides its stunning geographic setting, it is also 
famous for its two wineries. One dates back nearly a century to the 1930s, 
when the country was under Serbian rule during the inter-war years, and was 
built for the Serbian King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic. It is thus locally called 
the ‘King’s Winery’ (Kralska Vinarija), and being privately owned by a 
Kavadarci family, produces affordable wines under the label Villa Marija.  
The second winery is much newer, and is the product of a 
Macedonian businessman with an MBA from an American university and a 
dream to see a Napa Valley style winery and tourist destination in Tikveš. 
The winery, Popova Kula, has been very successful with wealthier 
Macedonians and foreign tourists, yet sitting atop a hill in town, the winery 
and its clientele stand in stark contrast with the town’s mainly agricultural 
inhabitants below and the livelihoods they eke out. Those I spoke to said the 
winery was good for the town, but they would never go ‘up there’. One 
woman, contrasting the smaller cars of the Yugoslav era that locals still drive 
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with the larger, newer sedans and SUVs of wealthier Macedonians (primarily 
from the capital) said ‘it’s for people with big cars’. Indeed, local inhabitants 
live in a town which has never had a large factory or other socially-owned 
industrial enterprise, and which has been primarily agricultural throughout its 
history. Vineyards dot the landscape along the riversides, and growers 
depend on the country’s wine production for their income. I visited Demir 
Kapija often for this reason, as the economies of Negotino and Kavadarci, in 
particular, were both larger and more diverse. 
On a hot day in July 2011 I drove there specifically for an IPARD 
presentation. I had indeed only found out about the presentation the day 
before—when it had been announced—by the Rural Development Agency’s 
office near where I lived in Kavadarci. Only a day of planning meant little 
time for advertising, so I was surprised to see even nine persons in 
attendance when I arrived. The presenters, however, rapidly went through a 
lengthy and difficult to read Power Point presentation. Lasting just a half 
hour, two representatives from the agency office in Negotino showed slides 
on a screen behind them on the stage in the town’s cultural centre (dom na 
kultura), and because of small letters and an over-abundance of text on the 
slides, the slides were largely unreadable. The agency representatives 
proceeded through the details of the application and then asked for any 
questions, but rather hastily dismissed the two they received. One was from 
an apparent farmer asking about a parcel of land in a certain vicinity of the 
municipality and whether it was suitable for IPARD rural tourism funding (it 
was not), and the other was about developing beehives for honey production. 
This was possible, but the answer to it reflects the natural difficulty most 
interested individuals face: although the IPARD’s funding could support 
honey production, the total project expenses must total at least 5,000 euros 
for there to be any agreement and contribution from the IPARD. Many 
growers, however, cannot fathom matching half of that, or 2,500 plus 
euros—an average farmer’s annual earnings—so must dismiss the idea of 
participating. 
The presentation had ended quickly with little casual conversation 
about the programme, so I exited and headed to the main-street café 
restaurant (kafana) just outside the cultural centre. There I saw and spoke to 
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an acquaintance, Tošo, who said he would have liked to have attended had he 
only known the presentation was going on. His idea is for developing a five 
hectare plot of land that he and his brother have. Two hectares are grapes—
but un-irrigated and thus poor quality ones (though he had still been 
optimistically tending to and spraying them with pesticides)—so he was 
interested in what he could do with the other few hectares. This round of the 
programme lost him, however, and another guy there with him exclaimed 
‘nothing’s clear to me about this programme—we’re sitting right here and 
we didn’t even know it was going on in there!’ 
Advertising for the programme is problematic, but coming up with 
funding to match an IPARD grant is the most significant issue for most 
interested applicants. The requirement that a project cost at least 5,000 euros, 
with half of the investment coming from the applicant, is impossible for 
many. With an average income of 300 euros a month for the employed in 
Macedonia, 2,500 euros is more than two-thirds of a year’s income and as I 
have discussed in terms of a ‘returning to the peasantry’, for farmers such 
income is not guaranteed. Indeed, although it is difficult to gage what a 
farmer’s income actually is—for it depends on a number of factors from 
personal production and sales to other familial income and costs—the 
amount of money required for an investment such as through the IPARD is 
substantial. Thus it came as no surprise that Agency officials seemed to have 
little faith in their presentations resulting in viable applications, particularly 
from a town such as Demir Kapija. 
In fact, back in the Rural Development Agency’s office in Kavadarci, 
a place I visited regularly and was well-received, we discussed the latter the 
following day. The administrators there admitted that the presentation I had 
attended was poorly planned, but did not blame their colleagues in the 
Negotino office who presented it. One said ‘it’s difficult in a town like Demir 
Kapija. Who can participate? They’re all farmers there’. This statement 
clearly reflects the administrative attitude around the IPARD and who should 
or is likely to participate. But having missed another presentation that they 
had done, I asked them how one in the nearby town of Rosoman had gone. It 
had been better planned and advertised, as I had even seen a poster for it the 
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week before when in the small town investigating their peach market174. My 
main informant in the Agency office, Dragi, said that they had 34 people 
show up. I asked whether any were applying and he said some will, but 
whether they would receive funding was debatable. ‘It takes large 
investments which farmers don’t have. How can they be expected to conform 
to European standards [via IPARD funds] when they’re hardly paid for their 
produce? They’re supposed to put what they earn into investments for an 
uncertain future?’ Dragi had a good point and knows personally—he is from 
a farming family and is not employed by the Agency but has immersed 
himself into the local office as a volunteer of sorts. On several occasions we 
discussed over Turkish coffee the transition and plight of grape growers in 
the region. But with no guarantees for export markets and thus income, life 
for growers like Dragi and his family is indeed full of uncertainty.  
We had spoken, for example, about why there are not individuals 
renovating their homes for rural tourism, an issue which had come up several 
times when chatting with grape-growers about other opportunities, such as 
the IPARD might assist with. Dragi, as did other acquaintances, towed the 
typical line of ‘there aren’t tourists in Macedonia’, to which I countered and 
said that indeed there are—just look at Popova Kula in Demir Kapija, or 
other wineries in the region providing tours and building tasting rooms. ‘But 
they won’t come’, he declared, and his point was clear: rural agriculturalists, 
and even someone affiliated with the Agency such as himself, lacked 
optimism and seemed unwilling to admit and thus recognise the change 
necessary to make a programme such as the tourism component of the 
IPARD work. 
The programme is thus not only impossible given most families’ 
financial means, but it is incompatible with their perceptions of the region’s 
future: they have not adopted the agency that the EU and Macedonian 
government seek to instil. This is arguably because of a lack of incentive—
neoliberal notions of economic behaviour assert that individuals should and 
                                                 
174 As discussed in Chapter 6, Rosoman has successfully shifted its production in the past 
decade from primarily grapes to peaches. This crop, which is mainly exported throughout 
the former Yugoslavia, and into Ukraine and Russia, has been a boon for the town. Other 
farmers have thus sought to get in on the business, but in doing so have created a market 
surplus, and brought the attention of traders keen on getting their share of the profits.   
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will become entrepreneurial yet such a theory disregards the extent to which 
the capitalist project requires a form of incorporation. That is, if grape 
growers (among others) are to participate in a larger marketplace than that in 
their town, then they need to be brought into it and incentivised to do so.  
Furthermore, for the individual who does not come from a connected 
family—as most successful IPARD applicants do—there are not only the 
bureaucratic hoops to jump through in submitting a good application, there 
are true dangers in accessing the necessary capital to match the IPARD grant. 
As evidence of this, one story I heard was of a few grape grower friends 
sitting in a café in the town of Negotino. They had an idea for an IPARD 
application and were speaking about how to get the funds to match their 
share of it when a man near them approached and said he could help them 
out. Claiming he was from the capital (Skopje), he said he had the 
connections to get them the money they needed. Obviously very skilled in 
what he was doing, the scam-artist said he needed some money up front, 
which after lengthy discussion, they provided. The sum is uncertain, but they 
did not hear from him again so after a few days the authorities and general 
public were notified of the opportunist at work. 
This is unfortunate but in some ways banks are doing the same: there 
are several advertisements for agricultural loans (krediti), with banks 
claiming that they are ‘supporting agriculture’. One bank in particular, the 
Austrian-owned Sparkasse, loaned out three-quarters of a million euros to 
agriculturalists by the middle of 2011 (Angelovska 2011). While many grape 
growers seek these funds for new equipment, such as tractors, and for 
installing better irrigation systems in their vineyards (and may combine them 
with IPARD funding), I am well aware of some individuals who took the 
loans simply to cover costs during what has been a very difficult period of 
unpaid or under-paid grape harvests. The repercussions of taking these loans, 
however, are significant. With high interest rates (kamata) of up to 20 
percent, to qualify for such loans individuals must provide collateral. Their 
inability to pay off their loan could thus result in the confiscation of a variety 
of property, from the machinery they purchased to other possessions, 
including property such as their home. 
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There were some successful IPARD applications that year for 
alternative projects, including funding for cheese making, bee keeping (for 
honey), berry farms and fruit orchards, produce facilities (such as large walk-
in refrigerators) and of course wineries. Yet all of the recipients I met were 
well-off by Macedonian standards, as evidenced by what they had to invest 
in order to receive the IPARD funding. In the Tikveš town of Gradsko, I met 
the owner of a milk production company who had received funding for 
cheese and yogurt production. His investment was 28,000 euros, which he 
had to initiate production with, as the IPARD funding was not to be 
distributed for three months. The owner, Zlato, told me that he was very 
pleased to have been helped by the Rural Development Agency to link up 
with banks for credit and loans. However, I was told by other informants I 
knew in the town175 that he is well-off because the factory he runs was 
bought for a pittance through privatisation a decade prior, and dairy is a very 
lucrative industry itself176. He, like many connected individuals who partook 
in the country’s privatisation, got something for nearly nothing, and has 
made a significant amount of income off of it. This capital he has then been 
able to use to participate in programmes such as the IPARD, a scheme which 
for most is off-limits. Indeed, as the head of the local Federation of Farmers 
(Federacijata na Farmerite) in the region stated ‘a large portion of farmers 
aren’t able to use [the IPARD] European funds. They need to have official 
documentation for the applications, they must satisfy several government set 
criteria and standards, they don’t have proof of property ownership, and of 
course they’re missing the money they would need at the start of the 
investment’. 
Funding for wine related expenses includes the ‘cap-by-cap’ (kapka 
po kapka, as explained in Chapters 3 & 6) irrigation systems, and a diverse 
array of machinery for everything from soil tilling to pesticide spraying to 
wine production facilities. Although I met no one personally who had used 
the IPARD funding for a cap-by-cap system, it has indeed been a growing 
                                                 
175 One family in particular were always open to conversation when I visited Gradsko. They 
owned a grocery store on the main road passing through the town, and I knew them through 
two Peace Corps colleagues who had lived with them for three months during our training 
in 2002.   
176 Given income and the amount of local dairy production, milk is quite expensive in 
Macedonia and costs up to a euro/litre.  
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trend to put such a system in place and the IPARD did support it. One 
Kavadarci winery which received funding in 2011, however, was a 
significant expenditure and project that was well publicised in the national 
daily (Dnevnik) and on television. The family, whom I shall call the 
Teodorovi, had put significant effort into the wine production facility they 
built using the IPARD’s funding. Including new tanks to stabilise their wine 
and its fermentation, the project multiplied their production by a factor of six. 
I asked the Teodorovi’s daughter, Elena—who has a degree in agricultural 
engineering and is an integral part of the family’s project—what sort of niche 
they were looking to create and where all of their wine would go. She said 
‘we’ll focus on both regular and dessert wines. The wine sector is difficult 
right now, but that is just more of a challenge for us. The domestic market is 
very small, but we have some agreements in outside markets (nadvorešni 
pazari) which I think will be realised, and we’ve already sold a portion of 
our wines’. The representative from the European Commission, Gerrard 
Quille, commented on the merits of the IPARD during the Teodorovi 
winery’s opening ceremony, stating that he was very pleased with the 
‘interest by Macedonian agro-businessmen’, and added of the IPARD that 
‘the goal is the realisation of the European Union’s standards, which will act 
as a guarantee for greater interaction with those markets’.  
However, these statements illustrate that the IPARD did not have 
what could be considered a successful year of rural development funding in 
2011. Out of 245 applications through the first two rounds of funding in 
Macedonia, there were 27 agreements and three projects completed. Even 
Quille commented that ‘maybe it is a small number of accepted applications, 
but in general we are on a good path and farmers should take advantage of 
this possibility’ (Angelovska 2011). Yet of the 112 applications in the second 
round there were just over a dozen agreements, with most (67) application 
being from individuals interested in replacing equipment, such as tractors 
and other machinery (the vast majority of which dates from the Yugoslav 
era). Only 25 were interested in product processing and promotion (such as 
juice, canned or jarred goods, etc.), and just 20 were for rural economic 
development activities (ibid).  
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Yet Quille’s comments verify the extent to which the European 
community are intent on integrating Macedonia while discarding the political 
reality of the matter specific to the county, as well as the economic matter 
specific to the Union—namely a lack of confidence in the euro-zone and 
southern European economies. Unfortunately, neither of these issues paints a 
positive outlook for Macedonia’s accession to the EU. Thus, whether the 
IPARD programme is worthwhile in terms of preparing Macedonia for a 
status it may never have is one question, but another is to what extent does 
the IPARD and EU accession contribute to a growing disparity between rich 
and poor in the country? While integration is meant to foster what are the 
virtuous ideals of the EU, there clearly seems to be a different reality in 
many EU countries in recent years (Greece being the most obvious). Cultural 
incompatibility among the countries, therefore, means that the marriage 
between north and south, east and west, may be imprudent. That is, those 
countries who have been supported by the EU yet which have non-
transparent political and economic systems have enriched their political and 
business leaders through the generous support of West and Central European 
EU taxpayers. Such a situation is rife in Macedonia, with opportunism and 
self-gain contagious and spreading. Among the opportunistic in Tikveš were 
our neighbours, a family who owned Kavadarci’s largest, dual import-export 
companies.    
 
Ovošje Komerc 
Another example of the IPARD funding’s recipients is that of a family who 
lived down the street from us. We went to the complex of ‘Ovošje Komerc’ 
at the suggestion of my wife, Irena, who has known the family all of her life. 
As she had told me and their son Vlatko explained further, the company’s 
history is lengthy: In the 1970s during the SFR Yugoslav era, Vlatko’s 
grandfather began transporting grapes, among other fruits, to Croatia and 
Serbia and selling them there. Unlike most enterprises his was private from 
the beginning. He used a kombi, or van, to transport the produce at first, then 
bought a truck with a camper trailer, so that he could stay in Croatia and 
Serbia all summer, sleeping at the markets and only returning to transport 
produce from Macedonia. As his family and business grew though, his sons 
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bought the produce in Macedonia and a driver brought it up to wherever their 
father was located.  
The company grew significantly and was then divided into two a 
decade ago (2001) in order for the two sons to have an equal share in it. They 
in fact still manage the family’s business together, and the other half of the 
company has its warehouse-office facilities directly next to Ovošje Komerc. 
They are thus only divided on paper, and over three decades the business as a 
whole has grown into the largest produce import-export group in Kavadarci 
and the region, owning a dozen trucks and sending their produce throughout 
the former Yugoslavia and into Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. They not only 
transport a variety of produce, namely Tikveš table grapes, but due to the 
crisis in the last decade also wine grapes bought at extremely low prices, 
which are then exported to other countries for wine production there. 
The family has thus been opportunistic and successful, and is 
comparatively wealthy as a result. They have taken advantage of not only EU 
but USAID funding as well—they visited California on a MCA sponsored 
wine development trip, visiting the oenology labs at UC-Davis to learn about 
modern wine production. They enjoyed this visit and opportunity greatly and 
told me about it at length, showing me a book they had acquired on various 
ways of positioning vineyards and the vines themselves177. However, when 
asked, they told me that they had not actually implemented in their own 
vineyards any of the strategies they had learned about.  
The family then took advantage of the IPARD’s funds for their 
winery project, for the purchase of two cooling tanks for the cellar beneath 
one of their warehouses. For it, they acquired two cistern tanks which cool 
the wine to kill off bacteria and better preserve it. With both costing upwards 
of 30,000 euros and the IPARD covering half of the costs, this was a 
significant amount of money poured into their wine cellar. Yet as they told 
me, their bottling is mostly hobby and for local sale, and they only sell 
                                                 
177 The ‘Y’ concept was that which they were most interested in replicating (but had not up 
to that point). This formation is essentially the placing of grape vines on ‘Y’ shaped rows. 
There are many benefits to this system, from the grapes receiving more sun and air (and 
thus being less susceptible to fungus and disease) to the grapes being at chest and head level 
for easier picking.  
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abroad just over the border in southern Serbia through some friendly 
acquaintances there. 
So why would the IPARD fund such a project? The answer to this 
helps to explain how the well-off and connected are able to maintain their 
success, and how the EU’s development strategies are not in fact enabling 
just anyone in Macedonia but quite the opposite: it is the elite families who 
are able to take advantage of the IPARD’s funding. Further, the Ovošje 
Komerc wine cellar was described in their IPARD application as a business 
opportunity, when in reality (as they told me) there is little actual likelihood 
of growing that aspect of their business and producing wine to sell. One 
visible piece of evidence for this is that their wine bottling and labelling 
lacks the sophistication of other serious commercial producers, and they 
clearly told me that they did not intend to expand their limited wine sales; 
their business is indeed in produce transport.  
Therefore, along with the Teodorovi, among others, they are able to 
qualify for the bulk of the IPARD’s funding for such large projects and have 
essentially covered their expenses with EU taxpayer money. They are among 
the elite who benefit from the IPARD’s programme because they can afford 
to make the financial investment necessary to participate. But what does their 
success mean for Tikveš and Macedonia once in the EU? Are they preparing 
the region for the global market, or for a ‘return to the peasantry’ in the sense 
that elites will run the industry for which agriculturalists will labour 
subserviently? I address these questions further in the next section. 
 
Tikveš in the EU: Preparation for the global market or a return to the 
peasantry? 
To tie this chapter into an overarching theme in my thesis, I would now like 
to discuss further how Tikveš might fare under the EU’s transition scheme 
and Common Agricultural Policy, and conclude with thoughts on the 
implications of such policies for production and the livelihood of 
Macedonians in the region.  
In comparison with the rest of Europe, Southeast Europe possesses a 
large amount of rural industry and potential for rural development. This has 
been duly noted since the end of socialism and the beginning of EU 
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integration, with financial assistance intending to help countries in the region 
introduce the necessary reforms in line with EU standards (EC Enlargement 
and Financial Assistance, 2010). Borrowing from the European 
Commission’s website, it is stated that ‘before joining the EU, a country 
must have a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; assistance is 
therefore provided to support economic reform, leading to economic growth 
and better employment prospects’ (ibid).   
But for current EU members, research has shown that while the CAP 
only slightly decreased production and increased costs in the traditional EU-
15 countries upon its introduction, the ten new members (NMS) who entered 
in 2004 saw substantial increases in costs with various changes in 
production—though often an increase in production for export but with an 
overall decrease in domestic consumption (Beghin et al, 2007). Restructuring 
for a country such as Macedonia will likely result in the same, but will also 
continue to mean layoffs in the industrial sector, shifting more individuals 
back into agriculture (Totev and Shahollari, 2001).178 However, such a shift 
is indeed the opposite of what the EU would like to see happen and which it 
is trying to thwart through the IPARD programme.   
It must therefore be emphasised that all of these modifications in 
agriculture and rural development are happening at a time of major 
challenges and ‘transition’ in rural Macedonia. Many industries have shut 
down and unemployment is high, yet all the while agriculture is undergoing a 
lengthy restructuring process with limited competitiveness. Moreover, it is a 
radical leap from the socialist agricultural framework of the former 
Yugoslavia whereby the government paid out for a crop such as grapes, but 
also owned the wineries that produced the wine that the grapes went to. The 
ongoing problem with the grape growers not being paid harkens back to the 
previous chapter, and suggests that either the country’s laws are poorly 
drafted or simply not enforced. In this particular situation, one can conclude 
that it is a little bit of both but it seems clear that with the control over the 
producers, market and thus consumers, wineries and their lobbying take the 
                                                 
178 Whether a return to agriculture will coincide with an increase in fruit and vegetable 
production though remains to be seen. 
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upper hand. Primarily, the official ‘Law on Wine’ discussed in Chapter 3 is 
continuously claimed by the wineries as being misinterpreted even though it 
fully regulates the industry and is in agreement with the EU’s measures on 
production of wine and grapes.  
Thus due to EU integration, whose intention is to enhance the 
domestic economy and bring it up to the European level of food safety and 
quality, Macedonia’s agricultural products should also be brought to the 
levels of the European market’s demands concerning their quality and price. 
Yet that this is being done in a situation of constantly increasing market 
competition makes it seem of crucial importance to restructure the mainly 
undesirable organisational scheme and practise of farmers, who may come to 
produce a limited surplus for the market or only to satisfy their family’s 
needs179. In fact, this has become an increasing norm in the past decade in 
particular, whereby desperate and poor farmers cease to produce one crop, 
and instead grow a variety so that if they are not bringing in income they are 
at least providing food for their family.  
I thus assert that this ‘return to the peasantry’ is alarming in terms of 
the inequality it represents and should be replaced by a ‘return to’ a 
specialisation, whereby farmers produce according to market demands, yet 
become more competitive by having the government assist in reducing their 
costs and recovering their lost productivity. If implemented this would result 
in the less competitive farmers starting to produce agricultural products that 
are not traditional but are demanded by the market, which should bring those 
individuals higher income.  
Nevertheless, the main goal and the fundamental principles drafted in 
the country’s development plan also represent its objectives regarding rural 
development, sustainable agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and need more 
than the implementation of a funding scheme such as the IPARD and the 
scant subsidies given by the Macedonian government. They need the close 
attention of government officials who are empowered to be concerned about 
the future of the country’s agricultural production and the livelihoods of the 
                                                 
179 Ian Bache, George Andreou, Gorica Atanasova and Danijel Tomsic. ‘Europeanization 
and multi-level governance in south-east Europe: the domestic impact of EU cohesion 
policy and pre-accession aid’. JEPP[2011]18, 1,122-141, 135 
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growers who comprise it. Unfortunately, as I refer to in this chapter and 
discuss in the following one on networks and survival, with personal 
enrichment and Rural Development Agency employee comments on the poor 
farmers of Demir Kapija, this is not the case at present.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is indeed a dilemma in the EU’s rural development 
strategy. On the one hand, it was the EC’s representative Gerrard Quille who 
stated ‘This is [just] the beginning for Macedonian farmers. Some of them 
are not used to the conditions [required] and they do not know exactly how to 
submit applications. Yet the number of rejected applications decreases every 
year’ (Angelovska 2011).  On the other hand, there is an evident tendency for 
the IPARD programme to support those who already have the finances to 
invest. Admittedly, this is potentially beneficial for the region and country in 
terms of increased income and capital, but the problem lies in the lack of 
redistribution and thus opportunity for lower-income, independent 
agriculturalists. They not only do not have the wherewithal and income to 
receive the IPARD’s funding, but they are subject to the demands of the rich 
and powerful—the politicians and wine mafia—who are left unchecked by 
the government and any form of regulation. 
I thus suggest that the EU, through the IPARD in this case, is using 
its muscle to change a much less-developed system than its own into the 
form it sees fit, but it is due to a cultural misunderstanding that Brussels 
policy-makers continue on this path. For the faith they invest in the 
Macedonian authorities to ensure equal opportunity in the IPARD funding 
process is in reality met on the ground by a cultural milieu whereby patron-
client and kinship relationships, and the power that comes through them, 
supersede institutional authority. The latter, which the EU is in part 
attempting to establish through the IPARD’s distribution of EU taxpayer 
money, is only one layer of Macedonia’s diverse social strata and the 
‘transcripts’ which play out through them. 
One issue that both sides of the spectrum face in Tikveš is the fact 
that the majority of registered farmers are older than 45 years of age, and 
statistically only seven percent of officially registered farmers are under 45 
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years-old (ibid)180. However, this without a doubt reflects another reality of 
the transition over the last decade: not only are younger Macedonians less 
inclined to go into agriculture, they have a visible disincentive in doing so. 
On top of this, agriculture has gone from being a viable, official occupation 
to being an occupation of last resort. Plots of land which are owned by the 
older generation of farmers have remained in their hands as a result, with 
their children only working the land because there is little other opportunity 
available. Indeed, including inherited land, less than a quarter of owned land 
belongs to these younger farmers. 
In terms of the IPARD, this creates a problem. It is the younger 
generation, working most of their adult lives after the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
who tend to have the inclination and dare I say ability to make changes and 
create opportunities for themselves in the region. This is evidenced by the 
fact that in 2010, only 13.5 percent of the IPARD’s applications came from 
those farmers younger than 45 years-old, but 64 percent of the approved 
projects were from those younger individuals (Angelovska 2010). Yet if 
interested applicants do not have their own land, then they are not qualified 
to apply for the IPARD funding unless they take their relative’s land under 
concession (pod naem). This helps explain why such a small percentage of 
the IPARD’s applications came from younger farmers and shows that, 
indeed, it is also administrative procedures and bureaucratic formalities 
which stand in the way of younger agriculturalists applying. 
The IPARD is attempting to modify Macedonia’s agricultural sector 
and conform it to EU standards but in doing so is, to borrow from the 
Macedonian saying, trying to ‘bury the vine and drink the wine’181. Said to 
those expecting too much, too fast, the EU may be guilty of not only aiming 
too high but missing the mark in terms of understanding what needs 
reforming in Macedonia. For it is not just the agricultural sector but the 
culture of bribery and corruption at the governmental, bureaucratic and 
judicial levels that needs reform and better regulation. Only addressing this 
                                                 
180 Although there are certainly more than seven percent of farmers under the age of 45, this 
statistic shows that agriculture has become less of an official occupation, and that 
individuals see little use in registering themselves as farmers. It is thus not uncommon to 
see farmers driving tractors with Yugoslav era registration plates on them. 
181 Bucni prčka, pij vino 
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will help ensure agriculturalists such as the grape growers of Tikveš a more 
equitable livelihood and future. In the meantime, however, life goes on and 
grape growing communities must adapt to the system as it transitions. This 
































‘Not living, just surviving’: calling upon entrepreneurship, 




The crisis (kriza) that privatisation has caused in the Tikveš region is 
significant, and my research project has sought to understand and address the 
effects of this transformation. Yet my fieldwork has not been only an attempt 
at documenting the transition but the local responses to it as well. Indeed, in 
observing ongoing changes during my residence in Tikveš, I have seen how 
individuals and families have been forced to continuously re-evaluate their 
circumstances, not only in terms of their income and what they are able to 
consume but in what they have been forced to produce for themselves. This 
situation has led some to entrepreneurship, others to an often tense 
competition for resources, and many to various forms of reciprocity.  
 In this chapter, I therefore present further ethnographic vignettes which 
speak to the ways individuals have adapted to the transition and how society 
as a whole has changed. In doing so, I discuss the methods of not only 
adaptation but for some, survival. Graffiti in Kavadarci such as ‘I’m not 
living, just surviving’ and ‘I haven’t eaten like a man in years’182 serve to 
reflect the region’s situation, which is indeed dire for many. Further, such 
statements lend weight to claims of the transition as a katastrofa, so often 
uttered in response to questions about privatisation and various changes in 
recent years. This has not only been said by grape growers about their losses 
but by numerous others: an older retired couple who have to provide for 
three generations because their grown children cannot find work, and their 
grandchildren are still going through their schooling; by women in a shop in 
the small Tikveš town of Rosoman, whose peach production (discussed later 
in this chapter) was hoped to be the region’s saving grace; by an employee in 
a pastry shop who has seen her benefits and pay cut as the government 
                                                 
182 In Macedonian: ‘ne živeam, preživeam’ and ‘ne sum jadel kako čovek vo godini’, 
respectively.  
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deregulates labour and healthcare. Although use of the term katastrofa has 
undoubtedly been a catchphrase in local discourse for some years now, it 
serves as an indicator of the general mood in the region. In fact, few ever 
claim that their life is better now than before nor that their overall standard of 
living has improved.   
What such individuals are dealing with is what Marx (1992, p809) 
referred to as ‘the dull compulsion of economic relations’—the daily 
imperative of earning a living and surviving. Industrialisation, of course, 
sought to shift the extent to which people had to fight for their survival, 
which makes it worth highlighting how the transition is not only the result of 
privatisation but a de-industrialisation at the national and local level. 
Whereas the socially owned enterprises183 of the Yugoslav era were meant to 
not only modernise society but to employ its local populace, the profit and 
consolidation oriented aspect of neoliberalism discussed in previous chapters 
is incompatible with notions of redistribution and equality184. Consequently, 
it is through family members and other close affiliates that individuals are 
able to make ends meet. 
   I therefore discuss here not only the variety of opportunities that grape 
growers and others are making for themselves, but the ‘economy of favours’ 
(Ledeneva 1998) and forms of network utilisation and reciprocity at work in 
Tikveš. I further explain such circumstances and forms of adaptation, 
including some of the success stories, because altogether these help to 
alleviate the economic and psychological constraints imposed in recent years. 
However, I argue that survival comes down to a few things: flexibility and a 
willingness to take risk, as well as kin ties and the connections they afford. 
To illustrate the recent circumstances of some of the inhabitants of Tikveš, I 
begin with an ethnographic vignette from a village I visited in spring 2011.  
 
Terror and survival in the village of Dolni Disan 
Sitting on a hillside looking down at what once was a Turkish village, the 
minaret of a mosque below me still stood yet the structure of the building 
                                                 
183 Such as kombinati, discussed in the thesis Introduction and Chapter 3. 
184 This inequality lends to the crisis in state legitimacy addressed in Chapter 4. Or as the 
economist Nouriel Roubini (2011) said, ‘Any economic model that does not properly 
address inequality will eventually face a crisis of legitimacy’. 
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itself had fallen in. Grass and small shrubs grew wild on the property, next to 
which was a Muslim cemetery. The headstones, mostly fallen over, were all 
engraved with fading Arabic script—the winds of time washing away 
history. Indeed, the mosque and its centrally located property seemed 
undisturbed and left to the elements. However, as I learned while in Dolni 
Disan, a village near to the large town of Negotino in the heart of Tikveš, the 
Turkish inhabitants there did not leave until industrial, ‘south Slav’ 
(Jugoslav) socialism came full force in the early 1950s.  
From the hilltop I sat and watched the village, enjoying the simple 
sound of people at work and an absence of cars. A donkey whinnied as it 
rolled around below me at the foot of the hill, taking some loose stones with 
him. Families from the houses nearby were busy cutting wood, tilling their 
gardens, re-arranging things; one old man, very hunch-backed, yelled at his 
teenage grandson who was climbing on the roof of the house to fix the TV 
antenna. The youth was determined and disregarded his grandfather, who 
was stumbling around the house and cursing as loud as he could for a good 
minute. It was quite entertaining, and in the end the old man wandered back 
to his garden, defeated by the youth’s insistence. I descended and made my 
way down the road.  
Upon entering the village it did not take more than a couple of 
minutes to be stared down by some older ladies, whom I approached to make 
their acquaintance. I told them who I was and what I was doing, and just 
stood casually speaking to them for a while. One sat ten feet back in her 
garden while the other was standing at the gate with me, apparently watching 
for something or someone in a village where not much happens. Both were 
likely in their late 40s to early 50s, and smoked while we spoke. Once they 
felt comfortable with me, they welcomed me into the garden for Turkish 
coffee.  
In conversing about the region and grape production, they said that 
there is no longer any pleasure (merak) in working when you have not been 
paid in years. It is all ‘a loss’ (za dzabe) and the state is to blame, they 
claimed. ‘They don’t intervene, they don’t provide like they used to’, the 
woman named Dragica said. ‘We work for Skopje—there’s plenty of money 
in Skopje, this country, and they’re using it to build statues and lions…and 
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stealing the rest! Everyone steals there and in the government now’185. When 
I asked though whether the local Negotino municipality was doing anything 
for them, they said ‘no, no, they only take’. Certainly they do not do much in 
terms of visible infrastructure, as the road to Dolni Disan was riddled with 
potholes, and as I learned later has not been repaved since it was first laid 35 
years ago. Rubbish is strewn everywhere, particularly off the road outside of 
town—a mini, impromptu landfill.  
Hearing of their displeasure with grape growing and governance, I 
asked why they do not just dig up their vineyards and plant something else. 
They replied that it was because they need permission—they cannot just dig 
them up. Having never heard this, I asked for clarification, and they stated 
that they need permission and if they do not get it or they stop tending their 
land then they may have it confiscated. This is because Dolni Disan was 
home to one of the semi-collective kombinati during socialist Yugoslavia, 
and as a small community many still have a relationship with it. Even if the 
land they tend to is now their own and the kombinat has been privatised, the 
tools and machinery used by many growers today are still owned by the 
enterprise and the land is meant to be cultured for vineyards and grape 
production only. Thus as a whole, they are unable to shift their agricultural 
production, as so many others in Tikveš have done.  
The house where I sat belonged to Dragica, who was originally from 
Dolni Disan but married a (now deceased) man from Skopje. She spends the 
fall and winter in the capital, returning to Tikveš for the spring and summer. 
She has a large garden in the village, one part covered with a greenhouse and 
the other tilled for planting a variety of vegetables. As we spoke about her 
situation, she said that financially she was getting by and that she does not 
depend on her family’s vineyards but only works them as an old pastime, to 
make brandy for her friends and family in the capital. Otherwise, she lives 
off her late husband’s pension.  
                                                 
185 They were referring to the government’s ‘Skopje 2014’ project, which quickly set about 
renovating and rebuilding the capital’s centre in 2010 to supposedly look like it did a 
century ago—in Baroque style—but with a theme park entourage of national historical 
characters and other statues. Its price tag is estimated to be some 350m euros. See the thesis 
Conclusion for a further discussion of Skopje 2014 as it relates to shifting identity, and for 
an analysis of the project and its background in the context of the nation’s brand-image, see 
Graan (2013). 
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The other woman, Stojanka, spoke of tougher times. A little younger, 
she has two teenagers and she and her husband, Blažo, are solely lozari—
grape growers. They earn no income other than what they make from their 
grapes and had not received their due pay in two years. Like many growers, 
they had sold their grapes to the notorious Dzumajlija Winery (see Chapter 
4) two years prior, but receiving no payment for them, knew better than to do 
so the following year. But by then other wineries were catching on to this 
trend to delay paying growers, and the large and local Povardarie Winery to 
whom they sold their grapes in 2010 had not paid them either.  
I asked them how they survived, and they said that somehow they 
manage. They grow their own vegetables at their house, including a plot of 
potatoes, and seem to draw on money from elsewhere—a phenomenon I 
have sensed many times but information which is not readily disclosed. 
Further information came though when Stojanka’s husband, Blažo, came 
over, followed by his brother Kole with his wife, jumping off of their tractor 
as they passed by on the way to the vineyards. The Atanasovski family, as 
they were called, were curious to see who this stranger sitting in Dragica’s 
garden was.  
Kole, Blažo’s younger brother, was an energetic and good spirited 
individual, and when I spoke to him he enthusiastically told me about his 
work. Like his brother he is a professional lozar yet he and his wife 
predominantly grow table grapes given the higher price they receive. They 
have not got any particular buyer, such as the former kombinat in Dolni 
Disan, but buyers (including Albanians) come from around the country for 
the late summer harvest. Further, Kole and his wife take their grapes to 
markets throughout the region to sell them.   
While drinking an anise flavoured brandy, mastika, with the brothers 
Atanasovski, I was told that the land around Dolni Disan is some of the best 
in Europe for vineyards—the hillsides, soil and elevated climate of the 
‘Belgrad’ area in particular, on which they each have a sizable five hectares 
of land186. Although Blažo’s and Kole’s pride in their village and work was 
                                                 
186 Their statement was bold but backed by historical record—Belgrad produced the most 
grapes in the region according to Ottoman tax records in the 19th century (Kamčevski 2007), 
and a famous folk song sings of its rich earth and wine. The lack of wind as well as the low 
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apparent, it was dampened by the downturn in the industry, so I inquired 
what they did to make ends meet. Obviously Kole has some disposable 
income given the effort he put into selling his crop around the country, but 
Blažo said that with a daughter studying medicine in Skopje and the need to 
maintain his vineyards, it takes ten thousand euros a year to support a family 
and he is not able to provide it. Yet like Stojanka, they gave vague answers 
regarding how they survive—‘somehow we do’, they said. They find enough 
income ‘for bread’ (za leb, a common expression), knowing that they ‘only 
have 200 euros but spend 300 a month’, as Blažo stated.  
They blame the state for their plight, and the conversation was 
interlaced with mentions of figurative theft, a lack of trust, and how people, 
politicians and businessmen are all stealing. Ironically, they speak of 
themselves in the village as a good people (narod) yet no one else is to be 
trusted. Dragica said though that this conversation could not happen in 
Skopje—‘people can’t sit out in the open and discuss such things, the mafia 
is strong’. I asked ‘because of the vinska mafija?’ and she said ‘yes, yes, it’s 
terror (teror)’. I never heard the word terror associated with the supposed 
wine mafia otherwise, but I do not discredit the notion that there really is 
such fear and anger pervasive in Macedonian society. The state again rules 
supreme but in contrast to socialism, the power structure neglects concern for 
the people and serves private interests—the many government apparatchiks, 
or their friends and family who manage the country’s private sector. 
The tension was apparent on several occasions during my fieldwork, 
with these informants and so many others tapping their legs, pacing around 
smoking, speaking in exclamation. Blažo eventually seemed bothered 
enough with the topic that he just got up and left, saying he needed to work 
in the vineyards. Indeed, with land to work but little outside connection 
otherwise, growers just carry on not knowing what better to do. The 
businessmen running the game know this, and that is why they can get away 
with what is illicit if not criminal behaviour.  
                                                                                                                                            
acidity in the soil makes for such high quality grapes. As I heard at the village’s former 
kombinat turned ‘Venec Winery’ a bit later on, the Vranec grape variety around Dolni Disan 
is naturally 25-28 brix sugar content. This is very high, and thus they can produce a sweet 
medicinal wine from it, another beverage that is sold in regional markets. 
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Leaving Dolni Disan that day, it was incredible to see how people 
continue to labour in the vineyards. They rightly complain about the situation 
yet go on working—out of habit, hope and obligation. It is what they know 
and have done for so long—perhaps a ‘dull compulsion’ indeed—yet they 
claim that few other opportunities exist. While I assert in Chapter 5 and 
continue here that growers, among others, have not been sufficiently 
incentivised and indoctrinated into the new system, I am aware of several 
individuals who have found opportunity in the era of the free market and 
discuss those below. 
 
Surviving the transition, returning to the peasantry: growing 
individualism and entrepreneurship in Tikveš 
Dolni Disan was like many villages I visited during my fieldwork. 
Regardless of location, the ability to draw on income from elsewhere and 
‘only have 200 euros but spend 300 a month’ was evident. I know 
Macedonians are clever economically—‘Homo Economicus Balkanicus’, a 
Macedonian friend of mine coined—living thriftily and stashing income 
away for future weddings, events and unanticipated hard times. Yet in Tikveš 
much of this income comes literally from the ‘fruits of their labour’. While 
walking one will see that much of the land is cultivated, and the produce is 
diverse and plentiful—fruits and vegetables with melons, grapes, peaches, 
plums, apples; peppers, tomatoes, potatoes, onions, cucumbers. It is from this 
and hard work that people are able to get by.  
Indeed not long after my visit to Dolni Disan I was in the village of 
Temjanik and spoke to a family of growers. They had a sizable six hectares 
of vineyards, half of them table grapes and the other half grapes for wine. For 
the latter there is only sorrow over their inability to sell them, but for the 
table grapes the woman said ‘thank God that Albanians come and buy our 
grapes’. Given the long and recent history of tension and conflict with the 
country’s ethnic Albanian population (with an inter-ethnic conflict in the 
northwest of the country in 2001), this was somewhat surprising to hear. Yet 
the crisis has in fact spawned an inclination to sell grapes, brandy or any 
other locally produced good to anyone willing to buy—evidence of business 
taking precedence over ethnicity. Several individuals I knew were therefore 
 194 
taking their grapes and brandy (albeit illegally) to sell in other towns in 
western Macedonia and Kosovo, thus largely Albanian ones, and glad when 
Albanians came to Tikveš to buy. As one neighbour said of selling to them: 
‘they pay the asking price, and in cash right away’.  
Another example of an entrepreneurial individual comes from a 
neighbour in Kavadarci, Mitko. He began growing table grapes several years 
ago and is said to have some of the best in town. He is thus able to command 
a high price for them, and being an industrious and driven individual, takes 
his grapes to market himself (to avoid the losses that selling to a middleman 
trader or wholesale buyer brings187). Despite incurring expenses and taking 
risks in doing so—namely through travelling and hauling his crop, he 
reported to me significant profits from his labour and efforts. I asked how 
much he earns from his grapes in comparison to his full-time day job (as a 
hotel caretaker, where he earns just over 2,000 euros annually), and he 
replied that minus expenses—500 euros for tractor fuel and fertilizer—he 
earns nearly 6,000 euros from his sale of his grapes and brandy. Thus in total 
he earns 8,000 euros per year, which is a reasonable salary off of which to 
live in Kavadarci.  
As an ambitious individual, however, he was not resting on his 
laurels but investing in his vineyards to increase and improve his grape 
production. Having gone with him to his vineyards on a hilltop several 
kilometres outside of town, I saw how he had to haul tanks of river water a 
kilometre up from the main road on his tractor and drain them into concrete 
basins above his vineyards. These existed because he was in the process of 
installing the drop-by-drop system through which the water is then dispersed 
throughout the vineyards. He showed me the benefits of this by pushing a 
pole a foot into the ground—a feat not possible in the dry earth around the 
vineyard. The following year he was intending to finish off his investment by 
installing a piping system that would bring water up to the vineyard’s basins 
from the local river—at a total cost of over 6,000 euros.  
                                                 
187 In general, traders (trgovci) will only pay one-third to one-half the value of table grapes, 
and this depends on where they will sell them. In Tikveš, such grapes will be sold at 
markets for half a euro per kilogram, but in other cities and towns in the country the price 
may be more than double this.  
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I wish to emphasise though that Mitko is one of the most energetic 50 
year-olds I have ever met. He jogs through his vineyards while working, 
jumps from his tractor to the cisterns, then to the ground another metre and a 
half below. He does everything with intent and focus, which makes it 
imperative to realise that behaviour is just as diverse in Tikveš among 
agriculturalists as it is among people anywhere else. That is, Macedonians 
might often move slowly and state that others should ‘slow down’, but not all 
do. Indeed, I met many, mostly younger entrepreneurial individuals who 
brought to light the other side of Macedonian society that has been fostered 
in the last two decades: the ‘return to the peasantry’ on the one hand, but to 
the rugged, competitive individual as well.  
Included in his 6,000 euro income from grapes, Mitko was selling his 
rakija brandy for over two euros per litre in the western Macedonian towns 
of Gostivar and Kičevo—a price that is far higher than that commanded in 
Tikveš, where one will often be given a bottle of brandy when visiting nearly 
any household as a guest, and many families have barrels of it in their cellars. 
Indeed, the resulting ‘flood’ of homemade grape brandy and increased 
demand for quality grapes has been a boon to some—when only good grapes 
go to the wineries, the others are made into brandy. Further, the negative 
publicity from the crisis in Tikveš has caused a new interest in the region’s 
liquor, with demand for it increasing along with its quantity despite the 
overall pricing (elsewhere in the country) staying similar to years prior. This 
example of supply side economics188 was mentioned to me by a couple of 
individuals who were profiting off of selling their brandy or transporting it 
for others; despite the increased quantities of it in the region, they were able 
to sell more in the capital and elsewhere than previously—no doubt to the 
annoyance of the wineries such as Tikveš, whose 0.75 litre bottles sell for the 
significantly higher price of seven to eight euros.  
 While agriculture remains the predominant form of work for most, 
some local individuals were exploring new markets. One niche opportunity 
that opened up, for example, was in used automobiles. With families unable 
to buy a new car because of decreasing income and increasing new car 
                                                 
188 Supply side economics holds that consumers benefit from lower prices and consume 
more when supply of a given product is greater.  
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prices, one younger acquaintance, Igor, and a group of friends set up an 
imported car business. Together, they flew to Germany or Austria, purchased 
used cars (usually at least a decade old) and then drove them back to 
Macedonia. They paid all fees associated with importing the vehicles, 
including for a Europol background check on them, and were required to 
register them in their names. If they had a buyer already then the car was sold 
immediately, but if they did not then the cars were kept in an empty lot on 
the edge of town. Despite the costs in importing the vehicles, they were able 
to then sell them and generally make 300-500 euros profit on each. Given 
that the former is the average monthly salary in Macedonia, if they could sell 
even a couple of vehicles per month then they were making above average 
income. Furthermore, Igor is a barber by trade and has his own shop in the 
town centre, where he earns 100 MKD (1.60 EUR) per haircut. Thus on a 
busy day he and the young barber he employs may bring in up to fifty euros 
income from cutting hair. 
There are indeed several such individuals who are creating income 
for themselves as entrepreneurs, with no help from the government or 
companies. Conversely though, there are others who seek to adapt and 
increase their income but do so with staple agricultural products, from 
tomatoes to potatoes, and there was a boon in such production during my 
stay in Tikveš. In peasant society fashion, this production helps families to 
feed themselves when their income is low, and many have tried to sell their 
surplus, causing the town markets to swell with sellers plying their tomato, 
potato, pepper, or cucumber crop. Such an increase in the number of sellers 
on the streets outside of the market has begun to cause problems for traffic, 
the licensed sellers within, as well as the municipality which regulates the 
‘pazar’. Yet despite fining some of sellers, the latter persist in trying to earn 
a living off of their agricultural labour.  
Potato production is particularly unique though, as seeking to counter 
the socialist era potato producers from the mountainous east of Macedonia in 
an area called Berovo, agriculturalists in Tikveš have been replacing 
vineyards and other crops with the root vegetable. However, the problem is 
that increased supply will not affect consumption but may in fact drive price 
down. For example, a man named Dragan in the village of Pepelište began 
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selling to a supplier in the city of Prilep in 2011. Yet he was also going there 
and selling his potatoes himself, so they got to the local market in two ways 
but regardless they went for a low price—10 MKD (0.16 EUR) per kilogram, 
he reported. Interestingly, he’s doing what plenty of large global businesses 
do to increase sales—sell through other suppliers and directly to the 
customer. 
Another less profitable but positive example of surviving the 
transition came from one of many visits to my mother-in-law’s ancestral 
village, Begnište. A beautiful village tucked away in the hills above Lake 
Tikveš several miles outside of town, the village numbers dwindled 
throughout the 20th century and, as I wrote about in Chapter 4, its inhabitants 
feel neglected by the state. However, the couple I came to know there, Vesna 
and Pero, were in fact satisfied with their livelihood, and glad to work the 
land and breathe the fresh air rather than idle in town in unemployment 
limbo. Although Pero is from the village originally, there have been several 
instances of individuals moving back to villages such as Begnište in order to 
live off of the land.  
On one occasion I showed up in Begnište spontaneously, and despite 
the fact that Vesna and Pero were hosting friends from the capital, they 
welcomed me in to join them for meze. Incidentally, the visiting friends 
played a role in the couple’s brandy selling, distributing their rakija in 
Skopje. Vesna and Pero sold it to their friends for just over a euro and a half 
per litre (100 MKD), but their friends then made another half a euro per litre 
when selling it in the capital. I asked about how things were going though 
compared to the year before, to which they replied ‘the same—a kilo of 
grapes cost less than one egg, and that’s if you get paid for them!’ They 
added though that they have no interest in supporting the vinska mafija in 
their ‘business’ by selling them grapes for 5-10 MKD per kilo, only to see 
the wine sold for anywhere from 10-20 times that, so were glad to produce 
brandy with their crop.  
Having just returned from work that day, Pero discussed his situation. 
He works the fields for the Goce Delčev plantation, a formally state-owned, 
100 hectare vineyard. It used to be part of the Tikveš kombinat (now Tikveš 
Winery) holdings, but was sold in the late 1990s. Regardless, Pero began 
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working there in his 20s, and has worked that and his own land as a 
professional farmer ever since. Yet he lamented his labour for the plantation, 
stating that he earns just 7000 MKD (115 EUR) per month, so subsidises his 
income with the grapes and rakija from their two hectares of land. In fact, 
Vesna and Pero produce ten barrels of brandy, bringing them significant 
additional income: if one barrel contains roughly 150 litres, which they can 
sell for some 225 euros, then ten barrels would net them over 2,000 euros. 
Although this brings their annual income to approximately 3,500 euros (far 
less than Mitko, for example), their expenses are minimal and certainly less 
than someone in Kavadarci where property taxes, groceries, and the like are 
more expensive. Instead, they grow their own tomatoes, peppers, beets, 
onions, potatoes, melons and corn on the land around their village house, and 
preserve much of it for winter. Consequently, they only need to purchase 
dairy, flour (for bread) and meat. It is unusual that they do not have any 
chickens or a pig, so do not reap the benefits of such livestock, but they do 
fish in the lake and while I was there Vesna was preparing some freshly 
caught fish from that morning. Their expenses are thus very minimal: they 
estimated 100 EUR per month for utilities, pesticides for their grapes, and the 
foodstuffs they buy.  
It is worth mentioning though the value of a true ‘piggy-bank’ in 
Tikveš, in the sense of raising swine at home. From my first month in 
Macedonia in 2002 (when I lived with my host family) throughout my 
residence in the country, I have taken notice of the number of families—
particularly in villages—who raise swine for pork production. A family will 
usually only have one or two pigs, but since piglets are for sale at bi-annual 
agricultural markets (panaguri) for 50-60 euros, their ultimate yield in terms 
of meat makes them a worthwhile investment: they grow throughout the year 
and are butchered in early winter. Nearly all parts of the animal are used, 
including the swine’s meat, fat, organs, intestines and even brain, and the 
preparation of specialties involving these is celebrated. 
Regardless, families throughout Tikveš are dealing with similar 
conditions of limited employment and salaried work, and must therefore 
adapt to their circumstances. One family member may possess full-time work 
or a pension, but many are living off of the land. From the villages near 
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Kavadarci to those around Negotino, there has been a return to both 
sustenance-based food production and a self (rather than state) driven mode 
of living. This is what I mean by a ‘return to the peasantry’, where the 
peasantry is a base form of production and consumption, with merchants and 
professionals earning and consuming solely on cash income having departed 
from such a status, even if they interact in the same economy as the more 
self-sustaining and farming ‘peasants’189.  
For example, the father of a young neighbour who owns a boutique 
on the corner returned to his village between Kavadarci and Negotino to live 
and grow crops in the garden of an old family home. Further examples of 
such self-production range from the growing of staple crops and trying to sell 
them at regional markets or on roadsides, to growing less common niche 
products (peaches, asparagus, kiwis, raspberries), to seeing a resurgence in 
tending to flocks of sheep, cows and goats for dairy and meat production. 
The annihilation of the latter was in fact a devastating blow to the livelihoods 
and traditions of many at the incipience of socialism in the SFR Yugoslavia. 
I was told this by a kin-neighbour whose family’s flocks of over a thousand 
head were slaughtered and not allowed to be replaced. Although her father 
was given employment with the state instead, the large plateau above 
Kavadarci, Vitač—famous for its grazing fields in the past and which is 
seeing a resurgence in its utilisation as such—was taken over by the region’s 
ferro-nickel operation, Feni Industries. Although the main facility is down in 
the valley below, ‘Feni’, as it is known, still has an elevated and covered 
metre wide, five mile long conveyer belt that runs across the plateau to bring 
metals down from the company’s mines in the Kožuf mountains.  
Feni, however, cannot go without further mention in this chapter or 
thesis. Its name dons the Kavadarci municipality, and many would agree that 
in reality Kavadarci is not just a ‘wine town’ (vinski grad) but a ‘metals 
town’ (grad na metali). For there is also a large metals supplier on the edge 
of town, IGM, and Feni in particular holds significant clout, employing over 
three thousand individuals in Tikveš (though mostly from Kavadarci and 
surrounding villages) as well as the region to the east, where it owns a mine 
                                                 
189 See the thesis Introduction for a lengthier discussion of peasant theory. 
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near the city of Štip. As a site manager there, my wife’s uncle makes the 
commute to Štip six days a week, leaving at 5am on the company’s employee 
bus and not returning until 7pm. He, like many, are overworked and 
underpaid for their labour but see few other opportunities. For although 
privatised and owned by an Anglo-Israeli consortium, Feni has grown in 
recent years, as has its pollution and power. Indeed, insiders know that the 
Mayor and other politicians are paid off by Feni, and an acquaintance who 
drives a truck at the facility said how it is only cleaned up and filters used 
when inspectors—who give advance warning of their arrival—come to visit. 
To local inhabitants this is obvious though: there is a red cloud visible from 
Kavadarci that hangs over the valley where Feni sits, and many claim that 
increased cancer and health issues are resulting from the unregulated nickel 
dust in the air and on the crops (including significant acreage of vineyards). 
Yet bringing in metals from all corners of the world for smelting, the 
operation is incredibly profitable and one will occasionally see in town the 
foreign engineers and managers (mostly Israelis and Indians) who run the 
finer details of things. They earn handsomely, but I am not aware of any 
Macedonian working for them who earns more than 300 euros income per 
month.    
Feni constitutes one aspect of the region’s change, but I shall now 
turn to another town whose crop lies under the cloud of nickel dust yet whose 
farmers have turned en masse to a fruit they hoped would be their saving 
grace, and to some extent has been. 
 
Peaches and cream? The Rosoman peach market 
The boon in peach production began in the small town of Rosoman (pop. 
4,150) to the north of Kavadarci, and during my fieldwork peach orchards 
were replacing vineyards in some places and being seen as a saviour to the 
region’s viticulture crisis. Although some farmers in Rosoman have been 
growing peaches for decades given the decreased demand for grapes 
combined with an increased demand and price for peaches, the majority of 
Rosoman growers began replacing their vineyards with peach orchards in 
and after 2005. While investment in the young saplings is significant, 
including the time it takes for a tree to yield fruit (two to three years), the 
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initial profits from peach production had been proving worthwhile in 
Rosoman. Until 2010, peach producers were often able to sell their crop for 
up to half a euro per kilogram at local markets and to produce traders, who 
transported and sold the crop for far more in Ukraine and Russia. Indeed, at 
the commencement of my fieldwork in late 2010 locals were continuing to 
plant more orchards, and as their Mayor said in an interview on the local 
Kavadarci TV channel (KTV) late that winter ‘soon enough there will not be 
a family without peaches’190. 
As the Mayor added, Rosoman claims to produce one percent of the 
world’s peaches and given an ideal climate for peach cultivation, was 
producing beyond its expectations. In addition, sophisticated producers and 
wholesalers there were making significant investments in the peach industry: 
by 2011 there were 14 refrigerated facilities (similar to those of Ovošje 
Komerc in Chapter 5) in which to store the fruit. Such facilities not only 
allow for the slower distribution of the crop, but they prevent surplus 
dumping and the decreased prices that flooding the market causes (over a 
short period of time). Instead, refrigeration combined with a lengthier harvest 
season than grapes offers producers and/or merchants involved in the peach 
industry a longer distribution period with higher prices.  
Rosoman has therefore successfully shifted its production in the past 
decade from primarily grapes to peaches, a transition which has been a boon 
for the town. Other farmers have consequently sought to get in on the 
business but in doing so have created a market surplus, and brought the 
attention of traders keen on getting their share of the profits. What I 
witnessed in the town when I visited was thus less positive than I had 
expected: peach growers were subject to afternoon long negotiations with 
buyers and traders from other towns in the country, in the end being paid half 
the price they had received in years prior. As I discuss below, the family with 
whom I spent one afternoon observing such negotiations had travelled ten 
kilometres by tractor, and when underpaid for their crop left angry and upset.  
As an example, in July 2011 I spent a day in Rosoman in order to 
learn more about the shift in purchasing that was occurring. I arrived early to 
                                                 
190 KTV Vesti, 14 March, 2011. 
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have coffee in a café and get oriented, but discovered that my voice 
recorder’s batteries had died so entered a shop to purchase new ones. After 
answering the cashiers inquiry as to why I was in Rosoman, I asked how 
things were going in their opinion. Surprisingly, given that the market for 
peaches had been reportedly excellent just the year prior, they immediately 
replied ‘katastrofa’. As I was used to hearing this term only regarding the 
wine industry and standard of living for grape growers, I sought clarification. 
The ladies thus added, saying ‘it’s just not going (ne odi) and the price is 
down; the peaches are pretty much free’. They referred to a Serbian-run 
buying station just across the road from their shop that was buying soft, 
mushy peaches for juice production for 5 MKD (.08 EUR) per kilogram, and 
only paying 15 MKD (.25 EUR) maximum for quality peaches 191.  
 After hearing this, I headed to the agricultural market-place (kvantaški 
pazar) in Rosoman, where producers sell in bulk, to see who I could sit with 
in order to gain a better understanding of the situation. I met a peach farmer 
named Zoran along with his wife, Stefanka, who had come nearly an hour by 
tractor from their village near Kavadarci to sell their crop. With two teenage 
sons, they were farmers and worked nothing else, so had a large trailer half-
full of peaches to sell. Their crop was only average in quality but as I had 
heard at the café, the price would drop by afternoon as producers sought to 
unload their goods, thus Zoran and Stefanka were keen to make an early sale.  
Yet what began as a price of 20 MKD (.33 EUR) fell after an hour. 
Given the informal way of doing business, I did not realise at first that a man 
sitting with them was a buyer from the city of Prilep who was talking them 
down. He was therefore not only distracting them from other potential 
buyers, but slowly bringing down the price through his presence, 
conversation and comments about pricing. He would say things such as 
‘you’ll be lucky to get 20 MKD for those’, but not making any direct offers 
                                                 
191 It is an unfortunate reality and legacy of Yugoslav socialism that much of Macedonia’s 
fruit meant for juice production is sold to Serbian buyers at incredibly low prices, taken to 
Serbia for production and packaging, and then imported back into Macedonia and sold for 
up to one euro per litre on grocery store shelves. One of the ladies lamented in this case that 
in addition to Macedonian and Serb traders, it is ‘šiptari’—a pejorative term for Albanians—




himself. His tactic was effective though, and after another hour Zoran and 
Stefanka began negotiating to sell their crop to him.  
Shortly thereafter the buyer’s sons and their large van (kombi) 
showed up, and although Zoran and Stefanka had already begun packing the 
peaches into crates, the buyer continued haggling with them as the fruit was 
loaded. Ultimately, 30 crates of peaches were sold to the buyer at 120 MKD 
(2 EUR) each. Where one crate holds ten kilograms of fruit, this means that 
the peaches sold for only 12 MKD (.23 EUR) per kilogram. And what of the 
wood crates, which cost up to 100 MKD on their own? The buyer gave them 
a dozen or so that he had but then took them back along with Zoran’s and 
Stefanka’s crates, thus depriving them of another dozen and half crates that 
they had brought along, which by their calculations were valued at 30 euros. 
In the end, the buyer paid 60 EUR for the produce, but of course this does 
not include the loss to Zoran and Stefanka in terms of crates, petrol for their 
tractor, and the time and cost for producing those crops. While Zoran said 
afterward that they had earned 40 euros earlier in the morning on selling the 
other part of the crop, he left angry.  
Irritated by the transaction, the couple quickly told me how traders 
similar to the Prilep buyer sit with sellers to break them down so that they 
eventually dump their crop for a lesser price. I could in fact sense the 
trepidation in the whole event while it unfolded, and as soon as the sale was 
complete they mounted their tractor to head home. I rode with them to the 
edge of town, and despite the sour business transaction, Zoran commended 
locals in Rosoman (Rosomani) for being hard working and business oriented. 
The unfortunate fact, in his opinion, was that he had little choice where to 
sell his crop, despite the fact that peaches sell for a euro a kilo at least in 
town markets (pazari) and may sell for several euros abroad. All the while 
growers are getting 15-20 MKD at best, and Zoran only got 12 MKD per 
kilogram—a very poor price, particularly given recent years’ prices. Zoran’s 
rationale though was that he is not a market seller (pazardzija), Rosoman is 
the region’s only official peach trading market, and it was better to earn 100 
euros in total for the day’s crop than to drive them back to his village. 
The picture that was painted for me of the peach market thus 
contrasted greatly with what I had expected and heard just the year prior, but 
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before leaving Rosoman I sat and had another espresso. Conversing with the 
server I had met that morning, several growers ended up coming around to 
join us. One had five hectares of peach trees, another just one. They spoke 
about the Mayor and buyers in town as the ‘mafia’, the ones who were 
making sure that certain buyers do not enter and that the prices get driven 
down by those who are welcomed. An investigation into the connections 
implied in their statements would yield further insight, but in their opinion 
the money the growers are no longer getting is going to the Mayor and local 
power players, similar to the grape industry. Indeed, in light of the vinska 
mafija, the growers half-joked of a ‘peach mafia’ (praska mafija). Therefore, 
for peach growers the situation is worse than it had been and there are 
significantly more gripes than before. Regardless, after that year the 
combination of an overproduction of peaches with persistent negotiators as 
purchasers was driving supply up and price down, and destroying hopes of 
the peach market as a saving grace for agriculturalists elsewhere in Tikveš. 
 
Kin & komšii: levelling mechanisms, reciprocity and economies of 
favour 
In this section I turn to the value of kin ties, and the connections that 
individuals within such networks maintain. For if it has not been evident, 
most work and socialising is done with kin who are often neighbours. I 
therefore elaborate here on how individuals are surviving this transition by 
maintaining close ‘kin-neighbour’ relations. In doing so they help to ensure 
connectedness, redistribute wealth and thus mitigate and alleviate financial 
and social burdens. As relations of reciprocity exist among neighbour-
relatives that are often manifested through the practice of frequent visiting 
and non-monetary exchange, I argue that in the current situation of economic 
hardship and growing inequality people call upon these relationships out of 
necessity more than they did in the recent past (when employment and 
financial security were more prevalent). Furthermore, I assert that reciprocity 
becomes less equal as some fare better than others in the new economic 
climate, and more frequent requests arguably create tension that people try to 
conceal in order to maintain the public image of harmony. Given the theme 
of this thesis, I begin by discussing reciprocity in the region’s grape harvest 
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in order to better understand the shared time, labour and resources among 
local grape producing families. I then address the growing inequality in the 
neighbourhood (komšiluk) in which I lived, and how reciprocity creates 
tension but may help ameliorate the effects of the ‘catastrophic crisis’.  
Of all wine-growing enterprises, reciprocal labour exchange is most 
intensively practiced during the grape harvest (berbata). From the middle of 
August and into October, all available family labour is mobilised to pick 
grapes. Many vineyards utilise hired labour during this period of time, but 
smaller ones—of one to two hectares—call upon only the labour of 
household members and other kin. Wives, siblings, children and in-laws are 
all recruited to assist with the laborious but time sensitive harvest, and this 
work is without any sort of direct monetary compensation. In partnership, 
kin-related households—all of which have their own vineyards requiring 
attention and which are usually run autonomously—work together during the 
harvest. When hired labour is incorporated as well, then there is a ‘self-
exploitation’ (Chayanov 1966) whereby all labourers work together despite 
the fact that the non-kin labour are being paid.  
 The mobilisation of family labour is not always available, however, as 
kin ties and resources go both ways and vineyards may need harvesting at the 
same time. Grape growing households thus act simultaneously as both 
employers and employees, and such informal work and lack of monetary 
compensation constitutes a significant micro-economy of its own. For 
manual labour and the homemade products produced through the grape 
harvest—namely brandy—bind the growers and their families in networks of 
reciprocity which not only allow them to exist but to better survive difficult 
times. For example, in August 2011 one family’s vineyards had been all but 
destroyed by a late summer hail (grat) storm—a common enough occurrence 
that many vineyard owners will have insurance against it. However, this 
grower did not and thus he and his immediate family stood to lose 
significantly given their devastated crop. By being bound into a kin network 
though, he and his wife worked with their siblings and one of his uncles in 
their vineyards to the point that they in fact received a portion of the 
harvested grape crop. The latter was undoubtedly a token of sympathy and 
gesture which allowed for the traditional production of brandy and possibly 
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wine, and was not equivalent in value to what the grower would have 
received from his own vineyards. Yet the grower could be assured that by 
participating in his extended family’s harvest, he was solidifying a reciprocal 
relationship and ensuring that his immediate family did not suffer greatly due 
to their lost harvest and whatever income would have come from it.  
Growers and their families not only exchange labour, but machinery 
as well. With a decrease in tractor ownership192, one grower may have a 
tractor and will lend it out but only whereby he operates it. Thus entire 
operations are conducted which require machinery, labour and forms of 
insurance, but which contain no monetary financial transactions. Such 
reciprocity is therefore a form of what I call ensurance, whereby such actions 
act as a way to ensure stability and economic survival, and are likely why 
many growers forfeit purchasing actual insurance policies despite 
government support which reduces their cost. Growers instead rely on kin, 
who in turn rely on them should they suffer any misfortune.  
Most of my daily interactions in Tikveš were with kin-neighbours, 
and I witnessed how such neighbours (komšii) call upon traditional forms of 
hospitality (gostoprimstvo) to alleviate both their labour and financial needs. 
For example, reciprocal activity among kin-neighbours is a daily experience, 
and consists of everything from bringing by cakes randomly—though often 
in exchange for something given prior—to exchanging recipes, borrowing an 
item, or giving gifts for a birth, name or saint day. The gifts are ambiguous in 
terms of their monetary value, for the precise value of a doll, toy or box of 
chocolates may or may not be known, but their perceived value increases or 
decreases based on whom it is coming from. A godparent (kum/a) may give a 
doll of low financial value but it is allotted great value by the recipient’s 
family, who will partake in a form of deference in the company of the 
godparent by pointing out and discussing how the child likes and plays with 
it (whether true or not). Further, the value of non-monetary goods exchanged 
between individuals and families seems to act as a symbol of mutual support.  
                                                 
192 Whereas growers lament that prior to privatisation they could ‘buy a new tractor every 
year’ if they had wanted (after being paid for their harvest), tractors are increasingly seen as 
a luxury: they cost to purchase, maintain and fuel. Therefore, given increasing financial 
hardship among growers, the latter are not only less inclined to use tractors, but may in fact 
sell them or their parts for income. 
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In terms of hospitality, I observed that the expectation of daily 
visitors keeps women active within the home—doing chores and cooking 
sporadically, so that they may be free to concurrently socialise throughout 
the day. For hospitality is a custom which is not only expected but enforced, 
as women who are relatives or next-door neighbours will freely drop by and 
let themselves in, with the certainty that they will soon be accommodated. As 
Herzfeld (1985) among others found, hospitality is a field for the ritualised 
exchange of intimacy and respect, and although I do not claim that there are 
always significant calculations made in performing most of the visits 
between the members of the household in which I lived, I am certain that 
some visits are made with a clear goal in mind and that the (often related) 
women who come to drink Turkish coffee (na kafe) maintain much more 
than bonds and relations through such daily socialising (Bringa 1995). To 
illuminate the extent to which kin-neighbours socialise but also utilise their 
relationships with one another, I thus call upon the relationship between my 
parents-in-law, Mančo and Rosa, with my host father’s cousin and his wife, 
Kole and Stojanka. 
Kole’s and Stojanka’s house, although not immediately next-door, 
such as Mančo’s brother’s and another cousin’s, is just down the street, 
allowing them to visit regularly. However, in terms of gender it is Stojanka 
who comes to visit on a regular, nearly daily basis. Such visits range from a 
half-hour to an hour, though may be longer and if able, she lets herself in and 
comes upstairs to the main floor of the house on her own accord. 
Conversations, of which I was occasionally privy to as an outsider male (who 
was not always out of the house during the day), are usually about ongoing 
situations with one another’s families. In the case of Kole and Stojanka, they 
have two grown daughters, one who has two teenage daughters and a son of 
her own, and at the time they all lived within the same house. Stojanka 
therefore usually discussed her daughters or grandchildren, or her husband’s 
ailing health, while Rosa discussed her family and increasingly dissatisfying 
work as a nurse in the local hospital (which has undergone state led 
privatisation as well). Economics, however, were always a subject of 
conversation—from the broader themes of increasing costs and 
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unemployment, to personal finances, to the purchases of wealthier 
acquaintances. 
Stojanka is an avid knitter, and during my year and half of residence 
in Tikveš, brought several knitted items as gifts for members of the 
household, including myself. However, there was always a form of Maussian 
exchange occurring during these visits: occasionally the exchange of gifts, 
though more often favours in the form of services or even loans. Yet the 
relationship in our komšiluk was somewhat lopsided, for although Mančo and 
Rosa called upon Kole’s seniority and older age to receive their allotment of 
winter fuel earlier than they should have193, and at times curried favours 
through his former ties to the state, it was usually Mančo and Rosa who were 
asked to give, both through favours and financially. Mančo, who is a doctor 
and former political office holder, has an extensive network of connections. 
Further, it is important to consider a household’s income and expenses, as for 
Kole and Stojanka, their means of income are Kole’s military pension and 
their daughters’ jobs, which totalled approximately 900 euros per month. 
Mančo’s and Rosa’s income was not only double, but they had far fewer 
mouths to feed—only their own and that of their daughter, granddaughter 
and son-in-law. However, during my stay with them, we were perceived to 
be an even wealthier household because of my supposed American riches—
my research grant supplying me with one-thousand dollars per month. As a 
household, we were therefore comparatively wealthy and a clear target for 
redistribution. 
Stojanka, with one of her granddaughters marrying in 2011, thus 
began soliciting loans from our household in late 2010. On the first occasion, 
she asked for 100 euros, which my host mother, Rosa, obligingly gave her. 
However, she asked again a month later, and at that point was given half of 
what she had requested, thus 50 euros. However, one of her daughters, 
Aleksandra, then came to the house just a week afterward, when only Irena 
was home. An unexpected and infrequent visitor, Aleksandra came in but 
                                                 
193 Retirees (penzioneri) receive their winter fuel—either wood or coal—from the state 
earlier than others. Mančo and Rosa therefore had Kole and Stojanka double their order, not 
only so that they could prepare sooner for the winter cold, but in order to ensure that they 
would receive fuel, as not all do. 
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within no time asked Irena for money as well. Taken aback, Irena refused to 
give her any, and Aleksandra left shortly thereafter. The situation thus 
became somewhat tense, as there was an apparent premeditated scheming 
occurring—loans were not just being requested through the frequent visits 
Stojanka made whereby her family’s financial troubles arose in conversation, 
but outside of that sphere. Indeed, when Stojanka borrowed money from 
Rosa, it was within the realm of hospitality—where individuals are forced to 
be empathetic. Aleksandra’s request, made while she was obviously aware of 
Rosa’s absence, was therefore in violation of what is culturally appropriate.  
Incidentally, when Stojanka borrowed money from Rosa, she would 
request that Rosa not tell her husband, Mančo, likely so that he would not tell 
his cousin, Kole. Whether Kole was aware of his wife’s and daughter’s 
requests remains unknown, for he may have known but Stojanka wanted to 
make it appear as if he did not. Yet such a request by Stojanka was meant to 
indeed leave this transaction within the realm of the female dominated 
hospitality and ritual exchange. In reality though, all of us found out about 
what was occurring, as the conversations had inside the house in Macedonia 
are generally open to all members of it, but are implicitly understood to be 
kept within its confines. I thus witnessed a local enactment of customary 
behaviour in Tikveš, whereby the ritual of hospitality intersected with both 
customary methods of seeking redistribution as well as traditional gender 
boundaries and perceptions of what information is relayed between men and 
women. 
However, despite the tension and conversations that arose during this 
time, I was reprimanded for my initial frustration with Aleksandra’s request 
for money from Irena. As Irena told me ‘this is not something for you to get 
involved with’ and ‘we must be careful about how we deal with this’. In fact, 
her concern was with the extent to which, beyond our two households, any 
animosity would be perceived and discussed by other neighbours. That is, the 
honour and image of the extended family were at stake, and this minor 
dispute was to be kept strictly confidential. She was undoubtedly right, as 
despite the brief hiatus in terms of Stojanka visiting—and the fact that 
Mančo and Rosa never received any money back—their relationship with 
Kole and Stojanka remains. Mančo and Rosa attended the granddaughter’s 
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wedding, which they helped cover some of the costs of and gave a generous 
wedding gift (100 euros). Further, they continue to interact with one another 
as if the incident of conniving borrowing had never arisen. Yet the 
conversations about finances persist, and Stojanka continues to request 
occasional injections of cash, but in exchange for favours and knitted items. 
The tension and memory of the incident therefore persists, and when 
Stojanka gave our young daughter a birthday gift, the comment made 
afterward was that Stojanka was ‘trying to pay off their debt’.  
Differing incomes and the accumulation of goods indeed serve as a 
challenge to existing relations with kinfolk, as there is a redefining of 
personal relationships and the behaviour used to retain social status. Yet such 
kin-neighbour relations help to ameliorate these differences and serve as 
levelling mechanisms. That is, reciprocity persists because there is a sense of 
obligation among those who are better off to give, in order to not only help 
one another survive but to maintain the image of family harmony.  
Reciprocity may have significant material and social effects, and as 
Gudeman (2008, p40-41) found, it ‘shares identity’ yet is a risky venture 
because it ‘establishes mutuality and maintains it, but with the possibility of 
breaking it’. One’s family is therefore not always the tonic to society’s ills, 
and during my fieldwork a non-kin neighbour across the street was in a 
dispute with his brother over the property boundary between their two 
houses—a dispute which was not resolved throughout my 17 month 
residence there. The two households ignored each other and did not interact, 
which created an odd tension when both families were out in their gardens or 
on their terraces opposite each other. Such as Gudeman points out, 
reciprocity is indeed a back-and-forth movement that takes place over time; 
‘never immediate, it is based on mutual trust, which can be violated or 
broken’ (ibid).   
Nonetheless, reciprocity is the basic social transaction and the glue of 
society and economy. It is therefore a non-market exchange that is more of ‘a 
commitment than a contract’ (ibid), and there are undoubtedly levelling 
enforcing mechanisms used in expressing aversion to accumulations of 
wealth. As evidenced in the case of the grape harvest’s reciprocal labour 
utilisation, the obligations one has beyond their own are those of extended 
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family. Yet if both harvests are occurring simultaneously or extended kin on 
opposite ends of the family need help with their harvest, then someone will 
be left short.  
As Ledeneva (1998) discusses with regard to post-communist Russia, 
one is obligated through reciprocal relations to those who help him/her, and 
one must help them in return; what she calls ‘economies of favour’ consist of 
clashes of shortages, resource allocation and human needs—factors which 
clearly play a role in the transition in Tikveš. These are based more on what 
people do for others than what they do for themselves, with the differences 
being in degrees of pressure, obligation and imposed reciprocity, and the 
roles of kinship, tradition and class divisions. Individuals have thus formal 
expectations based on informal practices, and such ‘economies of favour’ are 
examples of trust where little of it exists otherwise. Through consociality, 
such systems therefore seem able to mitigate crises, radical reforms and 
societal changes.  
To recapitulate, individuals with connections across a predominantly 
kin-based network fare better in times of hardship than those with limited or 
only immediate family connections. In Tikveš, given what has been a 
challenging post-socialist to pre-EU transition, this is evident in how broad 
kin-neighbour relations help to maintain connectedness, redistribute wealth 
and mitigate and alleviate financial and social burdens. For although there is 
an aspect of shame and secrecy in borrowing from one’s kin, there is an 
egalitarian levelling mechanism which forces redistribution as well as a sense 
of obligation to provide one another with the means to survive, be it through 
cash or connections. In the form of hospitality, the frequent visits by women 
in the community to their kin-neighbours’ homes help to maintain their 
social and familial relations, but also allows them to make their case for 
needs and charity.  
 
Conclusion: surviving the illogical market 
Grape growers and their families have faced years of crisis in the form of 
decreased demand, unpaid and under-paid grape harvests. There have thus 
been a variety of reactions to this transition, and use of the excess grapes 
produced. Besides ‘selling’ the grapes at makeshift purchasing-points setup 
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by wineries (discussed in Chapter 3), growers have taken to a variety of 
measures to deal with their surplus crop. These include producing homemade 
wine and excessive amounts of brandy (or selling one’s grapes to individuals 
who are willing to do so); utilising networks and selling the brandy 
elsewhere in the country; replacing one’s vineyards with other crops such as 
peaches, potatoes or tomatoes; and certainly relying on close relatives and 
kin-neighbours for assistance and redistribution.  
The onset of neoliberal capitalism means that inequality and 
uncertainty are the new norm, and the equality, certainty and income that 
growers of everything from peaches to potatoes to grapes are seeking is only 
temporarily possible, at best. The Rosoman growers and others who replaced 
their vineyards with peach orchards hoped they would be able to regain the 
income and standard of living they had before, but the reality is that traders 
and power holders seek to profit off of farmers’ labour and the growing 
market. In addition, producers such as the grape or peach growers feed into 
this system by expressing deference to the elites, with the hope of gaining 
some sort of connection and thus comparative advantage.  
Being married into and residing with a family who were skilled 
professionals and not agriculturalists, I was often amazed by the seeming ill-
logic of the market: even when I wanted to pay full price for a service or 
good, I was rarely allowed to. For example, I took my bike to have a brake 
cable fixed and some adjustments made. The mechanic was not familiar with 
my bike because it was from Germany, however he did the hands-on labour 
and I was pleased with the fix in the end. I therefore expected to pay him at 
least a few hundred denari (five euros) for his work yet he would not accept 
it, saying ‘give whatever’. When I handed him 200 MKD (3.3 EUR) he 
objected and threw a hundred back at me. I insisted he take it, but he simply 
would not have it.  
I pondered over how to explain this ‘logic’; he was not a farmer or 
grower so had different and likely fewer expenses. In the end I realised that 
he does not work for profit so much as to maintain social connections, and 
either because of the family I married into and/or because I am foreign but 
someone he knows of, he would not want to offend me and take my money 
as such. In fact, he was also aware of the fact that my father-in-law would 
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ask how much I paid for his services (which he did), and if it was too much it 
would cause offence and he may lose both future business and the social 
connection to Mančo. Another similar example of how social perception may 
trump monetary gain came when having new shocks put on our car. The 
husband of a friend of Irena’s who sells car parts cut the price by 25 percent, 
and the mechanics who put them on the car—father and son repairmen, 
Mitko and Saško, who are also neighbours—only asked us for 100 MKD and 
to buy them a coffee. We gave them 200 MKD (3.33 EUR) and said we 
would go for coffee soon, though as is often the case when saying such, we 
never did194. 
Surviving the transition is therefore laden with social expectations—
networks must be constantly maintained and re-worked—and while such 
behaviour may be considered reciprocal or falling within an ‘economy of 
favours’, there is also an aspect of what James Scott calls ‘conformity and 
the partial transcript’ (1985, p284). Scott described how the villagers with 
whom he lived always adopt a protective disguise in their relations with more 
powerful individuals or outsiders. Scott says that class struggle should 
therefore not be misunderstood to be a moral or fundamental worldview 
difference, but one of ‘bread and butter’ issues: the appropriation of work, 
production, property and taxes (p296). This disguise is apparent both in the 
subordinate classes’ conformity and their resistance: one conceals his anger 
when he is underpaid but vents it when at home, as ‘dissimulation is the 
characteristic and necessary pose of subordinate classes everywhere most of 
the time (p284)’.  
Scott’s work helps to explain why there is not open resistance to the 
growing inequality and profits of the winery owners in Tikveš. As he 
succinctly writes, ‘the village poor are hedged in by links of kinship and/or 
petty economic dependencies that they are reluctant to jeopardize. If they 
disagree with their relative, landlord, or employer, they are likely to do so 
with circumspection (p244)’. Indeed, to return to the chapter’s introduction, 
it is the ‘the dull compulsion of economic relations’—the daily imperative of 
                                                 
194 I posit that merely the suggestion or invitation to drink coffee is an effort to maintain social 
relations. That is, even if going for coffee never occurs, the act of suggesting it seems to have a social 
effect, particularly if one individual is expressing deference to another. 
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earning a living and surviving—which drives most daily interactions and 
behaviour in Kavadarci and the Tikveš region. By accepting the way of 
living at hand but doing one’s best to find another opportunity, individuals 
see most employment as dissatisfactory, and as one older grower said to me 
(when speaking of the younger generation) during my fieldwork, ‘they will 
look for work but pray they don’t find it’. Indeed, the coercive context in 
which employers manage their labour force helps to create and maintain the 
setting of relative powerlessness within which such a ‘dull compulsion’ can 
extract its daily toll.  
I thus assert that individuals are only able to survive because of their 
networks of friends, family and neighbours, as the pooled resources of such 
networks are better than the lousy conditions of going it alone. Through 
levelling mechanisms and notions of reciprocity, such as those demonstrated 
in the situation of Stojanka coming to our house looking for charity, 
individual families are able to bring in sufficient income to not only cover 
their costs but put them on a more even ground with those around them. This 
notion of equality is central to human happiness and sociality, and has been 
documented by anthropologists and economists alike. As economist John 
Galbraith (1958) argued over half a century ago, and which I assert is 
prescient when considering the modern capitalist world order, many 
consumer demands arise not from need but from social pressure. That is, 
people assess how well they are doing not only by how much they earn or 
consume, but by how much they earn or consume in relation to others they 
know.  
This I believe is key to explaining survival in Tikveš, from the family 
in Dolni Disan to Stojanka and Kole in Kavadarci. Although there might be 
increased pressure to gain what others have, by comparing oneself among 
kin-neighbours and other friends and family and then acting within those 
networks to seek redistribution, individuals and their families are able to 
level the playing field. In doing so, there is not only a redistribution of 
resources, but a mutual empathy and a solace in one another’s company. 
Overall, the sharing of lifeworlds and obligation to assist one another makes 
for a constant tension and interaction among relatives, and helps create a 
sense of optimism as well. For the value in social relations, including trust 
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and reciprocity, must be seen as key elements in considering to where the 
Tikveš wine region and its inhabitants are transitioning. Given EU accession 
and neoliberal governance, and the rising inequality, injustice and the 
disparities in wealth and opportunity that accompany it, growers and their 
families must continue to place managing their kin-neighbour and other 




























 There is nothing permanent except change. –Heraclitus 
 
The primary assertion in this thesis has been that the economic 
transformation of the Tikveš wine industry and region in the last decade has 
led to a reversal of the tendencies toward state run and regulated production 
set forth during socialist industrialisation. Throughout it, grape growers and 
other individuals have been severed from a significant amount of industry 
labour and forced to ‘return to the peasantry’ so to speak, while an elite 
minority have profited. Such a series of processes has come about through 
the combination of domestically and internationally supported neoliberal 
privatisation and development policy, and the consequent notions of power, 
governmentality, and false consciousness that they have fomented.  
 As an anthropological study conducted in a specific place over a 
significant period of time, it serves as evidence against the notion that the 
‘transition’ to the free-market would be a harmonious one, beneficial to all. 
Indeed, it appears to the contrary—that the new generation of Tikveš (and 
other) Macedonians are already and will continue to experience growing 
poverty and inequality such as Kaneff (2011) found, alongside a decimation 
of standards of living and social welfare. This rupture to their established 
norms is both psychologically and economically distressing. Therefore, as an 
ethnographer I have included herein an illustration of the life alterations there 
through my six chapters on everything from the region’s history, kinship and 
various traditions to the wine industry’s (re)development and privatisation, 
and the inter-subjective nature of such societal transformations.   
Although peasant-growers in Macedonia have been working in a 
semi-commercialised industry for decades, government subsidies have 
shielded them from the market and in Tikveš, the growing private wine 
industry’s needs. While decades of socialism may have decreased what Wolf 
(2001) calls ‘inherent peasant conservatism’195 (p150), I discussed peasant 
theory early on in this thesis because of the extent to which grape growers in 
                                                 
195 Generally defined as the exclusion of the outsider and limiting of the flow of outside 
goods and ideas into the community.  
 217 
Tikveš remain distant from for-profit farming as the economic system shifts 
around them. They instead function in a peasant manner—struggling to earn 
money which they could use to create such an enterprise in the so-called 
‘free market’. This inability is their exclusion, and appears for some growers 
to be resulting in a return to a lifestyle which characterised their forebears’ 
lives a half a century ago and prior. Therefore, though on the one hand this 
thesis is partially about ‘repeasantisation’, on the other hand I have not 
desired to portray the inhabitants of Tikveš as peasants in the traditional 
sense. Instead, I argue that peasantising processes are probably creating more 
occupational variety in people’s lives than during socialism because of the 
lack of official, full-time remunerated labour.  
Indeed, as Verdery and Burawoy state in their book Uncertain 
Transitions (1999), since the fall of socialism there has been a breaking 
down of macro structures, such as the administered economies of most 
formerly socialist states. This has allowed the creation of space for ‘micro 
worlds’, and such places and spaces ‘produce autonomous effects that may 
have unexpected influence over the structures that have been emerging’ (p2). 
That is, in response to unstable environments there is both innovation and 
reversion to old ways, hence repeasantisation. Furthermore, this occurs in 
response to the new order, which cultivates entrepreneurs and traders who 
threaten the integrity of the local community and its habitus, ultimately (and 
ironically) driving the community away from the international free-market 
economy while exploiting it. According to Verdery and Burawoy, overall the 
transition must be understood to be in between the rooted past and imagined 
future, bringing with it ‘multiple trajectories’ and regressive as well as 
progressive dynamics simultaneously (ibid). And similar to what Creed was 
told by a villager upon commencing his fieldwork in Bulgaria, the country is 
‘always in transition’ (1998, p1).  
Therefore, in the context of growers’ lives in the Tikveš wine region, 
there is an increasing perception among them that their work is in vain, and 
that unregulated profit-making is to be associated with (often political) 
corruption. Further, as the same sorts of grapes in different locations and 
commodity chains are experiencing a change in their pre- and post-harvest 
production, there is concern that when the country joins the EU and 
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competition in the wine industry increases further, such small-scale 
production as exists (given predominant small, family-labour plots) will have 
no future and that a way of life will be lost. Yet the transition in Tikveš at 
present is already heading that way, without the country being a member of 
the EU. It is full of contradictions, changing values, customs and traditions—
in short, uncertainty prevails. To study the region I sought to consider how a 
country or place gets into capitalism yet gets marginalised at the same time, 
and how free-market capitalism is creating such margins and 
contradictions196. Given the nature of unfettered global capitalism today, 
framing this transformation in neoliberal theory seemed most appropriate. 
Even within the same country, the experience of an economic system 
differs based on local factors such as culture, as well as access to work, 
technology and thus modes of production. As Hann concludes in his text on 
the topic of neoliberalism and post-socialist disillusionment, Not the Horse 
We Wanted (2006), to understand such a scenario we must take into 
consideration new processes of identity formation. We need ‘to recognise 
that economic dislocation has reduced living standards and increased 
economic uncertainty for very large population groups’ (p254).  
As new information and perspectives during my fieldwork naturally 
influenced my understanding of the situation in Tikveš, I came to realise that 
what I should be looking at was not just growers’ and other locals’ methods 
of getting by and surviving, but how they have been adapting by changing 
habits, consumption and even traditions—thus their overall identity. This is 
because although it has not been a systemic collapse, the transition in 
Macedonia in general has been characterised by both a slow disintegration of 
infrastructure and protectionist policy combined with a need for individual 
agency and resourcefulness.  
For while those affected seem to have keenly attuned interpersonal 
attention in all directions, in contrast those with the most power in society 
seem to pay particularly little attention to those below them. This has 
profound implications for societal behaviour and government policy: tuning 
into the needs and feelings of another person is a prerequisite to empathy, 
                                                 
196 Thanks to comments made by Stephen Gudeman after presenting my preliminary 
research at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, 8th July 2010.  
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which in turn can lead to understanding, concern and even compassionate 
action. When in positions of power, freely dismissing people can easily 
extend to dismissing inconvenient truths about them.  
Given such power among the elite, who have become more secretive 
in their strategising as they separate themselves from the majority of citizens 
who must live through the new order and its policies, I conclude this thesis 
by discussing this identity transformation in Tikveš and speculating on what 
the future of the country and wine region are. To do so I incorporate research 
from EU member Bulgaria and its Melnik wine region, and notes from an 
interview with the ‘leader of the lozari’ in Tikveš, as well as discuss further 
aspects of the Tikveš wine region’s transition and its future.     
 
History, shifting identity and power  
As discussed earlier on in this thesis, Macedonians are fighting for their 
identity at the international level, particularly due to the protest of Greece 
over use of the name Macedonia. This ‘identity crisis’ so to speak is front 
and centre in domestic politics, and after his party won the 2011 elections the 
president of the country, Georgi Ivanov, said in a speech ‘we will continue to 
fight for your name and identity’. At the same time, his party (VMRO-
DPMNE) has been spearheading the ‘Skopje 2014’ project, constructing 
statues of famous Macedonians (and some might argue Greeks or 
Bulgarians) from antiquity to present. These include Alexander the great, the 
Emperor Justinian, the king ‘Tsar Samuel’, Mother Teresa, and literally 
dozens of political figures and revolutionaries from the 19th and 20th 
centuries who played a role in overthrowing Ottoman rule and then 
establishing national identity among Macedonians through what is called 
‘ASNOM’ at the incipience of socialist Yugoslav rule.  
The Anti-Fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia 
(ASNOM), led by Metodija Andonov-Čento197, was held on 2 August, 1944 
and eventually created the governmental structure that was to be backed by 
and function under the ideology of communism. Although there were violent 
purges of Bulgarian intelligentsia involved, what ASNOM essentially did 
                                                 
197 A bust of Čento, as he is known, has long stood on the old stone bridge in the centre of 
Skopje, and one of the official neighbourhood-districts in the capital is also called ‘Čento’.   
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was help Macedonia establish itself as a republic within the SFR Yugoslavia. 
In creating an ethnic Macedonian identity (narod), the country was then later 
able to declare itself an independent republic after the dissolution of the 
Yugoslav federation.  
While there is evidence of a national Macedonian conscience from 
prior to ASNOM and the establishment of Yugoslav Macedonia198, the post-
war era to the present has contributed significantly to the cementing of such 
an identity. The discourse surrounding Skopje 2014, however, asserts that the 
Yugoslav model divided Macedonia more greatly than it united it, and that 
the aforementioned famous individuals constitute a Macedonian identity that 
was ignored during the SFRY era and which dates back millenia. In 
implementing this discourse locally, at the ‘twelve children’ (dvanaeset 
deca) commemoration ceremony I attended in June 2011 (mentioned in 
Chapter 1), the (VMRO-DPMNE) Mayor defied the Yugoslav notion of 
different ethnic groups (narodi) saying of the pre-war era ‘whether Serb, 
Bulgarian, Greek, Rom, Albanian—the people lived together as 
Macedonians’. Yet he also used the word privatisation in a way I had never 
heard before, saying ‘let us not privatise our history199’. This use of 
privatisation seems to refer to a sort of manipulation, but how it came into 
the lexicon is obviously through its meaning in recent history—to make 
private that which was formerly public (and in an exploitative fashion). 
Being stated in such a speech, it thus seemed to be implying that history is at 
risk of being dominated by a select few who concoct it as they see fit. 
However, by calling such attention to it the Mayor was doing precisely that. 
As there is significant literature on development’s link with the nation 
(narod) building project of socialism, as well as the connection between 
nationalism and identity200, I do not discuss it further here. What I seek to do 
instead is to, in calling upon the contents of this thesis, demonstrate how the 
                                                 
198 Misirkov’s famous text from the late 19th century, ‘About Macedonian matters’ (Za 
Makedonski raboti) is the most often cited example of this, as are the poems of Konstantin 
Miladinov.  
199 Da ne ja privatizirame nasata istorija. 
200 Including my own MA thesis (2007) from Indiana University’s Russian & East European 
Institute, titled ‘Power and conflict: economics, ethno-nationalism, and the state of security 
in the Republic of Macedonia since 2001’. 
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Skopje 2014 project and the ruling government’s nationalist and populist 
agenda clashes with the shifting identity in small communities outside of the 
capital such as those in Tikveš, and how this represents the growing schism 
between the powerful and powerless. For as Cohen asserts, ‘the more 
privileged a group is in society, the more secretive and mystifying it tends to 
be about its organisation and strategies’ (1974, p110). Indeed, neoliberal 
privatisation and governmentality (such as that lending to the government’s 
Skopje 2014 project) is allowed to masquerade as a good development, when 
actually it is often destructive and corrupt by nature in its most advanced 
forms. It is a system which requires incentives and indoctrination if it is 
going to be successful, yet the concentrations of power and wealth brought 
through it foster inequality and division when left unchecked.  
Although there is a growing local and international response to this 
accumulation of power and wealth in the hands of few and the consequent 
growth in inequality, including from world leaders, there is also an alienation 
felt by many toward such deleterious manifestations of neoliberal capitalism. 
For one, peasantising processes can sever groups from the ‘democratic free-
market’, keeping production and consumption local. Further, as evidenced 
through the ‘12 children’ ceremony quote, modern society and consumer 
goods are seen as threatening to local culture, identity and history, thus their 
absence helps to preserve social norms and keep uncertainty at bay.  
While this could be considered a rejection of modern notions of 
fetishised materialism, among those who do partake in the consumption of 
such consumer goods there are significant enough concerns about forced 
redistribution through reciprocity (such as that discussed in Chapter 6) that 
rather than pretentiously show off newly acquired items, individuals and 
families may keep them hidden from the public’s (and kin-neighbour’s) 
eye—a situation I witnessed in Kavadarci among family there. The last 
possible benefit of the transition on local identity therefore comes through 
notions of reciprocity, forced redistribution and reliance on kin-neighbours, 
and altogether these do several things. They arguably lubricate sociality and 
the sharing of daily life-worlds and help to ameliorate inequality, yet they 
also contribute to the cooperation and collaboration necessary to survive in 
the unregulated, free-market (and non-state guided) economy.     
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Therefore, although I see the silver lining in the transition, in that 
reciprocity and reliance is better maintained among kin, and the capitalist 
market may be shunned to an extent, I assert that neoliberal capitalism and 
commercialism can also undermine social relations and trust, rendering 
contact between individuals unreliable and unpredictable. As Karl Polanyi 
(1944) asserted, ‘instead of economy being embedded in social relations, 
social relations are embedded in the economy’ (p60).  
In addressing such ‘ritual decline’, as he calls it, Creed (2002) writes 
as well about how changing wealth, work and other activities seem to result 
in significant shifts in identity and social relations. He claims that this can be 
characterised by the ‘post-socialist diminution of the prior bases of social 
relations and engagement’ (p66), and that such ritual decline was due to 
‘state lack of interest and withdrawal, complementing political exasperation 
and economic disillusionment’ (p69). According to Creed, this results in a 
loss of dignity and self-worth, a decline in the quality of life and indeed a 
change in notions of identity.  
Similar to what Wolf found in his observations of societal 
transformation, ‘individuals continue to be burdened by inherited tradition, 
but the social relations required to uphold that tradition show ever more 
severe signs of strain’ (2001, p240). Such value and social relations are key 
elements of grape production that growers are and certainly will see 
changing. Lastly, Samuel Popkin counters the rational self-interest of a 
transitioning political economy with a ‘moral economy’—an approach which 
equates culture with values and values with morality, and then explains 
social action as the effect of values (in Wolf 2001, p165). There is thus a 
potential redefining of personal relationships and behaviour used to retain 
social status in such transitioning economic systems.  
Consequently, in terms of the relationship between the people and 
system of governance, Creed (ibid) found in his research that there was a 
failure in the democratisation process, and Alexander (2004) discusses this 
rethinking of value, writing that it could not be just a quality of material 
objects in relation to prices but something which is created in an 
‘agglomeration of political and social institutions’. When these fall apart the 
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value is lost and there is a perceived theft, which indicates a loss of social 
relations and which creates various forms of uncertainty.  
I thus borrow from Johnston and Saad-Filho (2005) and contend that 
neoliberalism ‘straddles a wide range of social, political and economic 
phenomena at different levels of complexity’ (p1) and as Tickell and Peck 
(2003) describe, neoliberalism is ‘contradictory’ and has ‘the capacity to 
bring forth countertendencies…existing in historically and contingent forms’ 
(p165). They thus assert that analyses of this process should ‘focus on 
change…rather than on binary and/or static comparisons between a past state 
and its erstwhile successor’. 
The problem then for Tikveš is in grappling with how to retain the 
material safety and cultural richness of a non-capitalist society and economy, 
but in also gaining the health, wealth, education and life opportunities the 
available elsewhere in the world. In fact, one premise of Collier’s book on 
neoliberalism (2011) is that the questions first posed in the debate around 
‘transition’—framed by Polanyi’s analysis (1944) of the battle of so called 
free-markets versus society201—have not lost interest. Indeed, the fate of the 
substantive economy produced by socialism and the tradition of thought that 
claims the mantle of classical liberalism, not to mention government 
adjustments to them, all remain crucial problems and considerations for the 
future of a region such as Tikveš (Hann 2006).  
 
The future  
In terms of the future of wine production in Tikveš, I firstly call upon the 
past and the notion of the deeply imbedded ramifications of Yugoslav 
socialist production in viticulture. That is, policy, production and memory of 
it have played a significant role in the conflict surrounding the region’s 
transition well into the 21st century. The legacy of the government’s 
dominance in the planning of inputs, outputs and production goals was a 
form of tight regulation and job security that is not painlessly unravelled, as 
                                                 
201 Polanyi argues that there are three general types of economic systems that existed before 
the rise of a society based on a free-market economy, and called them redistributive, 
reciprocity and house-holding systems. 
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evidenced by growers’ loss of income and their constant uncertainty in a 
privatised industry.  
As for the industry, by being largely closed off from market 
economies and trading only within the socialist federation previously, it was 
shielded from competition and consumer induced change. With the focus on 
industrialisation during the Yugoslav era, wine was therefore considered a 
low-level priority and was only developed in Tikveš in order to supply the 
planned economy. From a supply and demand point of view such production 
is dysfunctional: by having both government mandated quotas and inputs 
(labour, materials, etc.) the problem was an incompatibility with actual 
product demand. Against this backdrop, during socialism private winemakers 
were not incentivised to focus on quality but quantity, and as mentioned 
throughout this thesis, small producers were absorbed by the agro-industrial 
kombinati that dominated the industry (and which in private form today, have 
continued to remain strong). The end result was a system where the taste and 
variety of wine was secondary to its quantity of production and the 
employment that it guaranteed.   
 The upside of the transition to private wineries, however, has been the 
production of better wine, and the wine industry as a potentially profitable 
activity for the whole country given wine tourism and wine as an item of 
global trade. The downside of course, given capitalism’s mantra of reducing 
costs to maximise output and profits, has been the cost to the myriad 
individual grape growers, small wineries such as that of my informant Divna 
and her family, as well as reduced wine production overall with the 
dissolution of the socialist economy and marketplace.  
For with free-market competition from other (largely European) wine 
producers in the former Yugoslavia, wineries have faced a difficult time of 
finding markets for their product.  
Consequently, in these new trade relationships the ‘newbies’ to the 
global wine industry (such as Macedonian wines) are dealing from a position 
of weakness. Further and somewhat ironically, traders from wealthier 
capitalist countries—who are more skilled at business and marketing—are 
able to dictate prices and minimise profits further for the Macedonian 
wineries. Although labour and production costs are cheaper in Macedonia 
 225 
compared with France or Italy, the result for wine and grape producers there 
is a situation of reduced profits and income, with the growers bearing the 
burden of such losses.  
 With the expansion of the EU into the Southeast European region, the 
re-development of the wine industry throughout it is therefore in progress. 
This is due to the fact that the benefit of EU membership—and even 
candidate status such as Macedonia has—is meant to be a secure 
environment for labour, trade, investment and favourable exchange rates202. 
Yet the EU is an interesting player in the game of wine production in that on 
the one hand it is seeking to unify Europe, while on the other hand it 
encourages regional autonomy and cultural identity. Regulations are thus in 
place to ensure unique product production, particularly with wine given 
notions of region of origin, appellation and terroir, so that if a product is 
named after a place then it will contribute to that region’s development and 
identity.  
Therefore, despite the ‘catastrophic’ effects of privatisation on grape 
growers in Tikveš, there is the re-development of the region as an appellation 
and as a result of increased exports in Asia, Europe and the US, the Tikveš 
Winery in particular is gaining a name for itself internationally, as well as the 
region through the winery’s name. Further, this may be helping to bring 
individual grape growers back into the game, as the winery reportedly used 
50 percent more grapes in 2013 compared to 2012, foreign sales outside of 
Southeast Europe continue to increase, and even the UK retailer Marks and 
Spencer began selling Tikveš Winery wines in October 2013203.  
Foreign sales outside of Europe and the US—which are both seen as 
formidable markets, well saturated with wines from several continents (eg, 
South America and Australia)—is a primary goal of Tikveš wine producers. 
For example, Russia—where according to the locals in Kavadarci, all of 
Macedonia’s wine could be consumed in one day given Russians’ alcohol 
consumption—is seen as an ideal wine market. However, my neighbour in 
Kavadarci, Georgi (mentioned in Chapters 4 & 5), who owns a small winery 
and who is a frequent informal spokesman for the industry, said it is 
                                                 
202 Macedonia’s currency is, at 61 denari, pegged to the euro. 
203 http://kurir.mk/en/2013/10/22/macedonian-wines-conquer-the-uk-market/  
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incredibly difficult to sell there. The reason for this is that there is a 20 
percent tariff on wine from Macedonia, and one must have contacts and 
money to throw around—for promotional parties, fees and bribes—and only 
then can the market be penetrated. According to Georgi, advertising will not 
do any good if one’s product is not allowed on the market and blessed by the 
power holders. In fact, the only way at present for bulk wine from 
Macedonia to make it there and turn a profit is through repackaging it as 
Serbian wine so it can be sold without the high tariff. For example, Serbs and 
Germans buy all of his wine but only the Germans bottle it and label it 
Macedonian by origin. Where it goes once in Serbia though, he is not 
entirely sure.  
Even at the new, large and well-funded Stobi Winery204, its head 
winemaker with whom I spoke, Dane, complained to me about how 
competitive the global and European market is. European bottled wines 
dominate and Macedonia is largely without a name, image and brand for 
itself. The government does little to help the wine industry appear as one and 
represent it abroad, and as previously mentioned, bulk wine sells for as low 
as 0.20 EUR/litre. Further, without being able to charge a high price when 
exported, bottled wine is expensive to produce because bottles make up 40 to 
50 percent of the cost of wine production. Bulk wine is thus cheaper to 
produce and sell, but it brings down the standard of Macedonia’s wine 
industry as a whole. 
As one of the special interest groups discussed throughout this thesis, 
the Tikveš wine industry is therefore in transition, engaged in the free-
market’s battle for consumers and brand recognition. How this affects the 
grape growers though I have naturally sought to illustrate at greater length, 
and call upon here an interview with the ‘leader of the lozari’ (vodač na 
lozarite), Ljupčo A., conducted toward the end of my fieldwork in August 
2011. Several topics were discussed in the interview, from the high quality of 
Macedonian wine to the divisive politics and corruption which only add salt 
to the wound of privatisation.  
                                                 
204 See here for a good explanation of the winery from an industry perspective 
http://stobi.co.uk/blog/man-on-the-inside-journey-to-macedonia-2013/   
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During our evening meeting, Ljupčo began by indeed boasting of 
Macedonian wine—claiming its superiority to French wine, as many do—
and said that the EU needed to do more to help the industry primarily by 
increasing the quota for bulk wine. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this is 
because the quota for bulk wine is quickly filled every year within a couple 
of months, whereas the quota for bottled wine is never filled. His opinion 
thus contrasted with that of Georgi’s, who wants better marketing for the 
country’s wine industry as a whole so that the value and quantity of bottled 
wine will increase. Ljupčo, however, was representing the grape growers in 
his concerns for their plight but was seemingly unaware of how the wine 
market operates outside of Macedonia. As for the grape growers, he admitted 
that they are not only independent in their production—and often unwilling 
to form cooperatives—but divided by politics (and the populist politicians 
politicking to them, such as at the strike-protests in 2010).  
Ljupčo also spoke about Bulgarians buying already crushed grapes in 
order to export them in their cheapest form, fruit juice, which is then made 
into wine in Bulgaria. This is a particularly interesting phenomenon because 
as Kamčevski (2007) writes, this used to occur a century ago with wineries in 
Niš, Serbia, which bought Tikveš grapes for wine production there. 
Altogether, this means that not only are grape growers returning to pre-
socialist ways of existing, but so are the wineries themselves. What we may 
be encountering is thus a return to a pre-industrialised life for many.  
Neighbours Greece and Bulgaria though both present interesting case 
studies of wine regions within the EU. Greece, which has been an EU 
member for several decades, has a vastly different form of wine production 
but one which Greek acquaintances from Salonica lamented was suffering. 
They claimed that the country used to be like Macedonia, and to its benefit. 
Once it joined the EU however, Greeks were given directives regarding what 
to grow, as well as subsidies to sometimes not grow anything at all. Thus the 
country produces less produce and wine now than it used to, having lost its 
smaller but more productive rural farm-plots. Furthermore, my informants 
said that Greece was dependent on foreign products with a higher carbon 
footprint, and which were of lesser quality yet which cost more. Lastly, there 
is also the unemployment of local farmers to contend with, as such EU policy 
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and competition caused rural businesses to flounder in the present era of 
austerity there, and decades of migration to cities have only exacerbated the 
situation.  
Although austerity measures since 2008 have caused rather negative 
opinions of the EU, I asked what the general opinion was of the Union. They 
said being an EU member was no longer good nor viable, and gave as an 
example the fact that when Greece had recently wanted loans from China 
with only one percent interest they were barred from taking them, having to 
take loans from Germany or France with 20 percent interest rates. They also 
said that the EU seemed great at first because of the easy money coming their 
way, but in the long run it was not, being highly regulated and inflexible. 
Such a system thus seems contrary to that developing in Macedonia and 
elsewhere in the post-socialist world, and this contrast may help us 
understand why Bulgaria and Romania are at the bottom of EU lists in terms 
of production and output: the EU’s finance and market based capitalist 
structure hinders development in countries where the state ran the economy 
for so long, and despite industrialisation and urban development, kept its 
populace dispersed throughout. As for Greece, my informants there claimed 
that with EU entry, by so heavily regulating the countryside and agriculture, 
rural parts of the country were depopulated and notions of self-sufficiency 
destroyed. Additionally, prices and unemployment went up, there is now the 
euro and austerity induced financial crisis, and yet they have to privatise their 
state-run industries.  
Turning to the more economically, politically and culturally similar 
Bulgaria (which is more comparable to Macedonia given its recent 
government controlled economy), my visit to the Melnik wine region just 
over the border from Macedonia was eye opening. When I entered a shop 
selling wine in the village of Melnik, the woman there, Marieta, was not 
forthcoming at first, but I was patient in asking her about the region and 
situation. I used the situation in Tikveš and questions from my research as a 
template and with which to contrast the condition of Melnik’s and Bulgaria’s 
wine industry. I asked, for example: ‘Was the wine industry changing and if 
so why? How much do grapes sell for? She replied, telling me in lackluster 
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tones and short statements that it was terrible. ‘It’s falling apart…wine 
doesn’t sell’. With a short yes or no she answered my questions:  
 
Has privatisation occurred? –Yes.  
Has it been good or bad for the industry? –Bad.  
Do you have vineyards, how many dekari? –Yes, 50 dekari205 near 
Sandanski.   
Do you work them? –A little, my son does the work.  
And does it pay? –No, here’s our wine and we make a lot of rakija as well.  
So you don’t sell it to a winery? –No, no one wants the grapes.  
Do wineries, such as those here whose bottles you have, buy grapes or 
produce their own? –Both, it depends on the winery.  
What’s the price if they buy? –It depends, usually around one lev (0.50 EUR) 
per kilo.  
 
Our conversation was brief, but the latter price for grapes is of course much 
better than in Macedonia, hence the profit motive for Bulgarian wineries to 
buy from Tikveš grape producers. Marieta also told me that her son was 
planning to leave the country because the situation was so bad. I asked where 
to and she said Spain or Italy, like so many Bulgarians. I tried a little of their 
red wine, made from ‘Melnik-55’—an odd name for a grape sort I thought—
and paid four euros for a two litre bottle.  
Marieta was friendly enough and honest, but she suggested I speak to 
the owner of the shop she was in, Ilija, who ran another shop up the street. 
When I headed there, Ilija was without customers and free to speak with me. 
I asked him some similar questions but was more curious about post-EU 
entry and the effects on the industry. We moved in and out of the shop, first 
speaking on the sidewalk where he had wine and grapes for sale.  
I learned from Ilija a few interesting things about the Bulgarian wine 
industry. First, it is big—and Melnik is one of the smallest wine regions. He 
showed me a ‘Bulgarian wine map’ hanging on the wall inside, describing 
how the largest wine regions were near Plovdiv and Stara Zagora in the east. 
                                                 
205 Equal to five hectares. 
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But from the Black Sea to the northwest corner near Serbia and Romania 
there are vineyards and wine regions: ‘Bulgaria has dozens of grape varieties, 
and over 300 registered wineries’, he said. He added though that this does 
not include the smaller, family-owned wineries where there might be a 
decent quantity of production but only for often local, private sale and 
distribution.  
He confirmed that the Bulgarian wine industry as a whole was falling 
apart. ‘There’s too much wine and competition, and the larger wineries are 
taking over’, he said. Telling him about the term vinska mafija in Macedonia, 
he said he had not heard it and that it was not mafia but, like in Macedonia, 
wealthy businessmen and their wineries alongside foreign wine on the 
Bulgarian market which have made it very competitive. Interestingly, when I 
asked whether he thought that EU entry was bad for the industry, he said ‘no, 
it creates competition and offers better choice. It’s been good for us as well 
because we can travel and work freely now, and in terms of the wine industry 
we receive subsidies for our vineyards, which is great’.  
Unlike in Macedonia where there are different subsidies based on 
planting, selling, or maintaining vineyards and grapes, he explained that 
growers simply receive 15 EUR per dekar, thus 150 EUR per hectare of 
vineyards. Ilija told me more about the local industry, saying he was aware 
of the situation in Macedonia and that some wineries have been going and 
buying grapes there because of the cheap prices. I asked whether it was 
worth it with customs but he said ‘there’s no tariff, just a bribe (mito)’.  
This reality of not only wine but Macedonian peach, tomato and other 
produce production makes me wonder how Macedonia is playing a role in an 
EU country’s agricultural industry indirectly and apparently unintentionally. 
That is, not only is Bulgaria dealing with European and Bulgarian wine on 
their market, but Macedonian grapes (and wine) too. Further, with other 
fruits and vegetables, it is well known in Macedonia that Bulgaria, Greece 
and Serbia sometimes illegally import Macedonian produce, claim it was 
produced in their country and then possibly export it or products made from 
it through free-trade deals (such as to Russia). This is one of the hidden 
secrets of the local economy in Macedonia, and one which makes it worth 
considering whether the country should join the EU given the effects it will 
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have not only on it, but its production and trade with neighbours. On the one 
hand, being an EU member could help Macedonia increase the value of and 
profit made from its exports. On the other hand, EU regulations, competition, 
price inflation and migration might mean an abandonment of the rural 
agricultural life, affecting not just the local Tikveš and Macedonian economy 
but the regional, southeast European one too.   
Since Russia (along with China) is considered a top export 
destination on the international wine market and I assumed Bulgaria must 
have a niche there given their former relations with the Soviet Union, I 
additionally asked Ilija about the Russian market for Bulgarian wines. To my 
surprise, he claimed that very little Bulgarian wine is exported to Russia. 
They lost that market, I was told, and do not export a significant amount of 
wine overall. The Bulgarian wine market therefore seems to be suffering the 
wrath of a double-edged sword as well, but one forged under different 
conditions than that in Tikveš. That is, there is both diminished production 
and export, as well as decreased domestic demand (due to foreign imports) 
for its wine.  
One problem is that wine markets in the Balkans are very national 
and local, and one will not see Bulgarian wine in Greece or Macedonia, or 
Macedonian or Greek wine in the neighbouring country. Except for 
Macedonian wines in Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia, which have small domestic 
wine industries and historical Yugoslav ties with Macedonia, the Balkan 
wine industry is in fact a system of trade relationships between a Southeast 
European country and one outside of that sphere. Except for Serbia, 
Macedonia will largely export to Slovenia, Germany and increasingly the US 
and UK, but besides its former Yugoslav neighbours, not to any other 
countries in the region. 
This is a general summation, but at the local level individuals either 
want locally produced wine or wine that is deemed exotic and therefore 
prestigious, often coming from Western Europe or ‘new world wine 
producers’206, and marketing and brand image are key. For example, in 
Bulgaria West European wine is prominent, and as Ilija remarked, Bulgarians 
                                                 
206 Australia, South Africa, North or South America, etc. 
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who live in Spain and Italy are bringing back their newly acquired tastes, 
affecting the local wine market all the more. Bulgaria though has always 
been and still is better developed for tourism, and as I walked through 
Melnik there were a dozen shops, carts or signs for ‘wine cellars’ where one 
could taste and buy local wine. This aspect of wine tourism is one giant step 
ahead of Tikveš, which brings me to a discussion of the prospective for it. 
The prospective for wine tourism in Tikveš is great, but the problems 
with its realisation are many. For one, the wineries have little national 
government backing. This was a complaint of the Tikveš Wine Roads 
representative, Divna, as well as Dane from Stobi Winery and my neighbour 
Georgi, among others. Without collaborative advertising and national 
representation, it is difficult for a wine region to establish a name for itself at 
wine fairs and thus in the wine world. The other issue is local politics and 
culture. In Demir Kapija there is clear tension between the Napa Valley style 
Popova Kula winery, which is clearly the forerunner in wine tourism in the 
region, given its facility, location right off the main motorway, restaurant and 
overnight accommodation. Yet Divna among others scorn it and its owner, 
whom she claimed ‘always seeks to do things his way’. The local 
municipality further has issues with pollution from the winery, which did not 
have a proper sewage system installed in their hilltop location, causing 
nearby fields and waterways to occasionally be flooded with sewage. Lastly, 
there is simply a clear lack of both cooperation and vision among the grape 
growers.  
Certainly grape growers are the most likely to be in dire straits and 
their lack of optimism is understandable, but both the Macedonian 
government’s Ministry of Agriculture and the Dutch development agency, 
SVN, were investigating during my fieldwork why growers are so unwilling 
to work together in modern cooperatives. In particular, the director of SVN 
told me he wanted to know why farmers are not developing agribusiness and 
cooperatives the way it would be expected. Although some claim the shock 
of 1950s collectivisation is to blame, once that project was abandoned 
Yugoslav Titoist socialism was largely a positive experience for growers—so 
why not work together to rebuild the industry?  
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This question spawned a series of conversations for me with locals 
about such cooperatives, with the explanation often coming down to a matter 
of trust or leadership. Regarding the former, individuals do not trust one 
another and the only cooperation is that between kin, such as discussed with 
Mitko and his brother in Chapter 6, or the brothers who run the Ovošje 
Komerc business in Chapter 5. Indeed, outside of kin relations, there is little 
which assures individuals that their business partner will not steal or siphon 
off income, become nepotistic and hire only his kin, or abandon the 
enterprise altogether. 
 The other explanation was about a lack of knowledge and leadership to 
form such an enterprise. I spoke at length about this with the owner of an 
agricultural supply shop (zemjodelska apteka), Pane. To begin, Pane felt that 
cooperatives or businesses could not work without a series of skilled 
professionals such as managers, economists and oenologists (for wineries), 
and there simply is not the capital to bring these individuals into business 
together. In our casual conversation in a café, we debated the individualism 
and innate leadership of most individual farmers, and while we agreed it was 
high, he claimed it was beside the point and asserted:  
Look, business requires a positive regulated atmosphere, with a clean 
slate and little worry about past dues and future production. That it not 
what exists here. Growers here aren’t paid for 2-3 years, they owe us 
and other shops money, and they’re not certain to what end they’re 
growing the crop they are at present—many digging their grapes up, 
planting other crops, etc. Why would they work together when they 
don’t know what they’re working together on? An overall agricultural 
strategy is what’s needed here, and that can only come from the 
government, not the ‘free-market’.  
 
Pane’s points were valid ones, and led us to discuss the future and what that 
strategy should be. In his opinion, wine producers must continue doing what 
they do because of the market, yet such as Ljupčo A. asserted, the 
government and EU must increase the quota for Macedonian wine exports in 
order for the grapes (and wine) to be bought, and growers need to be 
compensated immediately. With the present conditions, including too many 
vineyards but limited ways to get the grapes and wine to market, it amounts 
to a clear loss. He said some winery owners are therefore aggressively 
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lobbying MPs to get this quota raised, and to decrease the bottled wine quota 
which goes unfulfilled by leaps and bounds.  
This brings to question what else could be produced beside grapes 
and wine in Tikveš? As far as creating wine reserves, which has been 
proffered by some locals worried about the industry, Pane claimed it is not 
necessary or practical—there is plenty of wine in the world, most wine is not 
meant for lengthy ageing, and indeed it will not last long in tanks. Ethyl 
alcohol production is one way to dispose of excess wine, but he did not know 
of anyone making it at present. There are certainly a variety of grape 
products, from raisins to juice to candies to the medicinal syrup madzun 
(only homemade at present), but also grape seed oil that could be produced 
with the Tikveš grape crop—yet no one is doing so. Beyond grapes, the 
region could return to its early 20th century and prior production and grow 
crops such as wheat, cotton, tobacco, poppies and myriad edible fruits and 
vegetables. In some ways it is doing so already, particularly the 
repeasantising individuals with their gardens and replanted vineyard plots. 
Yet the Mayor of Kavadarci’s suggestion that the region start growing 
poppies again for pharmaceutical purposes was met by the hysterical protest 
of locals.  
Therefore, producing a product is only one half (if even) of the 
equation. The real problem comes in determining what to produce and 
marketing it—both creating awareness (advertising) and getting it to 
market—and getting farmers and producers on board. The frequent replies to 
my questions of ‘why not grow/produce…’ were always ‘there’s no market 
[for it]’ (nema plasman), and given the time, energy and resources required, 
suppliers and state infrastructure are therefore seen as key to agricultural 
production. To call again though upon the ‘leader of the lozari’, Ljupčo, he 
said that the most important thing that needed to happen was the annihilation 
of the scheming and stealing at the state level (‘mangupska politika’), 
because it is indeed preventing so much good from happening. Thus there is 
a belief that both the region can prosper if such problems as corruption and 
lack of trust are dealt with, and that other opportunities for the region are 
clearly in tourism.  
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In fact, some towns, individuals and companies are already making 
headway in the tourism arena: wineries and travel agencies bring in groups of 
largely Dutch tourists, with Stobi Winery hoping to build a hotel on one of 
their large vineyards; alongside its wineries, Demir Kapija is establishing 
itself as a rock climbing destination, with an annual international climbing 
festival and the local residence of one of Russia’s most famous climbers 
there; the Mayor of the peach-town, Rosoman, wants tourists to come see the 
blooming peach trees in spring, which he claims are equivalent in splendour 
to the blooming of Japanese cherry blossoms; and indeed, individuals such as 
those who work at the market along the regional highway running through 
Rosoman are taking it unto themselves to produce goods and sell them.  
More could be done though, particularly in terms of accommodation 
and getting tourists to unique attractions, and developing these in the first 
place. Further, the country is routinely criticised for not branding products, 
and losing opportunities to other countries. The delicious roasted red pepper 
condiment, ajvar, for example, is trademarked by Slovenia (despite their 
minimal production of it), so that the ajvar produced for commercial sale in 
Macedonia must be spelled ajver—a previously unknown name for the 
product. Of greater significance and discussed in Chapter 3, since 2011 
Greece has been trying to claim hegemony over use of the name Macedonia 
on wine labels, and of worry is that Bulgaria might trademark the name 
rakija for its own brandy production. The possibilities are certainly endless, 
and the region and country will inevitably change along with the rest of the 
world as time carries on.  
In conclusion, while my thesis may be an indictment of the neoliberal 
order, I should assert that there have been some positive changes as a result 
of the wine region’s transition. The quality of wine has improved and 
markets for it outside of the former Yugoslavia and Germany have opened 
up207. Thinking then about Macedonia as a microcosm of the global order—
individuals reacting to internationally induced changes and creating 
opportunities in order to bring fortune to their families—only now is the 
dissolution of socialism really being played out; a new generation born after 
                                                 
207 The New York Times even listed the Tikveš Winery’s Vranec as one of the top five red wines to 
consider in the 2014 holiday season.   
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the breakup of Yugoslavia who know no guaranteed employment and 
accompanying benefit—vacations, pensions, a passport they can freely travel 
anywhere with, and the entitled mindset—are engaging with society in new 
and different ways, and increasingly commanding it. They only know that 
they have to do what their forefathers did, which is to work hard and follow 
the rainbow to ‘the pot of gold’ on the other side. Incidentally, rainbow in 
Macedonian is vinozito—wine [coloured] grain. 
 
 Final conclusion 
As modest an effort as this thesis surely is, it remains my hope that it will 
contribute something of value to scholarship. Given that there has not been a 
recent foreign assessment of the Tikveš region outside of the lens of 
development, and of Macedonia much beyond issues related to inter-
ethnicity, nationalism and post-conflict, I hope that this thesis provides a 
window into the people there—how they live, work, socialise and consume. 
Indeed, I wanted to write a thesis that would not only support evidence for 
some obscure academic topic, but that would also serve to inform curious 
readers about the human factor of Macedonian society. I have tried not to 
personally worry about documenting a disappearing world or customs, for 
loss and replacement is the nature of life everywhere on a daily basis, and I 
have been comforted by the resilience and flexibility of the culture(s) I 
encountered in a region such as Tikveš. 
What I wanted to do was present the ordinary culture and lives of the 
Macedonians living there, and indeed the micro-level culture of how they are 
adapting to the change at hand through their shopping, politicking and 
socialising. Thus I tried to carry out such a task, though have admittedly 
struggled to present it and wrap it into the larger discussion and context of 
what is perhaps post post-socialist life in Macedonia. For the world has 
changed significantly in the last two and a half decades, and in continuing to 
do so it is always necessary to re-focus the lens of intellectual observation.  
As for the argument of repeasantisation, I again assert that this work 
is not meant to be considered a part of peasant studies but that it allows us to 
realise that a reversal of productive modes is possible given certain political 
and economic conditions. The situation is in fact similar to what Wolf (2001) 
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found, where a peasantry can be re-formed when individuals or families 
retreat from the market and cash economy into one of self-sustenance. As to 
why there is not a violent resistance and reaction in such situations, Wolf 
also points out that individuals living through transition (even if permanent) 
often become ‘spectators of political struggles, or they may fantasise the 
sudden advent of a millennium, without specifying for themselves and their 
neighbours the many rungs on the staircase to heaven’ (p232).  
This makes it apparent that the political breaking point of such rural 
inhabitants is remarkably high. To reach that point requires an unusual 
worsening of their plight, and the conditions under which they live and 
suffer. Whatever the precise factors, be they economic, political or social, 
they all increase the possibility of unpredictable events and disorder, which 
in turn disturbs a sense of routine and daily survival. These forms of chaos 
and uncertainty therefore make for ‘a willingness to see existing institutions 
as disorderly and…illegitimate’ (ibid, p233), and as I argue in this thesis on 
the transition in Tikveš, for those suffering to latch on to notions such as the 
‘wine mafia’ and ‘thieving state’.  
Then again, as I cited in Chapters 2 and 6, Chris Hann (2006) said of 
neoliberalism that it is ‘the notion of everyone acting as an entrepreneur’ 
(p7). Neoliberal ideology then, just as any successful ideology, is based 
partly in people’s lived experiences, where successful ideologies are 
grounded in our general individual experiences and attempt to reconstitute 
and represent them in a way that extracts consent to certain policies, 
institutions and ideas (Eagleton 1991). Through minimal state intervention in 
their lives individuals are ‘free’ to pursue their interests, though they must 
bear the costs and responsibility to do so—hence the notion of the 
repeasantised, stoic individual. 
I hope that this thesis contributes to the area of economic 
anthropology, as although it is in many ways as diverse as all of 
anthropology, by focusing on shifting economic conditions as a result of 
privatisation, marketization and development, and considering the rationale 
of modern finance behind it, I feel confident that the reactions to the 
‘transition’ in the form of new forms of socialisation—such as those among 
kin-neighbours discussed in Chapter 6—are key aspects of economic 
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anthropology. My thesis therefore marks the beginning of further 
ethnographic activity, and many of the issues included herein (and many left 
out) will undoubtedly need further investigation. Indeed, assessing 
perceptions of inequality, along with the relations between finance and 
democracy—and how regulation of the former can help ensure a better 
realisation of the latter—would be pertinent to this project and making sense 
of the future of Tikveš and Macedonia, as well as the rest of the constantly 
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Appendix I—Research Questions 
As my research covers a range of topics, my research questions reflect the 
‘macro’ view of minutiae which I intend to observe and seek to understand. I 
therefore have two sections of questions: the broader and the more specific 
questions I intend to address.  
 
In broad terms, the following research questions will be addressed: 
• How have resources changed since 1991 and in the past decade? How 
were conditions different under and immediately after socialism in 
Tikveš?  
• If Yugoslav industrialisation meant the destruction of peasantry, then 
what does post-Yugoslav privatisation mean? A return to the peasantry? 
• How is grape growing changing as an occupation, and what do such 
changes mean for individual identities, values and social relations of 
production? 
• To what extent are growers able to keep growing because of reliance on 
semi-socialist conditions—reliance on another source of and thus dual 
income? 
• How are free-market changes—private and governmental—affecting 
community relations, livelihoods and trust in each other and the 
government? 
• What do the CAP, IPARD funds, and EU accession and development 
policies mean to locals in terms of their perceptions of them, and the 
effect such policies have on the growers and their communities?  
 
In more specific terms, the following research questions will be addressed: 
• What aspects of change are a legacy of socialism, and which are 
responses to the change itself? Has maintenance of private plots helped 
growers be committed and take initiative with the land? 
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• How does cultural variation within Macedonia and the region itself 
affect grape-growers in Tikveš? What do the words ‘reform’, ‘transition’ 
and ‘privatisation’ evoke in growers and locals?  
• Does ‘retraditionalisation’ include a return to patriarchy and zadruga-
like collaboration, or limited household choice and material 
consumption? Is there increased barter? 
• How do debts and employment affect the buying and selling of labour? 
Are payments made in kind or in cash? 
• What broader economic changes can be traced through the labour force? 
How are any bottlenecks in labour resolved?  
• How have reform and privatisation contributed to the growth of the 
informal sector (and at a time when EU mandates attempt to rein in on 
precisely such activities)? 
• How do growers perceive their relation to the state and market? What 
‘compromises’ are being made? 
• What is the significance of agriculture, formally and informally? How 
does this compare to other parts of the country and elsewhere in the 
Balkans? Is there any increasing economic manoeuvrability in local 
agriculture due to outflow or migration by the younger generation?  
• Who owns the land and how much public land is being farmed? 
Moreover, as Hann asks, what different meanings of the land exist and 
how do these affect social relationships? If land is a commodity then 
how does the agricultural sector stand in relation to other sectors?   
• Tenants tend to seek security through accepting outside controls over the 
arrangements of production and distribution, whereas peasants retain 
greater control of their processes of production. Is the former giving way 
to the latter in Tikveš? 
• What action are growers taking (if any)? Is there increased 
collaboration, adaptation, entrepreneurship, taking up of other work, 
migration? Are any [new] agri-business or co-operative associations 
being formed by them?   
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• What power do the growers have? If socialism provided a connection to 
the state and this tie has been severed (or severely damaged) what are 
the implications on state power and legitimacy?  
• How many are solely growers by occupation (‘zemjodelci’)? How are 
privatisation and the changing market affecting perceptions and realities 
of grape-growing as an occupation? Does the ‘habitus’ of the 
community reject the free market and de-regulated agricultural sector?  
• How are growers helping or hindering each other’s success, and why? 
Why don’t they trust each other? 
• How do politics and political party affiliation affect growers’ ability to 
sell grapes? Are there some buyers who will only buy from fellow party 
members? How does the political divide affect growers’ frustration, or 
willingness to acquiesce, compromise?  
• With wine the end product in Tikveš, there is undoubtedly an 
assessment to be made of it—its production, consumption and value. 
What criteria do growers and locals use in discussing wine, and what 
sort of gradations exist? 
• How are the mundane actions of growers and other locals affecting the 
development and transition process? Is there any optimism among 
growers that they have more control now? 
 
Field Lead-in Questions:  
• What percentage of agricultural production do grapes make up in your 
town/village? 
• How have growers been reacting to the grape crisis? 
• Have you received any of your due payments for the 2009 or 2010 
harvests?  
• Have growers or other individuals been producing wine or rakija? Is this 
an increase or even new process compared to before?  
• How does home production differ compared to five, ten or twenty years 
ago? 
• How does grape production and the industry surrounding it differ 
compared to five, ten or twenty years ago?  
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• What is the current state of buyer-producer relationships in the wine 
sector? 
• How is grape growing as an occupation changing? Would you say your 
standard of living is worsening as a result? In what ways? 
• What do you think should be done to improve the situation? 
• Is anyone you know (im)migrating, looking for other work? 
   
 
Appendix II—Maps  
 
 
Figure 1. Ottoman era Macedonia208 
 
                                                 













Figure 3. The Tikveš region (shaded), with the three dots representing the 




Figure 4. The Municipality of Kavadarci, including the four other Tikveš 
towns/municipalities of Gradsko, Rosoman, Negotino and Demir Kapija to 
its north and east 
